# Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics

War and World Order in
the Age of the Crusades

Andrew A. Latham

Routledge

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**To Wendy, Bernadette and Michael**
*Omnia meae debeo familiae!*

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# Preface

I began this project with the aim of contributing to the debates surrounding the "New Wars" thesis. My original goal was to develop a comparative analysis of the *historical structure of war* in the medieval, modern and emerging postmodern eras, focusing on transformations in organized violence on the temporal plane of the *longue durée*. In 2002 I published an article in which I laid out the rationale for this project, developed what I thought would be a fruitful conceptual framework and articulated some of my preliminary findings.[1] I then dove directly into the research, firmly convinced that careful attention to the more distant historical cases of medieval and high-modern war had the potential to suggest new analytical categories and heuristically useful analogies that could help highlight what was truly distinctive about the transformation of war in the contemporary era.

As I started to read the (vast) historiographical and (sparse) International Relations (IR) literatures dealing with what was to have been the first historical case, however, the focus and purpose of my project changed radically. Simply put, the more I read, the more dissatisfied I grew with the existing IR literature on medieval "international relations." To begin with, it seemed impossible to reconcile realist analyses premised on the timeless logic of anarchy with a historiographical literature that emphasized the historical specificity and uniqueness of both the medieval "state" and its derivative international order. Nor was the historical materialist literature much better. Focusing on social property relations and class conflict, this literature failed to engage seriously with what appeared to be the scholarly consensus regarding the nature of key geopolitical phenomena such as the crusades and state-centric war. Finally, it was difficult to square the constructivist literature's attempt to deny the very existence of the medieval "state" with a historiographical literature that self-consciously employed the concept of the state and did so to great effect.

Underpinning all of these dissatisfactions was a general sense that the IR scholarship had unduly exoticized the world order of late medieval Latin Christendom (*c*. 1250–*c*. 1550), treating it as both mysterious and radically different from the modern international system. On this view, a "Great Divide"—1648 in the conventional mythology of the IR field—separates the modern world from the medieval.[2] On one side of that divide is the definitively modern state and its derivative international system, changing

and evolving over time to be sure, but built around the sovereign state and anarchic state-system and therefore easily comprehensible to IR scholars trained to think (critically or otherwise) in terms of these categories. On the other side of the divide is the medieval world, an "orientalized" Other comprising an exotic congeries of ideas, institutions and structures that are so alien as to render the epoch simultaneously both irrelevant to the study of modern international relations and inaccessible to the contemporary IR scholar. The more I read, however, the more I came to suspect that what I will call the "radical rupture" perspective—which is, in fact, essential to the mythology of the IR field—was simply without warrant in the relevant historiographical literatures. While not denying the historical specificity of the world orders of early, high and late Latin Christendom, it seemed to me not only that the conceptual toolkit of contemporary IR was adequate to the task of engaging with and making sense of the medieval world (or at least the *late* medieval world), but that this world was actually of a piece with our own. Put slightly differently, as I continued to research late medieval politics and political thought it became clear to me that the decisive historical rupture (if indeed there was one) came in the early thirteenth century rather than the mid-seventeenth. IR scholarship that failed to grasp this point, or so it increasingly seemed to me, simply misread the "state-of-the-state" and the character of geopolitical relations in the late medieval Latin Christian world.

This dissatisfaction was compounded by a growing sense that the relevant historiographical literatures were not being treated by IR scholars with the respect they deserved. The "abuse of history" is an old story in political science and IR—a fact attested to admirably by scholars such as Ian Lustick, Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil.[3] As I pushed further into the history of medieval political thought and political development, however, I was struck by how poorly the relevant historiographies had been handled in the IR literature. Far too often, as I read my way through the body of IR scholarship dealing with medieval geopolitics, I was struck by lack of sensitivity to the historiographical "state-of-the-art"—that is, the current scholarly consensus regarding what is to be considered "reliable knowledge" or heuristically useful concepts and theory. Indeed, at times it seemed as if the arguments being made in this literature—about feudalism, hierarchy, sovereignty, the state, etc.—were based on texts that were a generation or two out-of-date. Nor did I see much evidence of reflection on how supporting historiographical monographs were selected or why the particular works of history adduced to support any given argument were "better" than others that might contradict the argument. Nor, finally, did IR scholars seem much interested in medieval international relations for their own sake; typically, their projects were inflected with the kind of "presentism" that most historians find more than a little troubling. It bears stating, of course, that not all IR scholars are guilty of these abuses. Moreover, even while lamenting these shortcomings, I completely understand

their collective etiology—the exigencies of contemporary academic life are such that one is seldom afforded the opportunity to develop an evolved sense of the warp and woof of an academic literature beyond one's own. This is a lamentable reality, but it is a reality nonetheless. Even so, I found the existing IR literature on late medieval geopolitics deeply dissatisfying. Ultimately, it was this dissatisfaction that prompted me to drop my original project and attempt to come to grips with the international relations of late medieval Latin Christendom in a deeper and more systematic way.

If I have been motivated, then, by anything other than the usual reasons for writing a book, it has been a desire to develop an account of late medieval international relations that does justice to both the epoch itself and to the (often contending) historiographical literatures dealing with that epoch.[4] That this era is worthy of study as a distinct and important period in the history of international relations I now take as a given. It is distinct in that it differs in significant ways from both the high medieval system that preceded it and the early modern one to which it gave way. It is important in two ways. First, as a discrete age in the history of international relations, it is important in its own right; if the field of IR is about the study of anything more than the international relations of the current moment, then late medieval international relations has a claim on our scholarly attention at least equal to that of the early modern period (and probably more so than that of ancient Greece). Second, at the risk of committing the error of presentism lamented above, understanding the international relations of the late medieval era is essential to understanding genesis of the modern world order; for it was in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the ideas and institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, the state, international law, diplomacy and many of the other core elements of what we have agreed to mislabel the "Westphalian" international system first crystallized and came to dominate the imaginative structure of European social and political elites. Put slightly differently, the "birth" of the modern world order was more a *process* (lasting several centuries) than a *moment* (whether 1555, 1648, 1714); grasping its logic, then, requires not just a snapshot of the background and details of a particular peace treaty, but a *longue durée* perspective encompassing the entire late medieval era.

That the IR scholarship on this topic must also do a better job of respecting the historiographical literature I also now take as a given. Ian Lustick, in his important work on the use and abuse of history in the social sciences, specifies a number of approaches available to scholars wishing to avoid the error of what he calls "selection bias." As Lustick puts it, the key challenge facing social scientists engaged in historically grounded research is how to decide "how the background historical narrative which is to serve as the empirical referent in the investigation [is] to be chosen? Which sources are to be consulted, which used, which discarded."[5] Lamenting the lack of reflexivity in this connection, Lustick suggests that there are in fact several

strategies for making these decisions in ways that mitigate the natural tendency to favor accounts that support one's own particular theory or thesis. In this study, I adopt the strategies Lustick labels "explicit triage" (a strategy that involves being reflexive and explicit about "the qualitative judgments that [lead] to choices of particular sources for constructing different parts of [one's] background narratives") and "quasi-triangulation" (a strategy that involves constructing historical narratives out of the overlapping claims made by historians despite working from "different archival sources and/or implicitly theoretic or political angles").[6] While not a perfect antidote to selection bias, adopting these two approaches has the salutary effect of both forcing the author to guard against it and encouraging the reader to be mindful of its potentially distorting effects. Taken together, my hope is that adopting these strategies will allow me to "build considerable confidence in the readers' minds that selection bias has been avoided."

My guiding vision for this book, then, has been to develop a theoretically governed, historically sensitive account of war as both an element of, and a window on, the international relations of late medieval Latin Christendom—one that meaningfully engages contemporary debates in the field of IR while being reflexive about the challenges associated with historically grounded social science. That being said, I am painfully conscious of the gap between aspiration and execution. Over the past five years, I have read as extensively as I could in the field of medieval geopolitics and war, but I have not read as widely as I might had my linguistic competencies not been limited to English and French. While many fine works in Italian, German and Spanish (not to mention, Swedish, Danish, Polish, Russian—the list goes on) have been translated into a language accessible to me, not all have. I recognize that this has probably skewed my perspective in ways that (by definition) I am not well placed to judge, but I do acknowledge the problem. Ultimately, though, a study such as this cannot be all things to all people: it cannot synthesize everything that has ever been written (in every language) on a topic, nor can it cover in the necessary detail all of the many topics that are of interest to potential readers. My hope, though, is that this study is sufficiently persuasive—or at least sufficiently thought-provoking—to spur others to challenge, refine, extend and/or deepen the core arguments presented in it.

I am also conscious of the fact that, to some extent at least, this is a work that falls between two (disciplinary) stools. Perhaps not surprisingly given my own training and background, it is in the first instance pitched at scholars within the field of IR. Given the nature of that field, however, some IR scholars, will judge it to be too "historical." On the one hand, some will ask "why study the distant historical case of medieval geopolitics?" I can only respond to colleagues who ask this question by stating what I now consider to be obvious: the era is important both in its own right and because of the seminal role it played in the evolution of the modern state-system. On the other hand, even among those who accept the need to study medieval geopolitics, some may judge it to be

too "ideographic"—that is, overly focused on the unique elements of a single historical case rather than seeking to develop more general law-like insights regarding political life. To these critics I say that I now believe that parsimonious generalizations can only be built on solid and appropriately detailed historiographical accounts. I do think it an important strength of political science and IR that we seek to develop generalizable insights and frameworks regarding political life and that we use historical cases to help us with this. I also, however, believe that in order to get the generalizations right we have to get the history right; that getting the history right entails the development of well-grounded analytic accounts that meet certain historiographical standards; and that developing such well-grounded historical accounts entails eschewing the simple mining of history in favor of patient and laborious scholarship that yields an understanding of both the historical facts of the case and the relevant historiography through which we interpret and understand these facts. This being the case, I ask the non-historian reader to be tolerant of my treatment of the late medieval state in particular—it is long and detailed. Given what I take to be the mispercep-tions that currently plague the IR literature, however, it is also necessary. My hope is that this lengthy overview of both the constitutive norm of "corporate-sovereign statehood" and the actually existing late medieval state will repay the reader with new theoretical or historical insights into the character of geopolitics in the late Middle Ages.

While its primary audience is the IR community, however, this book is also pitched at historians. Mirroring the objections of some IR scholars, there are likely to be at least some historians who think it too "theoretical"—that is, too freighted with all the jargon and conceptual paraphenalia of contemporary social science. Having read so many expertly crafted and piercingly insightful works of history in the course of this project, I must confess not only to considerable sympathy for this point of view, but also to being nearly seduced into writing a work of historiography rather than political science. Alas, by both training and disposition, I am a political scientist rather than a historian. While sympathetic to this criticism, I think that the goal of rendering a conceptually governed, historically sensitive account of late medieval war—and through it, of late medieval interna-tional relations more broadly—is both sound and laudable. Like all good historians, I have tried to present the argument in clear prose and with a minimum of jargon; and I have also tried to be as faithful as possible to the scholarly consensus—or, alternatively, conscious of the scholarly debates—regarding the relevant "facts of the matter." At the end of the day, however, my goal is not just to provide a sound and fruitful interpretation of war in late medieval Latin Christendom; it is also to generate theoretical proposi-tions regarding the conditions-of-possibility for war across a wide range of civilizational and historical contexts. I am always more than willing to take the time to justify this loosely "nomothetic" project; I am increasingly less willing to spend any time apologizing for it.

Writing a book seeking to explain the logic of the international relations of late medieval Latin Christendom has at times felt like "taking the cross" and embarking on one of the armed pilgrimages that were so emblematic of that era. And, as with the majority of those who embarked on such pilgrimages back then, I have accumulated a number of debts along the way. I am indebted to Macalester College for the institutional support provided during the course of this project. The College graciously agreed to accelerate my sabbatical and package it with a semester-long parental leave. This not only enabled me to complete the preparation and writing of this manuscript, but also to enjoy the first year of my son's life in a way that every father should. Both of these are blessings that I would have perhaps had to forego at a less humane institution. I would also like to thank the staff of the College's DeWitt Wallace Library for obtaining for me all manner of scholarly resources necessary to write this book. Without this invaluable support—and especially the assistance of Aaron Albertson—this project simply would not have been possible. Finally, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the students, staff and faculty of the Macalester College Political Science Department. Macalester is fortunate to be able to recruit some of the best undergraduates one can possibly imagine, and the Political Science Department seems to attract more than its share of the most able and motivated of these undergraduates. I am grateful to those students who—in my classes, tutorials and research teams—have proven to be such thoughtful critics of my ideas on war in general and medieval war in particular. More than they can ever know, I am grateful to them for their willingness to think seriously about a topic—war—that is in many ways increasingly marginalized in the academy. I am also grateful to my colleagues in the department. This is not only an accomplished group of teachers and scholars, but a group of supportive and encouraging friends. I count myself very fortunate to teach and research in such a wonderfully amiable unit of such a good college. In particular, I would like to offer a special word of thanks to my friend and colleague David Blaney, who not only demonstrated admirable forbearance when listening to me "bang on" about this project, but whose own work sustained me in my belief that there will always be a place for historically sensitive, theoretically governed scholarship in the field of International Relations.

I am indebted to several people at Routledge for nurturing and supporting this project, specifically to Laura Stearns who first commissioned this work, and to Ryan Kenney who so competently managed the production process. I would also like to thank the reviewers of both the initial prospectus and the penultimate draft for taking the time to read my work, for offering generally encouraging comments, and for providing concrete suggestions regarding how I might make my argument more interesting, relevant and compelling. I have incorporated much of what they have advised and believe that the final text is considerably improved as a result.

Some of the key arguments in this volume have been presented before. An earlier version of Chapter 4 was published in *International Studies*

*Quarterly* under the title "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom." I am grateful to Blackwell Publishers for permission to reprint this article in adapted form and to the anonymous reviewers of that manuscript—the version that appears here benefited enormously from their incisive and thoughtful comments. I am also indebted to Bud Duvall and all the participants in the University of Minnesota's International Relations Colloquium for inviting me to present the "DNA" of this project at one of their meetings back in the Fall of 2006. The resulting discussion and comments strengthened the final product immeasurably.

Finally, I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to my family—Wendy, Bernadette and Michael—to whom this book is dedicated and without whom it would have little meaning. I thank them for sustaining, inspiring and enriching me, in ways they probably can't even imagine. Wendy in particular must be credited with relieving me of innumerable family and professional responsibilities so that I could devote my leave during 2009–2010 to writing the bulk of this manuscript. For this, and for cheerily putting up with me during the course of this project, I am forever grateful.

Andrew A. Latham
Saint Paul, Minnesota
Feast Day of Saint Bernard of Clairveaux, 2011

# 1   Prologue

Over the past two decades or so, medieval geopolitics has come to occupy an increasingly prominent place in the collective imagination of IR scholars.[1] This is evident, for example, in Ruggie's analysis of the "heteronomous" medieval system of rule,[2] Fischer's attempt to demonstrate the continuity of medieval and modern structures of "international" relations,[3] Hall and Kratochwil's effort to historicize medieval geopolitics by examining some of its distinctive constitutive discourses,[4] Hall's work on the way in which historically specific discourses of moral authority constituted a source of power in medieval Europe,[5] Teschke's attempt to locate the *primum mobile* of medieval geopolitics in social property relations,[6] Alkopher's rich study of the socially constructed *mentalités* that made the crusades possible,[7] and Phillips' analysis of the medieval-to-modern transition.[8] Although these accounts differ significantly in terms of their respective analytical assumptions, theoretical concerns and scholarly contributions, they share at least one common—indeed, defining—element: a belief that a careful study of medieval geopolitics can help resolve a number of important debates regarding the fundamental nature and dynamics of "international relations." They are also linked in that, collectively, these contributions constitute a significant effort on the part of IR scholars to theorize the "hard case" of an international system putatively based on neither states nor derivative (i.e. statist) translocal institutions.

Yet as I explain more fully below, this ongoing fascination has not yet yielded an adequate understanding of the medieval geopolitical order or of the deep character of organized political violence within that order. To begin with, realist accounts suffer from a profound ahistoricism. A truly historicist account of geopolitics, of course, would start from the premise that all social phenomena (including those related to geopolitics and war) are artifacts of historically specific configurations of material and ideational forces and that as these configurations of forces change over time so too do their derivative phenomena. Realists, however, do not start from this premise. Rather, they begin with the assumption that war is a transhistorical epiphenomenon of an equally transhistorical "international" or geopolitical structure. To be sure, realists *do* recognize that war manifests itself differently in, say, the medieval and modern eras. But, for them, violent conflict

is always ultimately a function of the timeless pursuit of power under the structural condition of anarchy. Culture, ideas and *mentalités collectives* play little or no part in their explanations of organized political violence in general or medieval war in particular. For realists, war is explained in (transhistorical) materialist and structuralist terms.

Second, while avoiding the pitfalls of ahistoricism, the various historical materialist accounts suffer from what can only be described as a crippling economism; for they invariably seek to reduce medieval geopolitics to the dynamics of the feudal mode of production (and especially its associated class dynamics), treating ideas and *mentalités collectives* as derivative phenomena. But as the extant historiographical literature clearly indicates, the social logic animating the various political actors comprising the medieval Latin "international" order are *not* simply artifacts of social property relations or class dynamics. Rather, geopolitical rivalry is ultimately explicable only in terms of the dynamic interactions of certain material developments *and* developments in an analytically discrete "cultural realm." In other words, as we shall see, late medieval geopolitics can only really be explained in terms of the historically contingent convergence several social, institutional and cultural developments that produced a particular constellation of war-making units, structural antagonisms and cultural understandings of "geopolitics"—a constellation that had emerged by the middle of the thirteenth century and persisted until the mid-sixteenth. To seek an explanation for medieval geopolitics exclusively in the domain of property relations and class conflict is to overemphasize the role of brute material forces, paying insufficient attention to the autonomous role of ideas, identities and other intersubjective factors in medieval (and contemporary) political life.

Third, constructivist accounts—while providing important insights into the role of *mentalités* in constituting medieval geopolitics—typically disregard the medieval state and state-system. Indeed, it has become something of a commonplace in the constructivist literature to assume, assert or argue that there was in fact no such thing as a state in medieval Latin Christendom. As even a cursory review reveals, however, there is little warrant for this in the relevant historiographical literatures. On the contrary, among historians of medieval politics and political thought, the broad scholarly consensus is rather that there were both medieval states and a medieval international system. While acknowledging that these were different in important ways from their modern counterparts, these scholars argue that, properly historicized, the concept of the medieval state has great heuristic value.[9] As Joseph Canning puts it:

> Although states in the modern sense did not emerge in the Middle Ages, there is a usefulness in employing the term 'state' in an analysis of medieval political organisation from the twelfth century onwards, so long as the limitations involved in this usage are recognised.[10]

In denying the very existence of the medieval state, constructivists have gone far beyond Canning's sound advice to recognize "the limitations involved in this usage": they have attempted to write the state out of medieval politics. In the process, they have rendered almost invisible the fundamental dynamics of geopolitical conflict and war in the late medieval era.

This book seeks to address these shortcomings by providing a theoretically guided and historically sensitive account of the geopolitical relations of late medieval Latin Christendom. It does this by isolating the geopolitical phenomenon of "war"—unquestionably one of the most fundamental and distinctive elements of medieval geopolitics—and attempting to answer the following "how-possible" question: what were the material and cultural conditions that constituted medieval war as a historically specific geopolitical practice?[11] Put slightly differently, then, the primary goal of this book is to provide a "property theory" that can account for the material, institutional *and* ideational conditions-of-possibility for organized political violence in late medieval Latin Christendom. "Property theories," according to Alexander Wendt, "explain how things or processes are put together so as to have certain features."[12] In other words, they are *ontological constructs* that conceptually specify the nature of a social relationship, form or practice. Such theories often assume the form of models or ideal-types that provide a simplified representation of a complex reality and thus a way of grasping the variety of actual forms and tendencies in various historical settings. Using such heuristic devices to fix social patterns and dynamics lends analytical structure to a description, providing the conceptual benchmarks around which the analyst can subsequently develop meaningful interpretations of historical patterns, engage in cross-case comparison, and identify potentially significant causal regularities. A property theory of late medieval war is thus more than just a description of organized political violence in that era—it is an explanatory abstraction that enables us to answer constitutive (or "explanation-what") questions regarding how this historically specific social practice was constituted and structured.

My argument proceeds in several parts. In Chapter 2, I develop more fully the argument that the extant literature has thus far failed to provide an adequate or satisfying explanation of medieval geopolitical relations. Narrowing the focus to what I consider to be the most fundamental element of medieval geopolitics, "war," I then argue that violent political rivalry and conflict within this (or any other) world order can best be understood as an artifact of what I call the *historical structure of war*—which I define as that ensemble of political structures, "structural antagonisms" and cultural institutions that constitute the fundamental character of organized violence in an era and differentiate "war" from other forms of politics and violence. By *political architecture of organized violence* I mean those constituent units of a given world order with a significant war-making capacity, as well as the system-level social structure within which these units are embedded. By *structural antagonisms* I mean those historically

specific configurations of contradictory, incompatible or otherwise irreconcilable core interests that tend to derive from the interaction of historically specific war-making units within historically specific translocal structures. Because they involve war-making units, and because these units have at least the capacity to advance or defend their interests via armed force, such antagonisms constitute the basic conditions-of-possibility of violent conflict within a given world order. By *fundamental institution of "war"* I mean those deeply embedded socially constructed norms that specify the character, (moral) purpose and meaning of organized violence. At a very basic level, such institutions are important because they make war conceivable and constitute it as part of the repertory of "rightful actions" available to political actors in a relationship of structural antagonism. Perhaps more immediately, however, they are important in that they designate which actors are warranted to use violent means in pursuit of their interests, delimit which of these interests might legitimately be pursued via the use of armed force and determine the conditions that must be met if the use of force is to be justified. Together, I argue, these three elements establish the material and ideational conditions-of-possibility for the specific wars that punctuated the *longue durée* history of any given world order. I also argue that the world order of late medieval Latin Christendom generated its own distinctive structure of war, and that it is this that explains the distinctive sociopolitical character of violent political conflict in this era.

Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate this argument through a comparative analysis of the two major forms of war that could be said to be organic to late medieval Latin Christendom: *public war* and *religious war*. Perhaps not surprisingly, these two forms of violent conflict have sometimes been conflated in the extant literature. According to IR scholars in particular, while the medieval Church and temporal principalities (such as the kingdom of France, the city-state of Florence or the duchy of Aquitaine) may have been qualitatively different types of political unit they were all subject to the same basic imperatives and constraints regarding the use of armed force. As a result, all of these units-of-governance fought their wars for essentially the same set of reasons: for scholars like Fischer, the timeless logic of anarchy; for those like Teschke, the historically specific dynamics of feudal social property relations, and so on. Viewed through the conceptual lens suggested above, however, significant differences between these two types of war immediately come into focus. In each case, distinct patterns of violent conflict were made possible by the existence of qualitatively different forms of war-fighting units (the Church and various forms of "state"), animated by qualitatively distinct "identity-interest complexes" that generated qualitatively different configurations of structural antagonisms within the context of qualitatively distinct violence-legitimating discourses.[13] While public and religious war often overlapped or intersected, they were nevertheless analytically distinct historical phenomena irreducible to a common master variable, logic or dynamic. Treating them as such is essential to

understanding the complex patterns of violent conflict characteristic of late medieval Latin Christendom.

In Chapter 3, I begin my analysis of these patterns by specifying the conditions-of-possibility for what I have been calling "public war"—that is, war fought by recognizably public authorities over quintessentially political issues such as authority, sovereignty and jurisdiction. Drawing on the political thought of the era, I show how late medieval states (including the Empire, kingdoms, principalities and urban polities) were constituted as legitimate war-making units and invested with a core set of entailed interests in large part by a "global cultural script" comprising powerfully resonating norms of sovereignty, territoriality and the common good. Against the backdrop of what Thomas Bisson has characterized as the "crisis of lord-rulership," during the thirteenth century this script began to be enacted on different scales, through different pre-existing institutions of governance and around different configurations of social forces. As it did, states with claims regarding territory, sovereignty or other jurisdictional rights inevitably found themselves in conflicts with other states with contradictory claims. The most serious of these conflicts—i.e. those that touched on the core identities of the states involved—constituted the structural antagonisms of late medieval international society. In those (innumerable) cases where institutions such as diplomacy, mediation and law were not able to channel or contain these antagonisms, there existed an alternative institution through which structural conflicts could be legitimately resolved—just war (*bellum justum*)—though only in certain circumstances. Taken together, I argue, these three factors established the basic conditions-of-possibility for the specific public wars that punctuated the history of late medieval Latin Christendom. Making sense out of any one of these wars requires an understanding of both these underlying factors (the historical structure of war) *and* the particulars of the case in question.

In Chapter 4, I discuss "religious war," arguing that the crusades were ultimately explicable only in terms of a qualitatively different logic from the Hundred Years War—one involving the emergence of the Latin Church in the aftermath of the Gregorian Revolution as an autonomous unit of rule with a distinctive war-making capacity; the rise of a particular faction of the Latin clergy (with a distinctive set of socially constructed identities, values and interests) to a position of hegemony within the Church; and, the crystallization of radically new "crusade" discourse (*bellum Romanum*) in the twelfth century that constituted religious war as a meaningful category of collective thought and action. As a result of these developments, throughout the medieval era the Church (and secular powers mobilized by the Church) fought wars to defend, recover and expand Christian territory; to enforce religious orthodoxy; and to assert ecclesiastical autonomy and papal primacy over secular powers. While sometimes inflected by the logic of public war, religious war was not reducible to this phenomena. Rather, the roots of what subsequently came to be known as the crusades are to

be found in the constitutive ontological narratives of the clerical reform-ers who captured the papacy in the eleventh century—narratives that were deeply "religious" (rather than political) in nature and that ultimately moti-vated the post-Gregorian popes to prosecute sanctified wars against those whom they perceived to be agents of corruption and injustice in the world.

In the Epilogue, I recapitulate my general views on the character, causes and correlates of late medieval war. I then address a number of questions of interest to IR scholars: specifically, what does this study of late medieval war tells us about late medieval international relations more broadly? What does it tell us about the study of international relations beyond the late medieval case? What can such a study tell us about the historicity of war? What might this study tell us about the historical triumph of the sovereign state? And, finally, what can a study like this tell us about periodization in International Relations?

The framework employed in this book is derived in roughly equal mea-sure from IR theory and the historiography of medieval "international relations." As stated above, theoretically, it is grounded in the historical-sociological literature. This body of scholarship informs my argument that war is necessarily embedded in—and therefore expressive of—a wider com-plex of material and ideational structures, and that these structures vary considerably across time and space. Historiographically, the argument is powerfully conditioned by the extensive body of ideographic scholarship on medieval war, as well as related phenomena such as the evolution of the medieval state, the development of political thought in the late Middle Ages and the transformation of the Roman Catholic Church initiated by what is commonly referred to as the Gregorian Revolution. Close engage-ment with these literatures has led me to rethink many of my conceptual and theoretical assumptions about the nature of medieval geopolitics, lead-ing me, on the one hand, to abandon or rework some originally promising ideas and, on the other, to develop a few new ones as the need arose. The result, I hope, is an analytically more powerful and historically more accu-rate account of medieval geopolitics than is currently available in the IR literature—one that sheds light not only on the on the socio-political char-acter of war in late medieval Latin Christendom, but that can also serve as a heuristically useful framework for thinking about the deep character of war and geopolitics in other historical settings as well.

Although I engage in an ambitious effort to reconceptualize medieval geopolitics, this study is circumscribed in a number of significant ways. First, it is worth stating explicitly that it does not deal with the technology and tactics of medieval war; nor does it deal with battles, commanders or strategy; nor, finally does it address the impact of war on late medieval government and society. These are all worthy projects, but they are not mine. The focus of this study is solely on the *historical structure of war*—that is, on the ensemble of social relations, political structures and cultural norms that defined the fundamental character of organized violence and

established the deep and enduring conditions-of-possibility for the specific instances of organized political violence that punctuated the history of this era. Second, since the main goal of this book is to provide a better substantive theory of the historical structure of war, this study does not seek to uncover novel historical data or facts; rather, it attempts to provide a new conceptual framework for synthesizing and making sense of what is already known about medieval war. Accordingly, it relies heavily on the extensive secondary literatures in the fields of history and historical sociology as its basic sources of evidence. While for some this may prove a fatal weakness, the scope of the study is simply too big for new primary research. As Theda Skocpol has noted, in cases like this, "a dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research . . . would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research." As noted above, however, I do pay careful attention to various methodological issues that can undermine the credibility of any work based on synthesized findings from secondary sources. Finally, it is worth pointing out that this is not a history of medieval war, but rather an exercise in "first-order" or substantive theorizing about the ontology of violent political conflict in medieval Latin Christendom.[14] In other words, it is an attempt to develop a substantive *social theory of medieval geopolitics*—one with a particular emphasis on the role and character of organized political violence. This being the case, the goal of this study is *not* to provide a fine-grained ideographic treatment of either war in the medieval era or specific wars that punctuated that era. Rather, its objective is to specify the defining properties of war as a constitutive and fundamental element of the world order of late medieval Latin Christendom. Given this goal, a comprehensive history of medieval war would not be terribly productive.

# 2  Theorizing Medieval Geopolitics
## Scope, Context, Historiography, Concepts

## INTRODUCTION

All but the most presentist IR scholars accept the importance of understanding historical "international" systems, even if they do so for very different reasons. As a result, there is now a reasonably mature literature dealing with the state and it's derivative "international" institutions in ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, early modern Europe and high modern international society. Yet we currently lack a similarly well-developed body of scholarship on *medieval* "international" relations. On the one hand, broad comparative-historical surveys of the history of international systems—such as Christian Reus-Smit's *Moral Theory of the State*, Justin Rosenberg's *Empire of Civil Society* and Barry Buzan and Richard Little's *International Systems in World History*—typically fail to address systematically the "hard" case of medieval geopolitical relations; on the other, those scholarly works that do grapple directly with medieval geopolitics are typically far too limited in focus to provide an adequate systemic or structural account of this phenomenon.[1] This neglect has had two unfortunate consequences. First, the failure to theorize the medieval geopolitical system has left a gap in our knowledge of an era in the history of "international relations"—an era, I would suggest, that in its own right is every bit as important to the study of IR as Antiquity, the Renaissance or the early modern period. Second, to the extent that implicit or explicit beliefs about medieval geopolitics inform a number of debates within the discipline of IR, the failure to isolate, theorize and historicize the medieval geopolitical order with some degree of rigor necessarily impedes our ability to work our way through those debates. The purpose of this study is to begin to address these shortcomings by providing a theoretically governed yet historically grounded account of one of the most fundamental and distinctive elements of medieval geopolitics: "war."

  In this chapter, I start this process by specifying the phenomenological, temporal and geographical scope of my inquiry. I then proceed to provide a critical evaluation of several attempts to theorize medieval geopolitics within the IR literature, concluding that they simply do not yield—either individually or collectively—a satisfactory social theory of war in

the European Middle Ages. Next I review some of the historiographcial issues that need to be addressed in a study such as this. Finally, I outline an alternative conceptual approach to medieval war—one that is grounded in constructivism, but that avoids some of the shortcomings of the extant constructivist literature on medieval international relations.

## SCOPE: WAR IN LATE MEDIEVAL LATIN CHRISTENDOM

This study is about "war" as a key element of, and window on, the geopolitical order of late medieval Latin Christendom. But it is not about every aspect of violent political conflict in this era. It does not address, for example, military technology or tactics; nor does it attempt to illuminate the (changing) social composition of armies; nor, finally, does it say much about the conduct or logistics of particular battles and campaigns. To be certain, these are all important phenomena—and no history of medieval warfare would be complete without addressing them to at least some degree. This is not, however, a history of medieval *warfare*; rather, it is an attempt to theorize medieval *war.* There is a clear conceptual distinction to be drawn between these two scholarly enterprises. At the risk of oversimplification, the former has to do with explaining either (a) particular wars, campaigns or battles during the Middle Ages, or (b) the ways in which medieval societies prepared for, prosecuted and experienced war. It is thus about "how" and "why" specific medieval wars were fought, as well as "how" and "why" medieval wars were fought more generally. It is pre-eminently the domain of the historian. The latter, on the other hand, has to do with theorizing the socio-political conditions that gave rise to certain recurring patterns of violent conflict in the late Middle Ages.[2] It is thus more about the deep conditions-of-possibility for war: those social, ideational and institutional factors that gave rise to various types of "war-making unit," that invested these units with conflicting interests and motives (placing them in relations of structural antagonism) and that legitimized certain forms of violence while anathematizing others. It is primarily the realm of the historical macro-sociologist and the historically minded political scientist. In this study, I adopt the second of these perspectives. My goal is to develop a theoretically guided, historically sensitive account of the deep *socio-political character* of late medieval war. It is thus not a history of medieval war, but rather an exercise in substantive theorizing about the ontology of organized political violence in this era. Given this objective, I do not provide much in the way of either ideographic accounts of particular medieval military phenomena or more generic accounts of the art and science of medieval warfare. To do so would likely impede rather than advance the pursuit of my primary goal. Those interested in the history of medieval *warfare*—as opposed to theorizing medieval *war*—will thus find little of interest in this study and are encouraged to look elsewhere.[3]

This scope of this study is not only limited in terms of its unit of analysis (*war* as opposed to *warfare*); it is also limited in terms of its historical scope. Specifically, it deals with war in the late Middle Ages. What do I mean by this? Although the precise beginning and end points of the "Middle Ages" have been the subject of almost continuous debate over the last few decades, the era is conventionally understood to have begun with the "fall" of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE (marking the demise of the classical civilization of Antiquity) and to have ended sometime between the mid-sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as the result of a series of developments (changes in the character of warfare; growing royal power, the Protestant Reformations, etc.) that ushered in what has come to be known as the early modern era. Within this millennium-long epoch, three shorter periods are generally acknowledged: the early Middle Ages (sometimes called the "Dark Ages"), *c*. 500–1000; the high Middle Ages, *c*. 1000–1200; and the late Middle Ages, *c*. 1200–1500. The temporal focus of this study is the era beginning with the re-emergence of public authority in the thirteenth century and ending with the emergence of a distinctively early modern state sometime during the sixteenth century—i.e. the late Middle Ages. It touches on the *high* Middle Ages and early modern eras only to the extent necessary to highlight the distinctiveness of the world order ushered in by the emergence of a distinctively late medieval state.

This study is also limited in that it does not address what is sometimes called "private war." The reason for this is twofold. First, while the phenomenon of private war was central to the geopolitics of the high medieval era, by the thirteenth century it was no longer the defining form of war. This is not to argue that conflicts over land and wealth had gone away—they hadn't. Rather it is to make the claim, well-supported in the historiographical literature, that by the mid-thirteenth century, the private and proprietorial warfare of the high medieval era had largely given way to conflicts between public authorities over essentially political issues.[4] Second, during the late medieval era, such forms of private organized violence as did exist were considered either illegitimate (on the grounds that they were fought by those lacking legitimate authority) or not "war" at all (Thomas Aquinas referred to them as "brawls").[5] In the political imagination of late medieval Latin Christendom, only violent conflict between political entities was deemed to be war.

Finally, the geographical scope of this study is limited to Latin Christendom—i.e. to that part of the Christian world that recognized the authority of the Roman pontiff, practiced the Latin rite and shared in the cultural legacy of the Western Roman Empire.[6] Needless to say, the frontiers of this world order shifted considerably during the three centuries or so that are the focus of this study. Broadly speaking, however, what John France calls the "Catholic core"—the society that formed the nucleus of Latin Christendom—comprised "what is now southern England, France, Germany and much of Italy."[7] The Catholic fringe—also part of Latin Christendom,

but including territories more recently conquered and/or converted as a result of what historians term "the expansion of medieval Europe"—was made up of what we would now call Central Europe, Scandinavia and the Celtic lands (Ireland, Scotland, Wales and Brittany). To this must be added increasing portions of the Iberian peninsula and, after the First Crusade, the Latin kingdoms in Syria and Palestine (collectively known as *Outremer*). This study deals with the two major contiguous civilizations (Greek and Islamic), as well as the pagan lands to the north and east, only to the extent that they came into conflict either with Latin Christendom as a whole (during the crusades to the Holy Land, for example) or with some sub-set of its constituent war-making units

To summarize: This is a study of the socio-political character of violent conflict (a) between war-making units within the Latin Christian world order and (b) between war-making units within that order and others beyond its frontiers. The types of questions it seeks to address are: What were the principal war-making units populating the geopolitical system of Latin Christendom? What was the social logic governing the use of organized violence by these units (against both one another and extra-systemic polities/social formations)? What was the nature of the "translocal" structures—material and ideational—within which these units were embedded? How, if at all, did these structures inform the dynamics of violent conflict within this geopolitical system? And finally, what forms or patterns of war were generated by this historically particular constellation of structures and agents?

## CONTEXT: MEDIEVAL GEOPOLITICS IN IR THEORY

The IR literature on medieval geopolitics presents several different answers to these questions. All are embedded within a major school of IR theory—neorealism, neomarxism, and constructivism to be specific—emphasizing, respectively, the logic of anarchy, the dynamics of social property relations and the social construction of identities and interests. In this section, I critically assess each of these accounts, interrogating representative examples of each to determine whether they can provide a satisfactory explanation for war as a defining element of medieval "international relations."

### Markus Fischer: The Timeless Logic of Conflict under Anarchy

In 1992, Markus Fischer introduced medieval war as a subject of debate within contemporary IR by making the bold assertion that, contrary to the historicizing claims of Ruggie and other "critical theorists," the campaigns to the Holy Land launched by Pope Urban II in 1095 constituted a sort of "hard case" that supported neorealist claims regarding the transhistorical logic of conflict under conditions of anarchy. At the risk

of oversimplification, Fischer argued that while medieval discourse (as reflected in moral doctrine, cosmological belief systems, etc.) did in fact emphasize functional cooperation and harmonious communal relations, the "actually existing" practices of the era were dominated by the sort of behaviors that realists claim have characterized all "international" systems: the self-regarding pursuit by actors of their own interests; the formation of alliances and spheres of influence; and the use of force to resolve conflicts. Fischer concluded that medieval "anarchic actors" (castellanies, lordships, counties, dukedoms, principalities, kingdoms—and even the Church) "behaved much like modern states" and that the structural logic of anarchy, then as now, induced political actors to engage in a range of practices intended to maximize security, power and exclusive territorial control. Neither the "heteronomous" nature of the constituent units of the medieval world order nor the "communal" character of the dominant political discourses and norms of the era substantially mitigated the "structural logic of action under anarchy."[8] As Fischer put it, "feudal actors engaged in power politics *regardless of their attributes*."[9]

With respect to the specific case of medieval geopolitics he adduced to prove his point—the crusades—Fischer argued simply that the campaigns to the Holy Land were little more than a particular instance of the timeless pursuit of power by self-interested actors seeking a "share of the spoils."[10] Whatever the rhetoric of Christian unity, he argued, the reality was that the crusades were ultimately fought by "alliances circumscribed by the exigencies of power."[11] For Fischer, the structural logic of action under anarchy not only informed the decisions to launch and participate in the original crusade to the Holy Land; it also shaped the decision to divide the newly conquered territories into petty principalities (rather than turn them over to the Church or the Empire). Ultimately, he concludes, the self-regarding and inherently conflictual structural logic of action under anarchy was so strong that it decisively undermined the crusaders' ability to defend the Holy Land; as he put it, the crusaders "failed to hold the East precisely because they could not square their particular interests with the universal idea that had inspired them."[12]

Fischer's work has been roundly criticized in the decade-and-a-half since its publication, largely on the grounds of its "abuse of history," its trivialization of "critical theory" and constructivism and its misunderstanding of nature of "discourses" and "norms."[13] For the purposes of this study, I would like to highlight four deficiencies related specifically to his brief treatment of the crusades—deficiencies that not only render his account historically incomplete, but that seriously undermine his argument that the crusades demonstrate the timeless logic of competition under anarchy. First, Fischer placed undue emphasis on the motivations of individual *crusaders*, ignoring altogether the motives of the one institution actually authorized to launch a crusade—the papacy. Second, he failed to account adequately for the distinctive administrative and war-making capabilities

of the Latin Church—capabilities that set it apart from the Empire, king-doms and urban polities that defined the medieval geopolitical landscape. Third, and perhaps not surprisingly given his structuralist and material-ist theoretical commitments, Fischer was simply unable to grasp fully the motivations of individual crusaders. As Hall and Kratochwil point out, and as I shall argue somewhat more fully below, it was not the prospect of material spoils that motivated individual crusaders to "take the cross"; as the detailed empirical work of crusade historians over the last two decades has definitively demonstrated, crusaders often incurred great expenses in order to fulfill their vows and seldom had any expectation of substantial material reward.[14] Rather, the prime motive of the individual crusader was the desire to take advantage of the Church's promise to remit the sins of all those who fulfilled their crusade vows (or who died trying). Finally, Fischer's brief treatment of the crusades touched only upon the *crusades to the Holy Land*. While there is a well-established "traditionalist" historio-graphical school that maintains that the crusades to the East were the only *real* crusades, the more widely accepted "pluralist" view is that crusad-ing encompassed any Church-authorized "penitential war which ranked as, and had many of the attributes of, a pilgrimage."[15] This includes wars fought on papal authority against Muslims in Iberia, pagans along the Bal-tic coast, and schismatics, heretics and other enemies of the Church within Latin Christendom. Fischer, in common with most IR scholars analyzing medieval geopolitics, simply ignores these instances of crusading.

Taken together, these historiographical, methodological and concep-tual shortcomings fatally undermine Fischer's neorealist account of medi-eval geopolitics and medieval war. In effect, and contrary to the point Fischer was trying to make, the case of medieval war in fact highlights the heuristic *dis*utility of neorealist concepts and categories. As the histo-riography of war in medieval Latin Christendom makes abundantly clear, violent conflict in the Middle Ages was *not* simply a function of the time-less logic of anarchy. Understanding this phenomenon, therefore, requires a more historically sensitive approach—one that takes seriously many of the factors that Fischer dismissed as simply irrelevant to the study of the medieval international order.

## Benno Teschke: Social Property Relations and Medieval War

While several articles dealing with medieval geopolitics appeared in major IR journals in the years following publication of Fischer's argument, none paid serious attention to *war* as a geopolitical phenomenon.[16] In 2003, however, this changed with the publication of Benno Teschke's extended study of the relationship between social property relations and geopoliti-cal systems.[17] While the study's primary purpose was the debunking of what Teschke called "the myth of 1648," several chapters were devoted to analyzing medieval geopolitical relations. Teschke's main argument in this

connection was twofold: first, that "the constitution, operation and transformation of geopolitical orders are predicated on the changing identities of their constitutive units"; and, second, that "social property relations . . . primarily define the *constitution* and identity of these political units."[18] On this view, medieval geopolitical relations were largely a product of the contradictory strategies of social reproduction pursued by enserfed peasant producers on the one hand and an exploitative nobility on the other. "These strategies" he argued "determined the territorial and administrative properties of the medieval polity . . . and reveal the character of medieval geopolitics as a culture of war driven by systematic reinvestment in the means of coercion and (geo)political accumulation."[19]

Against this backdrop, Teschke characterizes medieval war in the following terms. First, he argues that war in the Middle Ages was a function of "political accumulation": given the nature of feudal mode of exploitation, rival lords used armed force to acquire wealth-generating land and to compel peasants to work that land and surrender whatever economic surpluses it generated.[20] Teschke then goes on to analyze what he identifies as the two principal forms of war in medieval Latin Christendom. The first of these was the "feud"—a form of organized violence endemic to the medieval Latin Christendom. This he explains as being a form of "legal redress" arising out of the inevitable and ubiquitous conflicts between subordinate lords attempting to maximize their autonomy and superordinate lords seeking to impose their will and maintain the obedience of their vassals.[21] The second major form of war addressed by Teschke is the war of conquest and colonization. In this connection, he argues that the violent expansion of post-Carolingian medieval Latin Christendom was a function of the development of primogeniture and the subsequent problem of excess noble cadets. Against the backdrop of localized appropriation and a culture of war, these developments, he argues, necessarily drove landless warriors to seek their fortunes beyond the frontiers of Latin Christendom. The result: four waves of violent conquest—the Spanish *Reconquista*, the German *Ostsiedlung*, the crusades and the Norman conquests—that greatly expanded the boundaries of Catholic Europe.

While Teschke introduced an important socio-political dimension to the study of medieval geopolitics writ large, ultimately his work suffers from two shortcomings that fatally weaken its capacity to illuminate the causes and character of war in the high and late Middle Ages. To begin with, Teschke's account fails to provide a convincing explanation for one of the most distinctive and significant elements of medieval geopolitical relations: the "crusades." Teschke explains this geopolitical phenomenon in terms of a confluence of two sets of material interests: those of the Church and those of the lay nobility. The interests of the former, Teschke argues, stemmed from the need to protect ecclesiastical land and treasure from increasing lordly encroachment in the aftermath of the feudal revolution. These interests led the clergy to pursue a number of strategies intended

to pacify the armed nobility, one of which entailed redirecting lordly violence "into external conquest."[22] The interests of the latter, derived from the fundamentals of feudal social property relations and the intensification of land-hunger following "the introduction of primogeniture that restricted noble access to the political means of appropriation," revolved around the need to acquire wealth-generating land and peasants.[23] As these two sets of interests converged in the eleventh century, they produced a number of expansionary geopolitical thrusts, one of which was the crusades to the Holy Land.[24] Viewed in this way, the crusades were little more than a feudal land-grab—one with a thin "religious veneer" to be sure—but a land-grab just the same.[25]

The problem with this account is twofold.[26] With respect to the motives of the Church, the notion that the crusades were a further stage in the evolution of the peace movement—i.e. that they were motivated by the desire of ecclesiastical officials to protect the material interests of the Church by redirecting lordly violence—while once popular, no longer enjoys much support among crusades historians.[27] The standard view today, as we shall see, is that the Church's motives have to be sought in the religiously derived values and interests of the post-Gregorian papacy—and especially in its core belief that the "reformed" Church had a duty to intervene actively in the world to promote justice.[28] With respect to his treatment of the motives of the *crusaders*, as Hall and Kratochwil argued in refuting Fischer's realist materialism, there is little support in contemporary crusades historiography for the claim that the crusades were an artifact of land hunger, demographic pressure or desire for a "share of the spoils."[29] Indeed, as noted above, the last two decades or so of specialized crusades research has definitively refuted the claim that the crusaders were land-hungry noble cadets or wealth-seeking colonialists.[30]

Second, Teschke also fails to provide a convincing account of the causes and character of what might be called the "public wars" of medieval Latin Christendom—i.e. wars fought by "states" to defend their rights and advance their interests. To be fair, Teschke's analysis of medieval geopolitics is really a study of *high* medieval geopolitics—he provides some analysis of the late medieval period (which he characterizes as a period of "non-exclusive territorial anarchy"), but doesn't really probe the logic of this system in the same way as he does the earlier period (which he calls "personalized anarchy"). If he had, he would have had to pay much more attention to the distinctive political logic of this period introduced by the revival of public authority. Perhaps ironically, then, although his is a political Marxist account, *politics* as such do not figure very prominently in his analysis of later medieval international relations. While Teschke has much to say about the expansion of Latin Christendom during the high Middle Ages, and clearly recognizes that an important transition took place in the late Middle Ages, he has little to say about political competition and conflict within Latin Christendom during the *late* medieval era.

Perhaps ironically, Teschke's account shares one important weakness with Fischer's: they both rely on a problematic understanding of "interests." On the one hand, while there are important differences among its classical, structural and neoclassical variants,[31] realism is to a great extent premised on the assumption that states' primary interests—survival, power, security, wealth—are material and objective, analytically separable from (inter)subjective ideas, norms and institutions.[32] Reflecting this, Fischer argues that, whatever the rhetoric of Church officials and the lay warriors who actually did the fighting, the crusades were really motivated by nothing more than the (timeless) pursuit of power and wealth. On the other hand, and at the risk of eliding important differences among various sub-traditions,[33] Marxist theories are also premised on the assumption that core interests are material and objective—in this case, derived not from the structures of anarchy, but from an agent's location within a mode of production/exploitation. In Teschke's political Marxist account of the crusades, the crystallization of a new pattern of social property relations (banal lordship) in the aftermath of the feudal revolution gave rise to a class of predatory nobles whose primary interest lay in maximizing wealth through the acquisition of productive land. This "land hunger," coupled with the self-interested efforts of the Church to redirect lordly violence away from its own material possessions, in turn gave rise to a strategy of "political accumulation" focused on conquering and colonizing the Holy Land.[34] In common with Fischer's realist analysis, ultimately this account of Church and crusader motives is rooted in objectivist and materialist assumptions.

There are at least two problems with such accounts, however. First, as discussed elsewhere in this volume, there are serious *empirical* challenges to the claim that the desire for *material* gain underpinned the crusades. Indeed, the current consensus among specialized *crusade* historians is that neither the Church nor the typical crusader were primarily motivated by such interests. This is supported by theoretical work that demonstrates that actors can be motivated by a range of interests—moral, axiological (norm-driven), etc.—that do not directly affect their material well-being.[35] Second, and perhaps more importantly, there are significant *conceptual* challenges to the assumption that actors can in fact even have "objective" interests— that is, interests that are independent of human thought.[36] As constructivists and other reflectivists have long argued, interests are not analytically separable from ideas, but are the products of inherently social *interpretive* processes—processes that produce specific and meaningful understandings of what constitutes both an actor's interests and threats to those interest. On this view, interests cannot merely be assumed; they must be specified through a careful examination of the intersubjective and institutionalized forms of knowledge, consciousness, "common sense" and identity that allow social actors to understand—and thus act in—the world.

Taken together, these weaknesses pose serious challenges to the historical materialist argument that war in later medieval Latin Christendom was

a function of social property relations. Put simply, a close examination of the religious and public wars of the era—grounded in contemporary state-of-the-art historiography—strongly suggests that it is not sufficient, as Teschke does, to reduce a heteronomous "international" system like Latin Christendom to a single unit-type and then explain system dynamics in terms of the constitutive logic of this unit-type (social property relations). Rather, the medieval geopolitical order must be understood as comprising two basic types of war-making unit, each with a distinctive constitutive logic (and entailed interests and motives): the Church and the State. This is the very meaning of "heteronomy." When attempting to grasp the logic of any given world order, this suggests the need to map both the constellation of unit-types comprising that order as well as the socially constructed interests of each unit-type. Social property relations may well be part of the equation—indeed, as John France has ably demonstrated, understanding the logic of high medieval "proprietary war" requires attention to precisely these relations—but it simply does not constitute a sort of master variable capable of explaining the "constitution, operation and transformation of geopolitical orders."[37]

## Tal Dingott Alkopher: Religious *Mentalités* and the Social Construction of the Crusades

Most recently, Tal Dingott Alkopher has published what is perhaps the most sustained and focused analysis of medieval religious war in the IR literature.[38] Arguing from a constructivist perspective, Alkopher sets out to provide a constitutive explanation of the crusades by specifying the *mentalités* that made the crusades both possible and meaningful. As she puts it, the goal of her article is to make use of "a unique French literature focusing on the medieval, and specifically the crusaders' *mentalité*, to expose deep structures of identities that informed, indeed, *constituted*, medieval practices in general and the crusades in particular."[39] Focusing on Frederick II's crusade of 1229, Alkopher analyzes a variety of different discursive themes or "focal points"—Holy War, Christian chivalry, Jerusalem, redemption, the Cross and the apocalyptic monarchy—to demonstrate how Frederick's decision to undertake his campaign to the Holy Land, inexplicable from a realist perspective, is both comprehensible and predictable when viewed through a constructivist lens.

　　Alkopher constructs her account of the crusades exclusively out of the raw materials provided by what might be called the "religio-political" school of crusades historiography, rejecting (for evidentiary purposes, at least) the accounts advanced by the alternative "socio-political" school. Over the past thirty years or so, specialist crusades historians—including such influential scholars as Alphonse Dupront, Jean Flori, Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Norman Housley, Thomas Madden and Jonathan Riley-Smith—have largely disconfirmed the (materialist) socio-political thesis

that the crusades were driven by a pervasive land-hunger derived from the dynamics of feudalism and demographic pressures associated with the development of primogeniture.[40] In its place, they have further developed the "religious" explanation—first articulated in the immediate postwar era by scholars such as Étienne Delaruelle and Paul Alphandéry—demonstrating through meticulous empirical research that the motives of both the Church and the crusader were located less in the realm of material interests than in the sphere of religious belief.[41] On this view, the crusades were first-and-foremost an artifact of the religiously derived discourses that both constituted the agents that populated medieval Latin Christendom and that imbued those agents with historically specific needs, values and interests. While conceding that more mundane considerations were often at play, proponents of this perspective conclude that the available empirical data simply do not support the claim that either the Church or the armed nobility were motivated primarily by material interests such as the pursuit of land or booty.

Alkopher's article constitutes an important contribution to the IR literature on medieval war for several reasons: it is the first sustained study of the crusades in the IR literature; it self-consciously undertakes to develop a constitutive (rather than causal) theory of the crusades; and it highlights some of the *mentalités collectives* that constituted crusading as a meaningful category of thought and action in the corporate imagination of the Latin Christian warrior nobility (including kings and emperors). Ultimately, however, her constructivist account of the crusades falls short of the mark. To begin with, in common with almost everyone else, Alkopher fails to consider the crusades beyond the Holy Land, largely ignoring the campaigns in Iberia, the Baltic region and against various enemies of the Church within Christendom. Second, she fails to theorize the *ecclesiastical* motives behind crusading; focusing almost exclusively on the motivations of individual crusaders (and especially Emperor Frederick II), she offers no real insight into the socially constructed identity and interests of the post-Gregorian reform papacy—the social force that both "invented" the crusade and subsequently wielded it as an instrument of "foreign" policy. Finally, even though she talks about the "institutionalization" of the crusade,[42] Alkopher fails to distinguish between, on the one hand, the broad *mentalités* that made the crusades meaningful/appealing to *individual crusaders* and, on the other, the concrete "social institution" that actually produced and reproduced both the "crusade" as a legitimate instrument of papal statecraft and the "crusader" as a historically specific identity formation with an (entailed) portfolio of interests. Understanding the former, which established the conditions-of-possibility for *participation in* a crusade, is doubtless important; understanding the latter, which established the conditions-of-possibility for *the "crusade" itself* (as a category of thought and action within the collective imagination of both ecclesiastical officials and the laity), is crucial. Given these weaknesses, and despite

her very real contributions to the constructivist IR literature on this topic, Alkopher ultimately fails to provide a satisfying constitutive explanation for the crusades to the Holy Land, let alone for crusades more generically or the deep "social (and religious) meanings that constitute war."[43]

To conclude: existing neorealist, neomarxist and constructivist studies ultimately suffer from too many limitations to provide a satisfying account of geopolitical conflict and war in the later Middle Ages. In order to overcome these limitations, what is needed now is a theoretically governed yet historically grounded account that (a) treats the medieval era not as a primitive, exotic and wholly different "other," but as a historically specific international system susceptible to analysis using intellectual tools readily available to the contemporary IR scholar; (b) takes seriously the socially constructed identities and interests of both the late medieval "state" and the late medieval Church; and (c) is cognizant and respectful of the historiography of geopolitics and war in late-medieval Latin Christendom. This is the task of the rest of this book.

## HISTIORIOGRAPHICAL ISSUES: MITIGATING "THE ABUSE OF HISTORY"

Before proceeding with this task, though, it is necessary to address some of the historiographical issues that underpin the specific weaknesses discussed above—especially those issues falling under the broad heading of the "abuse of history." The abuse of history, of course, is an old story in political science and IR, a fact attested to admirably by scholars such as Ian Lustick, Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil and Andreas Osiander.[44] Osiander diagnoses the problem thus:

> Almost never in IR literature is history discussed with anything approaching scientific rigour. When history is brought up in IR, there is no mention of the latest monographs or articles in historical journals, no taking sides in ongoing controversies among historians, no discussion of the available evidence and its problems, and no awareness that historians will occasionally discover something new or, more frequently, come up with new interpretations.[45]

He goes on to argue that for both the general public and most IR scholars, history "is really myth, and serves the function that myth usually serves: it explains origins, creates shared identities, justifies action, and inspires behaviour."[46]

Without necessarily agreeing with all of these critiques, it is clear that existing IR accounts of medieval geopolitics suffer from many of the historiographical shortcomings identified by Osiander. With respect to the questions addressed in this study, four stand out as particularly troubling. First,

existing IR accounts tend to draw selectively on the works of what might be called the "rupture school" of medieval political historiography, largely ignoring contradictory arguments advanced by members of the opposing "continuity school." According to the rupture thesis, what Sverre Bagge has called a "Great Divide" separates the medieval and modern worlds. On this view, a major historical rupture occurred sometime between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (accounts vary)—a rupture that decisively ended the medieval era and ushered in the modern era. In the realm of political *thought*, this view takes the form of accounts that emphasize both significant transformations in political discourse during this period and the incommensurablity and even mutual incomprehensiblity of political ideas on either side of the Great Divide. For late nineteenth-/early twentieth century German medievalist Otto von Gierke, the moment of rupture was the shaking off of the theocratic constraints on political thinking that took place in the wake of the Renaissance and Reformation;[47] for mid-twentieth century French medievalist Georges de Lagarde, it was the decline and eventual disappearance of medieval corporate doctrines in the sixteenth century;[48] and for late twentieth century English/New Zealand historian John Pocock, it was the "Machiavellian moment"—a juncture in the history of Latin Christendom marked by profound discontinuities in concepts of citizenship and authority as reflected in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli.[49] Wherever the temporal break point is located, however, proponents of this school agree that the political ideas shaping the modern world were qualitatively distinct from those informing the medieval one. To varying degrees, they also agree that these ideas were so different that they were "mutually incomprehensible on either side of the medieval/modern divide."[50]

In the realm of political *development*, the rupture thesis takes the form of an argument—advanced primarily by certain historical sociologists, historians of the early modern era, members of the French *Annales* school and German medievalists—that "real" states were the product of changes in the modes of production and/or destruction that took place in the early modern era.[51] Prior to these changes, proponents of this view broadly agree, systems of rule were "feudal" in nature—that is to say, they were based on lordships and chains of lordships networked via the institution of vassalage. On this view, states—to the extent that the term had any relevance at all in this era—were little more than semi-institutionalized feudo-vassalic networks culminating in a king or some other powerful prince. As a result of geopolitical competition and/or political-economic transformation, however, during the late medieval era several new forms of rule evolved. One of these—the territorial kingdom—eventually swept the others aside, ushering in a new international order made up exclusively of states. In Bagge's terms: on the medieval side of the Great Divide feudal systems of rule prevailed; on the modern side, the sovereign state did.

There can be little doubt that the extant IR literature on medieval geopolitics is both rooted in and reflective of the assumptions and arguments

of the rupture school of historiography. As even a cursory review of this literature suggests, IR scholars tend to assume, assert or argue that a massive *caesura* separates the late medieval and early modern eras, drawing heavily on the work of historians from the rupture tradition to support that view. In my judgement, however, this is highly problematic, constituting a historiographical misstep that simply cannot go unremarked or unaddressed. Why do I think this? Not, to be crystal clear, because of any deficiencies inherent in the rupture tradition itself. This body of work is a well-subscribed, mainstream historiographical perspective and one would be hard pressed to make the case that it is somehow marginal, outdated or simply wrongheaded. Rather, following Ian Lustick, I am arguing that the answer to this question lies in the way in which IR scholars have used the available historiography to build, test and/or falsify claims related to late medieval geopolitics. According to Lustick, political scientists engaged in historically grounded research tend to be unreflexive about the way in which they draw on the work of historians.[52] They tend not, for example, to reflect on the way in which historical "data" are selected to develop, test or falsify theoretical claims. Nor, he argues, do they spend much time thinking through why the particular historiographical works adduced to support any given argument are "better" than others that might contradict the argument. The result: a tendency to draw exclusively on those historiographical accounts "that accord with the expectations about events contained in the concepts they deploy and the theories they seek to test."[53] Scholars end up "picking and choosing from all historiography the bits [they] need for a most convenient background narrative." Contradictory facts or accounts are either ignored or, when acknowledged, dismissed as "irrelevant," "inaccurate" or (ironically) "biased." My view is that, to varying degrees, extant IR accounts of medieval geopolitics are guilty of precisely this kind of selection bias. One finds in most of these works little demonstrated awareness of alternative accounts; little discussion of the grounds on which source material is selected; and little reflection on the implicit theoretic commitments, biases and limitations of that source material.[54] In short, the extant literature is characterized by a general tendency to pick and choose the "bits one needs" and a concomitant failure to take the kinds of steps that would build "confidence in readers' minds that selection bias had been avoided—not least by providing them with the means to replicate the readings and inferences involved."[55] Perhaps not surprisingly given that the point of departure of much of this literature is to explain the crossing of the medieval/modern Great Divide, the result is a body of work that unconsciously presents the (contestable and contested) rupture perspective as if it were the objective Historical Record—that is, as if it were an unproblematic background narrative that could be used to help frame, test or falsify theoretical claims regarding the "triumph of the sovereign state" or the emergence of the modern system of states.

   In this study, I try to avoid the pitfalls of selection bias by purposefully introducing a countervailing perspective—what Cary Nederman has called

the "continuity thesis." According to this viewpoint, the truly epochal breaks we should be concerned with took place in the twelfth and the eighteenth centuries, with the period in between constituting a single historical era unbroken by any medieval/modern Great Divide. In the field of political *thought*, the continuity perspective principally takes the form of the argument that by 1200, at the latest, a concept of sovereignty had crystallized in Latin Christendom and that this persisted essentially unchanged until about the time of the French Revolution. To be certain, proponents of this perspective—including such influential scholars as Brian Tierney, Francis Oakley, Kenneth Pennington, Susan Reynolds, Cary Nederman and Janet Coleman—acknowledge the essential historicity of the medieval understanding of this concept;[56] there is a general recognition in this literature, for example, that at the level of both ideas and practices, medieval sovereignty was not exactly the same as its modern counterpart. They insist, however, that—whether referred to as *maiestas*, *superioritas*, *potesta absoluta*, *plenitudo potestatis* or *merum imperium*—the later medievals had not only developed a sophisticated concept of sovereignty, but had actually put this concept into political practice as well. In other words, these historians argue, from the thirteenth century on, sovereignty—understood as the supreme authority to judge, command and legislate within a geographically defined political community—was both a powerful normative concept and a tangible political and institutional reality in Latin Christendom.[57] On this view, Bodin and Hobbes may have introduced some distinctively early modern innovations to the concept of sovereignty (relocating it from the community-as-corporation to the state, for example), but they certainly did not invent it; nor did the institutions of sovereignty, the sovereign state and the sovereign state-system materialize (as IR scholars tend to assume) sometime between the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).[58] With respect to political *development*, scholars such as F.W. Maitland, Charles Homer Haskins, R.W. Southern, Susan Reynolds and R.I. Moore echo this view, in their respective ways arguing persuasively for the emergence of a historically distinctive medieval state in the thirteenth century. Again, these scholars concede that this state differed in important ways from its modern counterpart. They insist, however, that from about 1300 on states not only existed, but that they played a key role in the political life of Latin Christendom. The essential point is that, when it comes to political thought, practice and institutions, these historians agree that no Great Divide of the sort posited by the rupture tradition existed—or, if it did, it was a feature of the twelfth century rather than the sixteenth.

My goal in this study is to minimize selection bias by taking seriously *both* the rupture *and* continuity perspectives, developing an account that synthesizes both of these perspectives into a coherent framework for thinking about late medieval international relations. To this end, I draw on the continuity perspective to develop an account that emphasizes the role of constitutive norms of sovereign statehood in the evolution of competing

state-building projects beginning in the thirteenth century. Taking my cue from the rupture literature, I then cut against the grain of this argument to make the case that, while the enactment of this systemic cultural script of sovereign statehood did in fact give rise to sovereign states (and derivative anarchic structures), the resulting states and state system was nevertheless distinctively "medieval" in nature. In other words, I draw on both the continuity and rupture perspectives to develop a picture of a unique late medieval international system—one that simultaneously reflects both the "medievalness" and, as it were, the "modernity" of political life of the late Middle Ages.[59] In effect, the picture I am drawing here is one of a "little divide" rather than a "Great Divide." Before this divide, there were distinctly *medieval* states and a distinctively *medieval* state system; afterwards, there was a *modern* state and a *modern* state system. In developing such a synthetic account, my goal is not to treat "all historiography as one unsynthesized but synthesizable Historical Record,"[60] but to see what sort of picture emerges if we bring two contending (even apparently contradictory) accounts into dialectical interplay.[61] Ultimately, such an approach not only guards against selection bias (by requiring careful consideration of both bodies of scholarship), but also against the kind of Manichean thinking that unnecessarily and unjustifiably forces medieval history into either/or frames of radical *caesura* or unremitting continuity. While there are no doubt elements of the two perspectives that cannot be brought together without violating the law of non-contradiction, seeking a synthesis of these two perspectives has at least the potential to yield an account of late medieval international relations that productively transcends the limitations and shortcomings of the extant IR scholarship.

A second historiographical shortcoming of the extant literature is its failure to acknowledge that a scholarly work can have made an important contribution to the evolution of a historiographical tradition and yet no longer be considered authoritative within that tradition. Consider, for example, the case of the eminent scholar of medieval political thought Walter Ullmann. During the 1960s, it would have been "nearly unthinkable to write about medieval legal, political and social thought without substantial reliance" on Ullmann's voluminous scholarship. Particularly influential was his argument that "the entire sweep of medieval thought [was] a conflict between descending or hierocratic or theocratic and ascending or populist conceptions of power."[62] For nearly two decades, scholars of medieval political thought treated Ullmann's ascending/descending thesis as authoritative, at least in the sense that they believed that drawing on, and citing, his work made their own scholarship more credible. Then, in 1973, Francis Oakley published his critical *tour de force* "Celestial Hierarchies Revisited" in which he thoroughly demolished Ullmann's ascending/descending thesis. Cary Nederman neatly sums up the subsequent fate of this thesis, and of its authoritative status:

While Ullmann's work continued to be cited for some years follow-
ing Oakley's attack, reliance upon his ascending/descending scheme
became increasingly reserved and qualified among scholars, who often
made references to the caveats noted in 'Celestial Hierarchies Revis-
ited'. . . . Following in Oakley's wake, other scholars commenced a
more or less systematic reappraisal of Ullmann's leading hypothe-
ses. . . . Thus, the elements of Ullmann's framework that were most
provocative and attracted the greatest attention may safely be declared
dead and buried among serious scholars. By 1992, Anthony Black was
able to declare the ascending/descending model "simplistic," calling it
the kind of generalization "that would be laughed at by specialists in
other fields."[63]

The immediate point, of course, is that while Ullmann remains a *signifi-
cant* figure in the evolution of the scholarly field of medieval political thought,
he is no longer treated as current or *authoritative*. The more general point is
that, in history as in IR, the state-of-the-art evolves over time. The discovery
of new evidence and/or the advent of new interpretations, coupled with the
sociology-of-knowledge dynamics particular to any given field of knowledge,
constantly generate Schumpeterian waves of creative destruction in which
canonical works are critiqued, revised and ultimately superseded on empiri-
cal and/or conceptual grounds. As a result, very few works survive more than
a generation or two with their authoritative status intact. Failure to grasp this
reality can lead scholars into the error of citing works that are important but
outdated—"magisterial but passé" in Cary Nederman's pithy phrase—and
this, in turn, cannot but have the effect of undermining the credibility of the
historiographical argument being advanced.[64]

What does all this have to do with the extant IR literature on medieval
geopolitics? Put simply, the tendency to seek and employ only confirm-
ing accounts, combined with a failure to distinguish historically *significant*
from historiographically *authoritative* works of scholarship, has resulted
in much of this literature being grounded in works that are no more cur-
rent than Ullmann's. It is not uncommon in the IR literature to find key
conceptual claims supported in whole or part by scholarly works that are
a generation or two out-of-date. In addition to Ullmann, for example, one
finds IR scholars grounding their core arguments in the historiographi-
cal works of Otto Brunner, Marc Bloch, Georges Duby, Hans Delbrück,
Francois Ganshof, Otto Hintze, Joseph Strayer and Steven Runciman. To
be certain, many of these works are scholarly masterpieces—they are eru-
dite, innovative and, to varying degrees, revolutionary in the impact they
have had on their respective fields of scholarship. None, however, would
be considered by historians today either to represent the current state-of-
the-art in late medieval historiography or to provide authoritative grounds
for contemporary arguments. Having been challenged, found wanting and

ultimately superseded by the works of subsequent generations of scholars, these works are no longer used by contemporary historians to support their scholarly claims. Neither should they be used by IR scholars to support theirs. While this might seem obvious, even a cursory review of the literature indicates that it is an injunction too often honored in the breach rather than the observance.

In this study, I try to avoid this historiographical pitfall by being as sensitive as possible to the status of the sources I cite. I avoid relying on outdated or superseded sources, basing my argument instead on scholarly works that represent the current state-of-the-art. Some of these works are of recent vintage, some may properly be thought of as classics. While subject to the normal challenges of academic debate, however, none of the sources I use have been definitively discredited or judged obsolete or outdated.

A third historiographical shortcoming of the extant IR literature is what I will call its "soft presentism." Presentism, of course, refers to "descriptions or analyses of the past based on the vantage point of the present."[65] In its most extreme or "hard" form, it assumes the form of whiggishness, broadly defined as the tendency to see the present as an inevitable consequence of the past and to assume that contemporary reality is the culmination of the inexorable march of progress. In this version, the current moment represents the apogee of social or historical development and historiography plays the political role of endorsing and celebrating this moment. In its less extreme or "soft" version, presentism still refers to analyses of the past based on the vantage point of the present, but it is less teleological and triumphalist. Soft presentism, in other words, can perhaps best be understood as the tendency to view history through the lens of contemporary questions and concerns in order to illuminate the present rather than the past. Such a perspective is problematic in that it (a) gives rise to developmental narratives that exclude or deemphasize elements of the past that do not directly illuminate the present; (b) takes contemporary concepts out of their proper temporal context and projects them backward in time (often as a gauge for disproving the existence of ideas or institutions);[66] and (c) inhibits efforts to develop truly historicist accounts of the past—that is, accounts that are motivated by questions about the past and that attempt to reconstruct the past *iuxta propria principia* (i.e. on its own terms).

There can be little doubt that a form of soft presentism pervades the IR literature dealing with the Middle Ages. This is not to argue, of course, that this literature fails take the past seriously. That would be going too far. It is, however, to make the claim that IR scholars typically approach the medieval era not as an object of inquiry in its own right, but as part of the broader project of understanding the emergence of the *modern* state and state-system.[67] One focus of this literature is to theorize or explain the "founding of the sovereign state system at Westphalia" (Philpott), "variation in early modern states" (Ertman), "the origins and evolution of the modern states-system" (Teschke), or "Renaissance territorialization" (Larkins).

Another is on the "the transformation of international orders" (Phillips), "international change" (Nexon), "structural change in international relations" (Spruyt). Either way, the questions that motivate these studies are not primarily about the medieval world order, but about the early modern international system. The task is to create a developmental narrative that explains the "birth" or "triumph" of the sovereign state and its derivative state system. Medieval political structures are slotted into this larger developmental narrative, but only to the extent that they help illuminate this more contemporary phenomenon. If one accepts that, from a *longue durée* perspective, the modern era is the "present," the soft presentism of the existing literature becomes indisputable.

This soft presentism has a number of consequences for the way in which the medieval order is conceptualized and portrayed. To begin with, slotting the late medieval era into the early modern development narrative necessarily reinforces the tendency toward selection bias discussed above. If one is interested in demonstrating and explaining the novelty of the early modern state, one is going to look for sources that illuminate and affirm that novelty. Unless purposeful efforts are made to mitigate this inclination, the tendency will thus be to draw selectively on the "rupture" literature described above, while ignoring or downplaying the "continuity" literature. Beyond this, soft presentism also encourages the projection back in time of contemporary concepts. In the existing IR literature, this takes the form first and foremost of reading the concept of the *modern* state backward into the late medieval era. Having defined the state in an essentially Weberian—that is to say, modern—way, and not finding much evidence of this Weberian state in the late medieval era, the literature concludes that there were simply no states in the late Middle Ages.[68] As I will discuss in later chapters, however, this move introduces both anachronism and ahistoricism into the equation, leading to a highly misleading picture of political life in late medieval Latin Christendom. Finally, such a perspective encourages a focus on "transition" and "transformation" rather than on "constitution" and "operation." That is to say, it promotes an overemphasis on the decay and transcendence of late medieval norms, practices and institutions at the expense of a careful analysis of their origins, constitutive effects and operational dynamics. While the advent of the modern international order obviously occupies an important place on the IR agenda, approaching the late Middle Ages from this perspective does tend to encourage relatively "thin" accounts of late medieval political life.

The existing IR literature on late medieval geopolitics, I have argued, is largely motivated by questions having to do with the early modern era. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that a properly historicist account of this phenomenon would begin with different questions—questions about the late medieval era as an important and interesting case in its own right, rather than as a baseline for considering the transition to something else. In this study, I adopt precisely this perspective, interrogating the late medieval

order in order to generate insights about the late medieval order. To be certain, in the concluding chapter I do reflect on what this account has to contribute to the literature on transitions and transformations. And I do say something about the transition from the high to late medieval orders. But those are secondary interests. My primary goal is to understand the constitution and operation of the late medieval world order—that is, to develop a property theory of that order—through an analysis of its historical structure of war. In so doing, I seek to at least mitigate the soft presentism of the existing literature and its more problematic consequences.

A final historiographical shortcoming of the extant IR literature is the tendency to rely on other IR scholars, rather than historians, for the historiographical "raw materials" needed to develop an account of late medieval international relations. Commenting on the "garden variety kind of bad history often found in works of political science—inaccurate statement, ignorance of vital facts, untenable interpretations, and so on," Paul Schroeder emphasizes the problematic nature of this shortcoming:

> A particularly common and objectionable source of this bad history is the tendency of political scientists to rely for their accounts of historical events and developments on the work of other political scientists rather than historians—like brewing tea from already used tea bags.[69]

This shortcoming manifests itself in a variety of ways in the IR literature on medieval geopolitics, but crystallizes most clearly in the tendency to cite John Ruggie's work on "heteronomy" as the definitive source on the political structure of medieval Latin Christendom.[70] One would be hard pressed to find a single IR work on the Middle Ages that does not cite Ruggie's work approvingly (even if with qualifications). Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find more than a handful of IR works that do not rely on this work to provide a conceptual—and even empirical—foundation for claims regarding the radical difference between the geopolitical systems of the late medieval and early modern eras. There are even those who cite this work as a kind of shorthand or substitute for historiographical argument, making sweeping claims about the heteronomous nature of the medieval international system and then citing Ruggie as the sole substantiating source for these claims. Simply put, Ruggie's work on heteronomy has achieved canonical status within the field of IR—or at least among those who self-identify as being something other than Realists. Among these scholars, it is now treated as a kind of touchstone that can be invoked to ground definitively the claim that the late medieval "international" system was heteronomous in nature.

What is wrong with this? Or, more specifically, what is wrong with citing what has become a canonical text in this way? To be clear from the outset, the problem does not lie in the scholarly quality of Ruggie's work. Subject to an immanent critique, his work fares extraordinarily well, accomplishing

precisely what it sets out to accomplish and persuasively making precisely the points it seeks to make. Rather, the problem lies in the way Ruggie's work has been used in the IR literature. As far as I can determine, his two major works on heteronomy had rather modest objectives: to challenge Waltz's neorealist reading of structure and to suggest ways of thinking about international relations in what he saw as the emerging postmodern era. Again as far as I can tell, these works were never intended to constitute an authoritative foundation for an entire scholarly literature about medieval geopolitics. If they had been, they would have been grounded historiographically in an exhaustive review of the relevant literature (they are not) and conceptually in something more than Meinecke's notion of "heteronomous shackles" (perhaps drawing on more contemporary ideas of "heterarchy").[71] They have been treated in the subsequent literature, however, as if they were authoritative and definitive statements of the Historical Record regarding the later medieval era. Whatever the strengths of Ruggie's works, (and they truly are many) they simply cannot sustain this burden—i.e., they cannot, because they were never intended to, serve as the conceptual and empirical fundaments for an entire scholarly literature. Scholarly works that fail to recognize this, and that draw uncritically or unreflexively on Ruggie's characterization of the heteronomous character of the Middle Ages, end up providing an account of medieval geopolitics that is without a convincing historiographical foundation.

In this study, I avoid relying on IR scholarship to perform work properly falling within the remit of historiography. That is not to say that I don't cite works of IR scholars or use them to advance my argument—the book is replete with such citations. Rather, it is to make the point that, when I do draw on IR scholarship, I do so not so much to make or substantiate historiographical claims as to appropriate useful concepts or place my argument in disciplinary context. For the purpose of grounding my argument historiographically, I follow Schroeder's advice and rely solely on the work of historians specializing in the (geo)political life of late medieval Latin Christendom.

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE OF WAR

In the remainder of this chapter, I develop a historical-sociological framework for understanding the "big structures" of medieval war.[72] As George Lawson argues, this mode of inquiry is characterized by its focus on the macro-level cultural, institutional and epochal contexts and configurations that shape human existence; its sensitivity to the importance of changes in these contexts and configurations; its appreciation of the need to depict and theorize the often slow-moving processes through which even the most apparently immutable structures are transformed; and its focus on "a conjunctural analysis that looks both inward at the empirical detail of

an era as well as outward at its broader causal constellations."[73] In its most compelling form, it is also characterized by a non-reductive, multilinear approach to causality that eschews the search for a master causal variable and encompasses both material and non-material factors. Finally, this mode of inquiry is recommended by the fact that it enables the kind of "world-historical" comparisons of different historical structures that allow us to "fix the special properties of an era and to place it in the ebb and flow of human history."[74]

## Isolating the Historical Structure of War

Before proceeding to develop such an account, it is first of all necessary to isolate conceptually the unit of analysis that is the object of this inquiry. One way of doing this is to approach the history of organized political violence from each of the three distinct temporal observation points articulated by the *Annales* historians (especially Fernand Braudel): the *longue durée*, the conjuncture and events-time. As I will argue more fully below, approaching the *problematique* in this way brings into focus three conceptually distinct units of analysis, each evolving at its own distinctive temporal rhythm. Most importantly, such an approach allows us to filter out the static and background noise and isolate conceptually the key unit of analysis in this study: *the historical structure of war.* As always, of course, it is important to be mindful of the fact that no theory developed in the context of one *problematique* can be applied directly in another. But this kind of cross-fertilization offers at least the prospect of developing new concepts, ideal types and/or organizing frameworks that might help us historicize war. In my judgment, the potential benefits to be derived from this cross-fertilization far outweigh whatever costs might be associated with such an effort. The result, I hope, is a theoretical framework for understanding the ontology of organized political violence that is both conceptually richer and analytically more powerful than those found in the extant literature.

### Clausewitz: Historicizing the "Character of War"

Such an analysis requires first of all that we specify clearly those elements of war that are—as well as those that are not—susceptible to transformation. This is so for several reasons. First, if war (or key dimensions of war) are unchanging and transhistorical then it is both illogical and pointless to try to historicize war. Second, if it is in fact the case that some elements of war are susceptible to change, then it is important to distinguish clearly between these and war's more transhistorical elements; for, as Colin Gray has stated on numerous occasions, failure to do so leads one to confuse changes in the "grammar" of war for changes in the "nature" of war. In turn, as Gray has also warned, this can fuel "expectations of dramatic,

systemic developments that are certain to be disappointed"/[75] Finally, failure to isolate accurately those elements of war that are in fact susceptible to historical variation is likely to result in the articulation of property theories that are confused, misleading and/or simply erroneous.

In this respect, perhaps the best point of departure is the work of *the* pre-eminent philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. At the risk of grossly oversimplifying what is a remarkably complex corpus of theoretical speculation, Clausewitz's project can perhaps best be summed up as an attempt to articulate a universal theory of war that could account for both the unchanging, transhistorical "spirit of war" (i.e. the constitutive element that is common to, indeed definitive of, all war) and the "manners," "forms" or "grammars" of war particular to each historically specific social milieu (i.e. the concrete manifestations of war within determinate social formations).[76] In the course of this life-long project, he developed two antinomies that bear directly on the issue of historicity and war. To begin with, Clausewitz drew a sharp distinction between *absolute* war and *real* war.[77] Absolute war was a philosophical abstraction he developed to theorize the essential, pure or abstract nature of war—i.e., its Platonic ideal. For Clausewitz, *absolute war* was a politically purposeless clash of combatants characterized by an inherent tendency toward "complete, untrammelled . . . absolute violence."[78] *Real war*, on the other hand, was a theoretical concept developed by Clausewitz to help him understand the empirical reality of war as a concrete historical phenomenon—a reality in which war never fully realized its true (absolute) nature. Put simply, for Clausewitz, *real* wars were the actual forms of organized political violence generated by the interplay of the tendential inner nature of absolute war and a number of (always historically specific) limiting factors, the most important of which were "friction" (the effects of time, space, human nature, and other practicalities on the conduct of war) and "political context" (the political objectives—and even internal political dynamics—of the contending states). Approaching the issue from a slightly different angle, Clausewitz also distinguished clearly between the *objective* and *subjective* natures of war. The "objective nature" of war, he argued, comprises those aspects of the phenomenon that are universal and transhistorical. These he specified as its essence—"war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will"—and its elemental characteristics, which included "primordial violence," "chance and probability," the primacy of the political, the "fog of war" and "friction." In contrast to this, Clausewitz defined the "subjective nature" of war as those elements of the phenomenon that are subject to historical change. These elements include weapons, tactics, the "art of war," strategy and even the political context within which states fight wars.

According to Clausewitz, then, war has two dimensions.[79] On one level, it has an essential "nature" that is fixed and unchanging; on another, it has a historical "character" that is subject to considerable diachronic transformation. Clausewitz thus usefully opens the door to a serious historicist

analysis of war as a key element of global political life—a necessary pre-condition for this study. Ultimately, however, Clausewitz's military historicism is highly unsatisfying and cannot, at least in unmodified form, provide the conceptual framework or tools necessary to address the questions that motivate this scholarly project. To begin with, while Clausewitz's work addresses changes in the operational-level "art of war" and the broader changes in the state-society complex unleashed by the French Revolution, it is nevertheless characterized by a general failure to isolate conceptually—and then analyze systematically—what are arguably discrete elements or dimensions of the character of war. Such an approach would entail drawing a clear conceptual distinction between what I have labeled below the *warfighting paradigm* (the way armed forces conduct combat operations on the battlefield), the *social mode of warfare* (the way state-society complexes organize for and prosecute warfare) and the *historical structure of war* (the constellation of deep structures that define the social character and cultural meaning of "war") dominant in any given world order. Clausewitz fails to adopt such a perspective, instead conflating all three sociomilitary phenomena and reducing the history of organized violence to a one-dimensional and linear series of epochs punctuated by a number of revolutionary episodes. Second, and more significantly in the context of this study, Clausewtiz's *ouevre* is characterized by a general failure to isolate and analyze the transformation of war on the most macroscopic of these three levels—i.e. on the level of world order. Sustained and focused analysis of periodic shifts in the character of war on this level would illuminate not only the role of organized violence in global political life at any given historical juncture (and, by extension, the degree to which it can be managed and mitigated); it would also allow us to historicize war by highlighting the temporal variability and mutability of war as a constituent element of world order. Such a perspective, however, is absent from the work of both Clausewitz and subsequent generations of neo-Clausewitzians.

Simply put, then, neither Clausewitz nor the neo-Clausewitzians adequately address the following key questions: *What is the unit of analysis denoted by the terms "subjective nature" or "character" of war? Is it a single unit or several? What are the defining properties of this unit/these units of analysis?* And, *to what degree and in what ways does this unit of analysis/do these units vary over time?* Unless and until these questions are answered, the analytical potential of Clausewitz's military historicism will never be fully realized and we will never be able to address adequately the questions that animate this study.

## Conceptualizing the "Character of War": Reading Clausewitz against Braudel

The *Annales* school of historiography—and especially the work of Fernand Braudel—offers a way of conceptualizing history, temporality and change

that might provide a useful supplement to Clausewitz in addressing these important questions. At the risk of eliding significant nuances, Braudel argues that large-scale historical phenomena need to be viewed from the perspective of three distinct temporal vantage points, each of which involves a deeper and wider framing of the "unit of analysis" and the forces that act to transform that unit of analysis over time. The first of these vantage points or "historical planes" he refers to as that of "events-time" or *l'histoire évé-nementielle*. This is the perspective of "the short time-span, proportionate to individuals, to daily life, to our illusions, to our hasty awareness—above all the time of the chronicle and the journalist."[80] In other words, it is the history of micro-level decisions and events, or what Ruggie calls the "incremental temporal form."[81] The second temporal observation point is that of the *"conjoncture"* or the conjunctural time-span. This perspective deals with medium-term history—that is, with "episodes" such as "Romanticism, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, [and] World War II."[82] Its temporal form or time-scale is typically measured in decades; a *conjoncture* may last ten, twenty or even fifty years. Conjunctural history, then, is the history of broad social, economic and political trends and developments— as Spruyt puts is, it is "social history that aggregates individuals and human structures."[83] Finally, the *Annales* historians insist that history be viewed from the perspective of the *longue durée* or the very long-term time-span. From this vantage point, they argue, the historian is less concerned with mere events or even medium-term episodes than with the evolution of fundamental social structures and institutions that assume a quasi-permanent character. Because it focuses on social structures, a *longue durée* historical perspective is also concerned with deeply embedded and persistent cultural institutions that may persist for centuries. The historian taking a *longue durée* view is therefore interested in the *mentalités*, "social epistemes," or forms of consciousness that define an epoch, as well as in the way that these are materialized in concrete institutions and practices.

What does all this have to do with Clausewitz and his theorization of the subjective nature or character of war? Simply put, reading Clausewitz against Braudel brings into focus three different dimensions of the character of war (and, therefore, three different units of analysis that are subject to historical transformation). From the perspective of the short time-span, the transformation of war appears primarily as profound changes in the nature of *war-fighting*, usually assuming the form of a transition from one "war-fighting paradigm" (or specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines and organizational forms) to another. As such, they do not simply involve changes in either the instruments or artifacts of warfare (e.g., tanks and long-range bombers), the enabling technologies (the internal combustion engine, armor, etc.) or the supporting or ancillary technologies (such as command, control, communication and intelligence technologies). Nor are they limited to changes in the operational concepts or techniques that shape the way in which these technologies are employed. Nor, finally, are

they concerned solely with organizational innovation. Rather, such revolutions characteristically involve the evolution of a new war-fighting vision that in turn guides a transformation of most (if not all) dimensions of the prevailing war-fighting paradigm. They are in part driven by technological change. Importantly though, they are also shaped and conditioned by human agents who, acting through and within military institutions, are attempting to bring about significant improvements in military effectiveness (i.e. the ability to prevail on the battlefield).

Approaching the study of revolutionary military transformation from the perspective of *l'histoire événementielle* is heuristically useful in that brings into focus both the revolutionary changes in the technological, operational and organizational bases of war-fighting and the nature of the transformative forces driving these changes. But while such a perspective can powerfully illuminate the transition from one war-fighting paradigm to another, it cannot and does not capture all of the significant changes currently taking place in the realm of organized political violence. In particular, a focus on changes in the war-fighting paradigm tends to obscure or occlude a number of important transformations that are taking place beyond the battlefield—changes that may be *related* to the evolution of a new war-fighting paradigm, but that are both broader and deeper in nature. Approaching the history of organized political violence from the vantage point of the *conjoncture*, however, brings into focus a picture of revolutionary military transformation that at least partly addresses these shortcomings. From this temporal perspective, revolutionary change appears as deep changes in what might be called the "social mode of warfare"—that is, the way in which a state-society complex organizes for and conducts war. Viewed in this way, episodes of revolutionary military transformation appear less as a series of (radical) changes in the dominant weapons, tactics and organizational structures of *war-fighting* and more as a profound shift in the complex of social, cultural, economic and deep technological forces that shape the way in which a society prepares for, prosecutes and experiences *warfare*.

Viewed from the temporal perspective of the *longue durée*, the unit of analysis that comes into focus when studying organized violence is the "historical structure of war." By "historical structure" I mean those deeply embedded configurations of social relations, ideas and institutions that both constitute actors and condition their (inter)actions.[84] By "war" we mean organized and purposive violence that is applied to achieve political ends.[85] Thus, the historical structure of war can be conceptualized as *the prevailing configuration of social relations, ideas and institutions that constitute the basic or fundamental character of "war" within any given world order.* Viewed from a slightly different perspective, such structures can thus be understood to be those elements of "world order" that pertain directly to the role of organized violence in social and political life. They are "historical" because they are artifacts of complex social processes and therefore

| Temporal Perspective | Unit of Analysis | Key Structural Elements |
|---|---|---|
| *Événementielle* | War-fighting Paradigm | 1. Military Technology<br>2. War-fighting Tactics/Technique<br>3. Military Organization |
| *Conjoncture* | Social Mode of *Warfare* | 1. Preparation and Mobilization for Warfare<br>2. Modalities of Warfare<br>3. Social Experience of Warfare |
| *Longue Durée* | Historical Structure of *War* | 1. Political Architecture of Organized Violence<br>2. Structural Antagonisms<br>3. Institution of "War" |

*Figure 2.1*   The temporal layers of organized political violence.

vary substantially across time and space; they are "structures" because they constitute the deep and relatively persistent ontological frameworks that generate, shape and constrain social life. Each historical structure of war can be said to comprise three key elements: (a) the *political architecture of organized violence*, (b) a constellation of *structural antagonisms* and (c) the *fundamental institution of "war."* Together, I argue, these three elements generate configurations of types of wars that can be said to be organic to the world order with which they are associated. As I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the character of any historical structure of war is conditioned by the nature of wider world order and the dynamics of world order transformation. For the moment, the important point is that these organizing elements establish the grounds on which historically specific structures of war can be distinguished from one another—that is, they constitute the *differentia specifica* of organized violence on the temporal plane of the *longue durée*.

### Conclusion

Viewing organized political violence through the temporal prism provided by the *Annales* historians, then, allows us to isolate conceptually three distinct dimensions of the historical character of organized political violence: war, warfare and war-fighting. Focusing on the deepest level of this three-tiered structure—the "historical structure of war"—the following sections develop several key concepts that will help us analyze and historicize war as a fundamental element of the late medieval world order. As mentioned above, these concepts are the *political architecture of organized violence*; the *structural antagonisms* entailed in that architecture; and the *fundamental institution of "war"* that both constitutes and governs war as a social practice.

## The Political Architecture of Organized Violence

The *political architecture of organized violence* comprises the constituent units of a given world order with a significant war-making capacity, as well as the system-level social structure within which these units are embedded. At the unit level, the political architecture of organized violence comprises a specific sub-set of the broader group of institutional actors that populate any given world order. Somewhat more specifically, it comprises *those constituent units of world order capable of generating and employing organized violence to advance or defend their political interests.* Reflecting the constructivist premises of this study, I argue that these war-making units are socially constructed—that is, they are the product of intersubjective beliefs that specify agent identities and (entailed) interests. Consistent with the prescriptions of "holistic constructivism" I further argue that these war-making units are constituted through two social processes, one systemic and structural, the other unit-level and corporate. At the structural level, war-making units are constituted in part through a translocal, systemic *constitutive ideal* that specifies the type(s) of actors warranted to use force for collective or public purposes.[86] This ideal performs three functions: it defines what constitutes a legitimate war-making unit; it invests such units with a basic identity and entailed portfolio of interests; and it defines the basic parameters of rightful action for such a unit. System-level constitutive ideals account for the similarities among war-making units—that is, for their common identities and interests. At the unit level, such entities are constituted in part through more *local* discourses that construct *particular* identities and interests. These local discourses differentiate war-making units by investing them with unit specific identities and interests, thus accounting for the variations that cannot be explained by reference to shared systemic norms.

Beyond the unit level, the political architecture of organized violence also (in part at least) encompasses the translocal or "systemic" matrix of political relations within which these war-making units are embedded. System and structure, of course, are fundamentally contested terms within the social sciences in general and IR in particular: there is little agreement, for instance, on whether structures are "material" or "social"; on the precise nature of the relationship between "structures" and "agents"; or even on the extent to which structure actually matters at all.[87] Recognizing that there is no theoretically innocent way of entering onto this disputed terrain, in this study I simply begin with the assumption that structures *do* matter—that is, (a) that structures have systemic properties that are more than the sum of the properties of their constituent elements; and (b) that these properties have meaningful independent effects or consequences. I also assume that structures have both "material" and "social" dimensions.

On the material plane, I use the term structure to refer to the organization of concrete historical agents or units into a discernable "system" that

has properties not simply reducible to the nature or interaction of those agents and units. According to Kenneth Waltz, such structures have three defining elements. The first of these is its structure's "ordering principle," which Waltz defines as the organizational concept governing the arrangement of the parts of a system.[88] There are two such ordering principles (and, therefore, two types of structure), he argues. On the one hand, a political structure may be hierarchical in nature, involving relations of sub- and superordination in which some actors are entitled to command others. On the other, a political structure may be anarchic, involving the interaction of juridically equal units in which none is entitled to command. For Waltz, the international structure that has been in place over the past several centuries is unambiguously anarchic: it comprises states interacting in a "self-help" environment—i.e. an environment in which there is no overarching authority capable of managing conflicts—that induces them to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their own survival and security. Indeed, according to Waltz, anarchy is such an enduring element of international relations that it can be treated as a historical constant—that is, as a fixed systemic property that, while consequential, cannot explain *variation* in outcomes. The second element of structure, according to Waltz, is the functional character of its constituent units. While conceding that the constituent units of any given anarchic system may differ from one another in terms of size, wealth, power and form, Waltz argues that they must necessarily be functionally similar—that is, they must be "like units" that do the same things even if they vary in terms of their ability to do those things. In other words, he argues that anarchic systems by nature comprise functionally undifferentiated units. This being the case, unit differentiation cannot account for variation in outcomes; as with ordering principle, Waltz subsequently drops unit character as an element of structure. Waltz defined the third element of structure, the distribution of capabilities, in terms of precisely these differences in functional capability. For him, such unit-level differences necessarily give rise to the system-level patterns of power—bipolarity, multi-polarity—that shape the broader patterns of international politics. While recognizing that *differences* in capability is a unit-level phenomenon, Waltz argues that the *distribution* of capabilities—i.e. the degree to which power is concentrated in a system—is a property of the system as a whole rather than of individual units. Indeed, given that he has already dropped unit character and ordering principle as elements of a structural theory of international relations, from his perspective the distribution of power is the only true structural variable that can account for variations in patterns of conflict and cooperation.

While Waltz's categories (character of units, distribution of capabilities and ordering principle) provide a useful starting point for thinking about the effects of structure on patterns of violent conflict, his framework needs to be modified substantially if it is to help address the questions that animate this study. To begin with, we need to move beyond Waltz's assumption that

international systems are necessarily composed of like units. While this is arguably a valid assumption in respect of the Westphalian system, there is simply no reason to suppose that it will automatically be valid in other historical cases. *Contra* Waltz, I assume that the functional isomorphism of units is a system property that must be established through research rather than simply asserted through fiat. I further assume that this can best be done by analyzing the constitutive norms that are generative of the specific (types of) war-making units that populate any given system.

Second, while Waltz considers the *distribution of capabilities* (especially capabilities for organized violence) to be the key variable in explaining variation in outcomes, if we are interested in grasping the deep character of war across world orders, a narrow focus on this variable is not particularly illuminating. To be sure, patterns of polarity can be indices of change *within* a given world order. However, because such patterns are highly variable (at least when viewed from the perspective of the *longue durée*) over the life of any given world order, they cannot tell us very much about the deep structural continuities that in fact define such an order. Given this, the distribution of capabilities or patterns of polarity drops out of my account of the historical structure of war.

Finally, if we are to develop an understanding of structure that helps address the questions that animate this study, it is necessary to move beyond Waltz's essentially binary conceptualization of *ordering principle*. As summarized above, Waltz claims that the there are only two such principles in theory (anarchy and hierarchy) and really only one in practice (anarchy). As a number of scholars have pointed out, however, conceptualizing ordering principle in this way is ultimately not terribly helpful. To be sure, it helps paint a picture of the basic conflict dynamics of a given system. But that picture will necessarily be painted in very broad strokes. If we want a more fine-grained portrait, one that enhances our ability to grasp fully the historical specificity of any given international structure, it is not enough merely to specify that a system is a segmented realm lacking a superordinate political authority (i.e., that it is anarchic). Rather, we need to go beyond this basic insight to understand the principle underpinning that segmentation—which may be heteronomy, "negarchy" or hegemony as well as anarchy.[89] Once we are able to move beyond Waltz's overly parsimonious concept of structure in this way we can develop a more nuanced picture of any given international system.

One way of accomplishing this is to follow the lead provided by John Ruggie in his seminal discussion of "modes of differentiation." As part of his overall critique of Waltz's structural theory of international politics, Ruggie advanced three basic arguments regarding differentiation. First, he pointed out that Waltz's definition of differentiation was inconsistent with the conventional use of that term among sociologists. Where Waltz had defined the concept in terms of *difference*, Ruggie pointed out that the term actually denotes *separateness*. Second, Ruggie also argued that,

properly defined in terms of separateness, differentiation was in fact central to any structural account of the international politics. The reason for this, he argued, was that without grasping the mode of differentiation it is impossible to understand how a system is segmented into separate units or how different historical systems vary. As he put it, "while anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us *on what basis* the segmentation is determined."[90] Third, Ruggie illustrated his argument about the importance of modes of differentiation by comparing the medieval and modern international systems. The former, he argued, differentiated its constituent units according to the principle of "heteronomy" while the latter was segmented on the basis of the principle of "homonomy" or "sovereignty."[91] Ruggie concluded his discussion by emphasizing that differentiation does not, as Waltz claimed, drop out of a properly structural account of international politics. Indeed, quite the opposite: as Ruggie put it, "without the concept of differentiation . . . it is impossible to define the structure of modernity in international relations—modes of differentiation are nothing less than the focus of the epochal study of rule."[92] By extension, without differentiation it would be impossible to define the structure of *any* world order.

Building on Ruggie's original insight, Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert have recently developed a taxonomy of principles of differentiation that elaborates on the concept of heteronomy and thus allows for greater analytic precision when engaging in such an epochal study of rule.[93] According to this taxonomy, there are really only three basic principles of political differentiation. The first of these they label *segmentary* differentiation, which they argue gives rise to systems in which "every subsystem is the equal of, and functionally similar to, every other social subsystem."[94] To the extent that anarchic systems comprise "like units" they can be said to be expressions of the logic of segmentary differentiation. The second principle identified by Buzan and Albert is *stratificatory* differentiation. This principle, they argue, gives rise to systems in which "some persons or groups raise themselves above others, creating a hierarchical social order."[95] This can take the form of hierarchies of status, authority, wealth and/or power. The final principle identified by Buzan and Albert is that of *functional* differentiation. As they put it, this type of differentiation gives rise to systems in which "the subsystems are defined by the coherence of the particular types of activity and their differentiation from other types of activity, and these differences do not stem simply from rank."[96] To the extent that a system is functionally differentiated, they argue, it will comprise "unlike units" playing distinct and specialized roles.

As Buzan and Albert conclude, "perhaps the major contribution of differentiation to IR is that it offers a novel taxonomy for thinking about the structure of both units and systems."[97] When attempting to analyze the historical structure of war, such a taxonomy is particularly useful in that it allows us to map the particular configuration of segmentary, stratificatory

and functional differentiation within a given system, thus providing a more nuanced and illuminating "profile" of that system and the war-making units it comprises. In turn, this moves us beyond Waltz's relatively impoverished anarchy-hierarchy dyad, allowing for a more fine-grained understanding of the structural conditions-of-possibility for violent political conflict within a given world order.

## Structural Antagonisms

Deriving from any given political architecture of organized violence is a historically specific configuration of incompatible or clashing core interests. Simply put, the war-making units that comprise the political architecture of organized violence all have socially constructed core interests and goals deriving from both systemic constitutive norms and unit specific identities. Inevitably, some of the more deeply embedded of these interests and goals will be contradictory, incompatible or otherwise irreconcilable. I conceptualize these systemic conflicts as "structural antagonisms," which I define as *fundamental configurations of contradictory, incompatible or otherwise irreconcilable core interests within a given world order.* Such elemental conflict-configurations, I argue, are "structural" in that they are properties of the interaction of the constituent war-making units of a system as well as the translocal matrix of political relations within which these units are embedded; they are "antagonisms" in that they entail social relations that are inherently contradictory or hostile. To the extent that these contradictory interests are being advanced by units capable of waging war, there is always at least the potential that this dynamic will result in violence. Such antagonisms thus constitute the basic conditions-of-possibility of violent conflict within a given world order. They are most commonly artifacts of the competitive enactment of the constitutive norms or "cultural scripts" that give rise to the key war-making units within any given world order.

The prevailing political culture (or culture of anarchy) within which these structural antagonisms crystallize powerfully influences the way in which they will be worked out. In what Alexander Wendt calls a Hobbesian culture, the logic of *enmity* will tend to intensify and amplify these conflicts. As Wendt argues, Hobbesian anarchy is a social structure in which the constituent units do not recognize each other's right to exist and are therefore engaged in a true "war of all against all." Such a structure necessarily intensifies the structural antagonisms inherent in a system, giving rise to endemic warfare and a tendency toward the elimination of "unfit" actors. In a Lockean culture, the logic of *rivalry* will tend to limit and contain these conflicts. Lockean anarchy, as described by Wendt, is a social structure in which the sovereignty and basic right-to-exist of the constituent units is universally accepted (or nearly so). In such a system, structural antagonisms can be converted into violent conflict, but typically

do so within limits established by this basic right to exist. War is thus limited and constrained; the violent elimination of constituent political units exceptional and rare. In a Kantian culture, the logic of *amity* will tend to mitigate or extinguish potentially violent conflict. As Wendt defines it, Kantian anarchy is a social structure in which the right to exist of the constituent units is universally accepted and war is no longer considered to be a legitimate means of resolving disputes between these units. In a Kantian system, the member units view each other neither as enemies nor rivals, but as friends. As such, the use of force to resolve disputes (at least among friends) is inconceivable.

## The Institution of War

Developing a clear picture of the political architecture of organized violence and its derivative configuration of structural antagonisms can tell us a great deal about the conditions-of-possibility for war in any given historical world order. Ultimately, however, if we really want to understand how particular forms of violent conflict are made possible in particular historical settings we must also grasp the complex of norms, beliefs and discourses that constitute "war" as a meaningful social practice within those settings. This is so because it is this complex that actually enables certain structural antagonisms to be converted into *violent* conflicts in certain circumstances. It does this first by making war conceivable and constituting it as part of the repertoire of "rightful actions" available to political actors in a relationship of structural antagonism. Beyond that, this normative complex also specifies when and under what conditions armed force can legitimately be employed. It does this by designating which actors are warranted to use violent means (i.e. legitimate authorities) and by delimiting the ends that might legitimately be pursued via these means (i.e. just causes).

To facilitate analysis, I conceptualize the ensembles of norms, intersubjective beliefs and discourses that constitute war as *institutions*. As Christian Reus-Smit has argued, international institutions operate on three different levels or scales: relatively superficial issue-specific "regimes"; "fundamental institutions" that structure how states solve coordination and cooperation problems; and deeply foundational "constitutional structures" that define legitimate statehood and rightful state action.[98] Although Reus-Smit himself suggests that war is a fundamental institution, occupying the middle strata in this generative structure, my view is that it properly belongs on the deepest of these three levels. I make this claim because, when viewed from the temporal perspective of the *longue durée*, the institution of war appears not merely as a mechanism for solving coordination and collaboration problems of states (although it is in part such a mechanism), but rather as a complex of prior/deeper constitutive norms and values that actually make war conceivable, meaningful and legitimate as a social practice

within a world order.[99] They also contribute to the constitution of the units populating any given world order. Viewed in this way, the institution of war has a different set of effects than is suggested by Reus-Smit's concept of fundamental institution. Instead of what might be called actor-constitutive effects and regulative effects, the most elemental institution of war has both actor-constitutive effects and *practice-constitutive* effects. This latter set of effects constitutes or makes possible a practice (in this case, war) by constructing it as a behavioral possibility within the cultural repertory of rightful actions available to political actors.

Against this backdrop, I define the institution of war is a complex of deeply embedded intersubjective beliefs regarding the ontology, (moral) purpose and meaning of "war" that make certain kinds of organized violence both conceivable and legitimate. Such institutions entail three constitutive elements: a basic concept, understanding or ontology of war; a set of norms regarding legitimate authority to wage war; and an ensemble of beliefs about the moral purposes of war.

Fundamental ontological beliefs regarding war constitute the foundation of this institution. The term ontological belief refers here to the forms of consciousness that make it possible to imagine "war" as a meaningful social practice. Fundamental ontological beliefs regarding war thus entail categorical beliefs specifying the difference between war and other types of politics and violence. They also entail beliefs regarding the deep etiology of organized violence—that is, ideas regarding the root cause(s) of war. Such ideas may locate these root causes in the temporal world (the nature of humanity, the character of particular political units or systemic dynamics) or in the spiritual (God or the gods). Closely related to this are beliefs regarding the extent to which war is a natural, inevitable or universal element of the human condition. Finally, these basic ontological beliefs entail constitutive ideas regarding the extent to which war has an *existential* dimension. In other words, they include beliefs regarding the extent to which war is an intersubjective context within which it is possible to express one's humanity or identity.[100] Taken together, this complex of basic ontological beliefs situates war in the moral and political imagination of a society, making it either conceivable and meaningful or inconceivable and meaningless.

The institution of war also entails a set of constitutive norms regarding the legitimate authority to make war, where "legitimate" means consistent with widely recognized rules, norms and principles; and "authority" refers to the right to exercise power. All societies have hegemonic and deeply embedded beliefs that warrant certain agents or actors to wield force for political purposes while delegitimizing the use of such violence by others. When attempting to grasp these beliefs, several questions thus present themselves: "within any given world order, who is authorized to wage war?"; "is this authority limited to one type of political unit or do several types enjoy such authority?"; and "what is the nature or source of the warrants authorizing these units to employ armed force?" Historically contingent answers to these questions clearly provide essential insights into the way in which *war* is constituted and

political architecture of organized violence +
structural antagonisms +
institution of "war" =
"Historical Structure of War"

*Figure 2.2*   The historical structure of war.

conceptualized within a given world order. But they also illuminate the pro-
cesses by which the *war-making units* populating that order are constructed.
This is so because these norms—by investing certain actors with legitimate
war-making authority—amplify and reinforce the systemic and unit-level
constitutive norms discussed above, contributing to the process by which
war-making units are socially constructed. In this respect, norms related to
legitimate authority to wage war can be said to be both practice-constitutive
(of war) and actor-constitutive (of war-making units).

Finally, the institution of war necessarily entails norms regarding the
justice of war ("just cause"). These are the norms that specify when it is
morally and/or legally permissible to use force. If norms related to legiti-
mate authority are significant because they determine which actors are war-
ranted to use violent means, discourses of just cause are important because
they specify the circumstances in which those actors can legitimately use
such means. In the language I have been using in this study, they are thus
significant in that they help determine which structural antagonisms can
and will be converted into violent conflict.

## SUMMARY

The basic patterns or configurations of violent political conflict associated
with any given world order, I have argued, are generated or made possible
by the "historical structure of war" inherent in that order. Such structures
comprise the ensemble of war-making units, structural antagonisms, and
cultural institutions that establish the fundamental conditions-of-possibil-
ity for violent political conflict in any given historical setting. Historical
structures of war are neither temporally nor spatially isomorphic: they
vary considerably from one historical setting to another. In other words,
the character of war-making units and nature of the system within which
they are embedded differ from world order to another, as do the structural
antagonisms deriving from their interaction and ideas about the moral pur-
pose and meaning of war. It is this variation, I argue, that explains the
distinct constellations of wars that are organic to, and emblematic of, dif-
ferent world orders. The following chapters explore one important case of a
historical structure of war—that of late medieval Latin Christendom.

# 3 Public War
## The Wars of the Corporate-Sovereign State

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I specify the conditions-of-possibility for what I have been calling "public war"—that is, war fought by recognizably public authorities over quintessentially political issues such as authority, sovereignty, and jurisdiction—in late medieval Latin Christendom. I begin by developing a sketch of the political architecture of organized violence particular to this era, focusing on the emergence of both a historical specific configuration of war-making unit (the "corporate-sovereign" state) and a historically specific translocal structure within which those units interacted (a structure that differentiated its units primarily—but not exclusively—according to the segmentary principle of sovereignty). I next discuss the structural antagonisms that crystallized as a result of the competitive enactment of the script of corporate-sovereign statehood within this structure, as well as the "Hobbesian-Lockean" political culture that conditioned the way in which these structural antagonisms worked themselves out. The chapter then proceeds with an examination of the late medieval fundamental institution of war, specifying the way in which it enabled and legitimized the use of force in certain circumstances and anathematized them in others. In the following chapter, I round out this picture of late medieval war by considering the way in which the Church constituted a distinct form of war-making unit embedded in a distinct constellation of structural antagonisms.

### THE POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

#### Existing Constructivist Accounts of the Late Medieval State and State-System

Over the past two decades or so, constructivist IR scholars have produced a substantial body of research on the "geopolitical relations" of the European Middle Ages. To begin with, this scholarship has taken the form of an extended theoretical critique of neorealist and historical materialists

accounts of the nature of the medieval geopolitical system. This body of work—comprising Ruggie's use of the medieval case to challenge Waltz's structural account of international relations, Hall and Kratochwil's collaborative critique of Fischer's neorealist account of medieval geopolitics and the efforts of both Alkopher and Latham to highlight the explanatory power of constructivism through their respective analyses of the crusades—entails competing attempts to demonstrate the general heuristic superiority of one paradigm or another by underscoring its superiority in the particular case of the European Middle Ages.[1] In another vein, the constructivist literature on medieval geopolitical relations has taken the form of a more empirical (though still conceptually guided) inquiry into the roots of the modern state-system. This body of scholarship—which includes works such as Andrew Phillips' "realist-constructivist" analysis of the origins, collapse and decay of the Latin Christian world order; and Daniel Philpott's effort to reestablish the significance of Westphalia—seeks both to highlight the differences between the medieval and modern geopolitical orders and to specify the causal mechanisms through which the former was transformed into the latter. Closely related to these studies is Osiander's attempt to place the medieval geopolitical system in a *longue durée* historical context in order underscore its specificity and distinctiveness.[2] Finally, there are a number of constructivist works—Hall's important article on "moral authority" as a power resource, for example—that seek to shed light on some specific element of medieval geopolitical relations as a means of illuminating an analogous aspect of the modern international system. Taken together, this corpus of research has begun to provide a conceptually guided constructivist account of the geopolitical relations of the European Middle Ages that is both recognizable and relevant to IR scholars. It has also begun to find an audience among historians of the era as well, attesting to both its quality and heuristic value.

Perhaps ironically, however, the existing constructivist scholarship on medieval geopolitics falls dramatically short in at least one crucially important respect: it fails to provide a satisfying account of either the late medieval *state* or the state-system within which it was embedded. Doubtless out of an abundance of concern with neorealist claims regarding the transhistorical nature of "sovereignty" and "anarchy," constructivists have typically been more interested instead in refuting the very existence of a medieval state or international system. While the line of argumentation developed in these works is understandable, and at times quite illuminating of the non-statist aspects of medieval (geo)political life, it is also disappointing; for it means that, perhaps surprisingly, the existing constructivist IR literature actually has little to say about the late medieval state-building project or the distinctive international system that it spawned.

Underpinning the specific weaknesses of this literature is a tendency to unduly exoticize the medieval international order, treating it as both mysterious and radically different from the modern international system.

Without exception, existing constructivist accounts are premised on the assumption that a "Great Divide"—somewhere between 1555 and 1714, with 1648 standing as the conventional date—separates the modern world from the medieval.[3] On one side of that divide is the definitively modern sovereign state and its derivative state-system, changing and evolving over time to be sure, but easily comprehensible to IR scholars trained to think (critically or otherwise) in terms of these categories. On the other side of the divide is the medieval world, an "orientalized" Other comprising an exotic congeries of ideas, institutions and structures that are so alien as to render the epoch simultaneously both irrelevant to the study of modern international relations and inaccessible to the contemporary IR scholar.[4]

This exoticization manifests itself most conspicuously in the trope of "heteronomy," which runs through the extant literature, shaping its primary conceptual currents and lending it its peculiar idiom. Simply stated, constructivists almost unanimously assert, assume or argue that the medieval mode of differentiation was not sovereignty (or, as Ruggie sometimes labeled it, "homonomy"), but "heteronomy"—a distinctively medieval organizing principle that produced functionally differentiated polities (never states) subject to different laws of development.[5] External sovereignty, they maintain, was impossible because of the universalist claims of the pope and Emperor, both of whom claimed and exercised authority over kingdoms, principalities and cities. Similarly, internal sovereignty was short-circuited by feudalism, custom and ecclesiastical and temporal "liberties," all of which meant that there was no supreme locus of political authority within any given polity. The result of all this, constructivists maintain, was that Latin Christendom was segmented politically into a number of qualitatively distinct types of political unit—the Holy Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, city-states, urban leagues, feudal lordships, principalities, kingdoms and even guilds and monasteries—all of which were "structured by a non-exclusive form of territoriality, in which authority was both personalized and parcelled within and across territorial formations."[6] By way of contrast, constructivists typically agree with Ruggie that the modern international system was made up of "territorially disjoint[ed], mutually exclusive, functionally similar" states possessing both internal and external sovereignty.[7]

What are we to make of this heteronomous conceptualization of late medieval political life? On the one hand, it must be said that there is more than a little truth in this characterization, especially at the juncture of the high and late Middle Ages (say, around the year 1100). There can be no denying that the incomplete, overlapping and contested states that emerged out of the wreckage of the preceding system of what used to be called "feudal anarchy" but which Bisson labels "lord-rulership" (see below) were not the hard-edged, substantively disentangled and juridically discrete states of the high modern era. On the other hand, however, this characterization is also profoundly deceiving; for it fails to acknowledge that, while the *high*

medieval era was doubtless "structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality" (and therefore non-statist and heteronomous), during the three centuries or so that comprise the *late* medieval era the working out of a distinctively statist project (involving the pursuit of internal and external sovereignty) was the defining logic and dynamic of political life.[8] Indeed, as Ruggie himself clearly grasps—but as subsequent constructivist analyses have failed to appreciate—the heteronomous medieval system of rule Ruggie was describing in this passage had decisively passed from the historical scene by the *thirteenth* century. Ruggie himself puts it thus, "The notion of firm boundary lines between the major territorial formations did not take hold until the thirteenth century; prior to that date, there were only "frontiers," or large zones of transition."[9] Ruggie then goes on to cite as his source for this claim the influential French medievalist Edouard Perroy, who, as he notes, understood this transformation to be "*the* fundamental change" in the political structure of medieval Latin Christendom.[10] If this fundamental change, involving the crystallization of hard frontiers and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, took place during the 1200s, then it is reasonable to infer that, from this point on, the constituent units of medieval political system were separated from one another on the basis of the principle or norm of sovereignty (even if imperfectly enacted or implemented). This being the case, one can only conclude on the basis of Ruggie's own argument that by the 1300 at the latest the primary mode of differentiation operative in Latin Christendom was sovereignty rather than heteronomy. To suggest, then, that sovereignty is the fundamental constitutive norm of the *modern* state system is to argue either (a) that the modern international system was born in the thirteenth century or (b) that the otherwise historically distinctive late medieval international system was nevertheless also constructed out of norm of sovereign statehood. To date, however, the constructivist literature has resisted both of these conclusions, maintaining that before the modern system of states emerged in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, sovereignty simply had not yet been "invented" and international relations were therefore necessarily heteronomous in nature.[11]

Because constructivists characterize the political order of the late Middle Ages as heteronomous, and because they wish to highlight the distinctiveness of the modern international system, they typically portray the late medieval international order as comprising a constellation of qualitatively different types of political units: the Holy Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, city-states, urban leagues, feudal lordships, principalities and kingdoms being the most common. These political units, they assert or assume, not only differed in significant ways from each other, they also were something other than states. Drawing on a conceptual standard of statehood widely accepted within International Relations circles, they maintain that these polities were not states for a number of reasons: they were neither internally nor externally "sovereign," they did not monopolize the legitimate means of violence, they did not exercise uniform or direct control

over all parts of the political community, and governance was based not on impersonal institutions, but on personal or feudal-vassalic relationships. In short, constructivists typically argue or assert, the late medieval order was not only heteronomous, it was *ipso facto* non-statist as well.[12]

This perspective is problematic for several reasons. As I shall demonstrate below, a number of these claims can be challenged on empirical grounds: it is not the case, for example, that late medieval polities were not organized around a constitutive norm of sovereignty or that they were little more than semi-institutionalized feudal networks. Nor is it the case the claims of Empire and Church prevented the crystallization of sovereign territorial polities: as the medievalist Susan Reynolds puts it, "the idea that medieval polities are supposed not to have been sovereign because of the universalist claims of pope and emperor seems to survive today chiefly in the minds of those who take their medieval history from old textbooks."[13] Perhaps more importantly, however, the fundamental problem with this view is conceptual. To put it directly, the standard of statehood against which constructivists judge and define medieval polities is not a standard of *generic* statehood, but a standard of *modern* statehood. As Reynolds has so ably argued, the tendency among historians of the early modern era (and, I would argue, IR scholars who read their works selectively) is to overemphasize the novelty of the new type of state that emerged in that period and then to suggest that it was so different from what existed before as to warrant granting it exclusive rights to the label "state."[14] As she points out, however, this move is problematic: it is not only thoroughly presentist (in that it projects contemporary political concepts back on to earlier periods), but it effectively closes off any possibility of doing "the kind of serious comparisons of polities and periods that we need if we are to turn mere assumptions about variants and changes into solid arguments based on evidence."[15] I would also add that it leads to considerable confusion about what kind of political units populated the late medieval international system. If one equates the "state" with the "modern state," as most constructivists and other IR scholars seem to do, then the claim that the late medieval international system was heteronomous and non-statist is defensible. If, however, one follows Reynolds' lead and modestly recalibrates the definition of the state so that it is less presentist and therefore more conducive to cross-temporal and cross-civilizational comparison, then this claim becomes untenable. Somewhat more specifically, if one accept Reynolds' definition of the state as "an organization of human society within a more or less fixed area in which the ruler or governing body more or less successfully controls the legitimate use of physical force" then many of the units that populated late medieval Latin Christendom—the Holy Roman Empire, kingdoms, principalities and city-states—come to be seen as variations on a distinctively late medieval form of state.[16] Viewed in this way, the system becomes "homonomous" and statist (or almost so—as I shall argue in subsequent chapters, the Church did in fact constitute a distinctive

type of governance/war-making unit). As Reynolds herself puts it, if we adopt this less presentist conceptualization of statehood, current historiography strongly suggests that "a good deal of western Europe was governed throughout the Middle Ages in polities that can reasonably be called states."[17] Because of its pervasive tendency to equate the "state" with the "modern state," however, the extant constructivist literature has difficulty accepting this and is forced to go to great lengths to establish that all of these units were something other than states—i.e. to establish heteronomy. In so doing, it ends up producing an account of the late medieval state and state-system that is not only at variance with the picture painted by Reynolds, but that would likely be unrecognizable to many of the leading historians of late medieval political thought and development.[18]

Closely related to the theme of heteronomy is what Ben Holland has recently labeled the "Roman law thesis."[19] According to this thesis, the crystallization of the norm of territorially exclusive sovereignty was primarily a result of "the rediscovery of the concept of absolute and exclusive private property from Roman law."[20] Prior to this rediscovery, property rights in Latin Christendom were "separable," "conditional" and "non-exclusive." According to Ruggie, Kratochwil and other constructivists, the first refers to the fact that property rights were not unitary, but divided into "ownership" rights and "use" rights (privileges) and that different people could enjoy title to and rights in the same property at the same time. The second refers to the fact that the exercise of these rights was dependent on moral considerations—title or privilege could be forfeit if abused.[21] Finally, "non-exclusive" refers to the fact that title-holders could not exclude from their property those with legitimate use-rights in it. As this conception was applied to systems of rule, these constructivists argue, it gave rise to the heteronomous international system described above. With the revival of Roman law, however, a more unitary ("bundled"), unconditional (absolute) and exclusive concept of property rights—*dominium*—emerged; "By his *dominium*, an owner held the complete bundle of rights attaching to his property."[22] There were no use-rights or privileges. Further, Roman law made no provision for challenges to a title based on inappropriate use—owners could do what they wanted with their property, subject only to minimal limitations derived from certain "background conditions." Finally, *dominium* entitled owners to exclude others from their property. This new conceptual framework provided what Kratochwil called the "generative grammar" of the new system of territorially exclusive sovereign states. In other words, it provided an idiom for thinking about the organization of political communities: just as absolute property rights conferred unitary, unconditional and exclusive title to property, *sovereignty* conferred unitary, unconditional and exclusive authority over a territorially defined political community. Similarly, just as property owners were obliged to recognize each other's rights under Roman law, so too were sovereigns obliged to recognize each

other's sovereignty under international law. The result: an international system comprising mutually exclusive, sovereign-territorial states.[23]

While this is a suggestive line of argument, it is better suited to describing developments in the late medieval rather than early modern eras. Roman law, of course, was revived in Latin Christendom during the *twelfth* century, not, as Ruggie and others sometimes seem to suggest, in the early modern period.[24] The full text of the *Corpus iuris civilis* became available to Latin Christians *c*. 1070, and was subject to sustained study and commentary from that point on.[25] By the early twelfth century, the principles of Roman law had already begun to reshape the way in which politics were understood and practiced within Latin Christendom. By the thirteenth, Roman private property law had also been rediscovered and applied to support one side or another in the pressing debates of the day. It was at this time that the concept of property approximating that described by constructivists such as Kratochwil materialized. Although the distinction between *dominium* (title) and *possessio* (possession) or *usufruct* (use-rights) retained some theoretical and legal significance until well into the modern era, by the early fourteenth century the latter had been so elevated in Roman law that the possessor or tenant not only enjoyed the right to use property, but to alienate, transfer or convey it as well (a right labeled *dominium utilis* by the influential jurist Accursius). In effect, the tenant had become the "owner" of the property, entitled to exclude others from it and otherwise to use or enjoy it as he saw fit. Simultaneously, the right of *dominium* had withered to a fixed economic right over the property, entitling the superior lord to nothing more than certain fees or dues (a right which Accursius labeled *dominium directum*).[26] Lords could no longer prevent the alienation of their land by tenants nor regulate their use, possession or enjoyment of it. By 1300, then, while property remained nominally "unbundled," it had nevertheless become effectively unconditional and exclusive. If ever there was a historical moment when discourses of Roman property law should have served as a framing analogy or generative grammar for absolute and exclusive territorial sovereignty, this was it.[27] Arguments to the effect that that the emergence of the Westphalian state-system (effect) took place three-and-a-half centuries after the revival of Roman law discourses of property rights (cause) must be approached with a certain skepticism. While there can be little doubt that historical processes can take considerable time to unfold, in this case the lag between cause and effect strains credulity.

Finally, what are we to make of the claim—ubiquitous in both the constructivist and non-constructivist IR literatures dealing with the later Middle Ages—that the medieval political order differed from the modern by virtue of its "feudal" nature? What are we to make, in other words, of the claim that the Middle Ages were characterized by a "patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government" which were "inextricably superimposed and tangled," and in which "different juridical instances were geographically interwoven and stratified, and plural allegiances, asymmetrical

suzerainties and anomalous enclaves abounded"?[28] Again, there can be no gainsaying the validity of this claim with respect to the high medieval era. As I shall specify more fully below, in the immediate post-Carolingian period political order did in fact assume the form of cross-cutting and over-lapping chains of lord-vassal relationships that taken together constituted such a political patchwork. By 1300, however, feudalism had both declined in importance as a mode of social and political organization and, in any case, effectively been subordinated to the logic of state-building. As Bernard Guenée puts it, "from the tenth to the thirteenth century the political life of the West was dominated by feudalism: feudal relations—based on the personal bond of vassalage and the concrete tie of the fief—played a pivotal role."[29] Guenée goes on to argue, however, that there is broad agreement among historians that "in the fourteenth century there was a singular decline in the importance of feudalism in the State. The State of that period was certainly no longer feudal."[30] Rather, he maintains, during the late medieval era, relations of vassalage and fief were harnessed to the task of state-building. Specifically, he argues, feudal relationships and laws were used to consolidate the political authority of the emerging states by providing sources of authority and financial support that supplemented statist institutions such as taxation, jurisdiction and administration (see below).[31] Once again, the difficulty with existing IR accounts is less one of misconstruing the nature of feudalism or its impact on political life as of getting the periodization wrong. Ultimately, the problem is this: in existing constructivist accounts, the discrete era of the *late* Middle Ages effectively disappears, subsumed under and conflated with the preceding (high medieval) era of lord-rulership. My goal in what follows is to propose a kind of friendly amendment to the these accounts, accepting for the most part their characterization of the high medieval era, but supplementing it with a more fine-tuned account that recovers and reasserts the distinctiveness of the three-centuries long era separating the high medieval political order from that of the early modern period.

## Toward an Alternative Constructivist Account

Constructivists correctly focus on the way in which the distinctive world order of late medieval Latin Christendom was constituted by a historically specific constellation of norms, *mentalités* and intersubjective beliefs. The existing constructivist account of medieval geopolitics is undermined, however, by three analytical missteps. First, constructivists have tended to foreground (somewhat anachronistically) the institution of feudalism and the organizing principle of heteronomy, placing too much emphasis on the role the Empire, Church and chains of lord-vassal relations in the governance structures of late medieval Latin Christendom. Second, they have paid insufficient attention to the powerfully resonating norm of sovereign, territorial statehood that evolved during the thirteenth century and that reshaped political life during the later Middle Ages. Finally, and to

some degree underpinning these two missteps, constructivists have failed to recognize the degree to which the era beginning the late thirteenth century and ending in the middle of the sixteenth was a discrete period in the history of European political development, different from both the high medieval era that preceded it and the early modern to which it gave way. In the following section I seek to remedy these missteps. I begin by describing the "crisis of lord-rulership" that brought the high Middle Ages to an end and set the context within which new constitutive ideals of rule and political community were to crystallize. I then develop a theoretically guided historical snapshot of the constitutive ideal of the medieval state *c.* 1300. I conceptualize this ideal as having three core elements: a basic concept of political community; an ensemble of constitutive beliefs about the "moral purpose" associated with this form of community; and a historically specific concept of "sovereignty" that differentiated and legitimated individual political communities. The concept of political community is at the core of this constitutive ideal, establishing the very basis upon which the late medieval "state" was conceived and instantiated. The moral purpose of the medieval state refers to the reasons that medieval agents held for "constructing and maintaining autonomous political units."[32] The medieval concept of sovereignty refers to the way in which medieval agents understood the issue of where ultimate political authority ought to reside and the nature of the rights and obligations associated with that ultimate authority. Taken together, these three elements constituted a kind of "global cultural script" specifying how political communities should be conceived, constructed and governed.[33] Building on this, I develop a picture of the actually existing late medieval state as it materialized on various scales, in various institutional configurations and around various social forces. In this section, the emphasis is on the way in which the prevailing system-level constitutive ideal (or global cultural script) touched down in the concrete political conditions generated by the "crisis of lord-rulership" to produce a constellation of qualitatively distinctive forms of state (kingdoms, principalities, communes and leagues). Finally, I attempt to address the shortcomings of the existing constructivist literature by developing a sketch of the state-system deriving from the enactment of the script of medieval "statehood" in the concrete historical circumstances of the later Middle Ages. The result, I hope, is an account of the political architecture of late medieval war that sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of the structural antagonisms inherent in late medieval Latin Christendom.

### The Crisis of "Lord-Rulership"

As Thomas Bisson has recently demonstrated, the origins of the late medieval state can be traced directly to the crisis of lord-rulership in the twelfth century. During the preceding century or so—i.e. from the time of the collapse of the Carolingian Empire—the nucleus of the medieval world order

was the largely autogenous "lordship," a territorial unit of authority ruled by a noble embodying/enjoying extensive rights of economic appropriation (seigneurial rights) as well as substantial political jurisdiction (banal rights).[34] Significantly, the lords or *domini* who ruled these units of authority were neither imperial office-holders nor conditional fief-holders; rather, each was a local warlord who had exploited the opportunities opened up by the collapse of imperial administrative structure to impose forcefully his personal rule over what Duby referred to as a "zone of military occupation."[35] Once established, these warlords proceeded to appropriate the formerly royal right to command and forbid, to enforce any surviving imperial tax obligations, to dispense justice and otherwise to exercise freely the hitherto "public authority" of the regalian ban—including the once-exclusively royal right of confiscation.[36] Lay lords even asserted the right to collect the ecclesiastical tithes that had hitherto been paid directly to the bishops, abbots and other Church authorities. In conjunction with the rents, "customs" and other levies traditionally owed to manorial lords, the usurpation of these banal and ecclesiastical rights provided the *domini* with a nearly unlimited capacity to extract economic surplus from the now almost entirely enserfed peasantry. As a result, during this era lordship constituted the basic building block of the political order of Latin Christendom. As Bisson puts it, the "lordship held by nobles accounted for much of the exercise of licit power around 1100."[37]

From the mid-eleventh century on, however, this system of rule entered into a period of deepening crisis. Even as some lords began to aggregate vast lands and amass enormous power, the direct exercise of personal domination began to generate a destabilizing reaction on the part of those social forces that were subject to it. Against the backdrop of a still-resonating body of classical and early medieval ideas of public order and legitimate authority, Bisson argues, the lived reality of increasingly coercive and violent lordship inevitably gave rise to growing outrage at the institution of lord-rulership. Drawing on these sources, clerics, political thinkers (such a John of Salisbury) and publicists alike began to develop critiques of lordly tyranny—critiques which grew increasingly sharp and which ultimately had the effect of progressively delegitimizing the *status quo* among those social orders subject to lordly predation. This was paralleled by an internal crisis of the lordly class—manifesting itself as large-scale inter-noble violence, insubordination of castellans, dynastic disputes and "political" assassination—that fuelled a growing sense even among lord-rulers and their retinues that the *status quo* was unsustainable and that something had to be done to avert the collapse of the entire social order.

Confronted with this "crisis of lordship," medieval political thinkers began to work out new ways of approaching the inter-related issues of governance, power and authority. Drawing on the cultural resources available to them—the principles of legitimate rulership that had

emerged out of the Investiture Controversy; the concepts and proce-
dures of Roman and canon law; the teachings of scripture and patristic
thought; the long-known works of Cicero and other classical writers;
the recently rediscovered works of Aristotle (*Ethics* and *Politics*); and
the example of the Church—from the beginning of the twelfth century
on thinkers such as John of Salisbury, Azo, Thomas Aquinas, John of
Paris, Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham were developing new
conceptual languages and methodologies for thinking about (and debat-
ing) the question of how political communities should best be conceived,
constructed and governed.[38] As we shall see, their answers to this ques-
tion included ideas of sovereignty, territorial political community,
individual and collective liberty, public authority, the common good,
property rights, citizenship, limited government and constitutionalism.
In short, their solution to the crisis of lordship was to (re)invent the
"state"—that is, a territorially defined, governed political community
claiming and exercising temporal sovereignty. It is true, of course, that
these thinkers did not coin the term "state" as a label for the territorially
bounded, governed political community that they envisioned as an alter-
native to lord-rulership. *Pace* political theorists like Skinner and con-
structivist IR scholars such as Osiander, however, this "does not mean
that the concept of the State escaped [the medievals], at least not in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries."[39] As Antony Black, Susan Reynolds,
Sverre Bagge and others have argued persuasively, it simply means that
political thinkers of this era used a different vocabulary—*regnum*, *civi-
tas*, *respublica*, *universitas regni*—to make sense of their political reali-
ties and to refer to what would later be labeled "the state."[40] Ultimately,
the point is that whatever they called it, by 1300 at the latest the con-
cept of the state had become well established in the social imaginary of
the ruling class of Latin Christendom, acting as a kind of "constitutive
ideal" that shaped the way power-holders both understood the world
and acted in it.[41]

### The Constitutive Ideal of the Late Medieval State

The constitutive ideal of the state that emerged out of the crisis of lord-
rulership comprised three core elements: a historically specific concept of
political community; an ensemble of constitutive beliefs about the "moral
purpose" of such a community; and a historically specific concept of "sov-
ereignty" that differentiated and legitimated individual political commu-
nities. Taken together, this constellation of intersubjective beliefs, social
institutions and constitutive norms constituted a kind of "global cultural
script" that was enacted by late medieval actors claiming legitimate political
authority. Such scripts defined what constituted a legitimate actor, invested
that actor with a basic identity and entailed set of interests, and established
the basic parameters of rightful or legitimate conduct. They can thus be

said to have constituted, animated and constrained the units that came to comprise the late medieval state-system.

### The Late Medieval Understanding of "Political Community"

At the heart of the late medieval constitutive ideal of the state stood a historically specific understanding of "political community."[42] Drawing on the cultural raw materials available to them—especially the recently recovered political thought of Aristotle and the recently revived principles of Roman civil law, but older (especially Biblical, Ciceronian and Germanic) notions as well—late medieval philosophers, scholars, polemicists and jurists reacted to the twelfth century crisis of lord-rulership by articulating a new constitutive ideal of political community (*communitas politica*, *civitas* or *communitas civilis*).[43] Perhaps not surprisingly given the materials they were working with, this new ideal was grounded in a widely shared conception of the naturalness, necessity and/or desirability of political association. Within the Augustinian tradition, while such associations may have been understood as an unfortunate by-product of original sin, they were nevertheless viewed as natural and necessary.[44] As Augustine himself had argued, pre-lapsarian humans were by nature *social* animals, but not *political* ones; before the Fall, people socialized naturally and had no need for coercive institutions that impinged on human liberty. After humanity's Fall, however, such institutions became necessary as both a punishment and remedy for sin. Although Augustine rejected the idea that political institutions had a positive role to play in salvation history, he nevertheless recognized that they were a necessary precondition for peace and order. Within the Aristotelian and Ciceronian traditions, on the other hand, human beings were understood to be "political animals" whose very nature—even before the Fall—required them to live within a *political* community (*polis*). For thinkers like Aquinas, the political community was necessary and ubiquitous because it was a product of human nature; only within such a community was the cultivation of virtue and the realization of human potential (toward which humanity was naturally inclined) fully possible.[45] To the extent that these two traditions defined the horizons of the late medieval political imagination, they effectively worked together to embed and naturalize the belief that people naturally lived in political communities and that it was good for them to do so.

   How, then, did the late medievals imagine these political communities? To begin with, there can be little doubt that they imagined them in organological terms—that is, in terms of a *corpus* (body) comprising multiple *membra* (limbs), each playing a specialized role in support of the whole. Black summarizes this organic metaphor or corporeal analogy thus: it "signified the relationship between members . . . as that of parts having separate functions within a single unit, and at the same time suggested that a society was a structure with a common interest, and perhaps a common motive, purpose

and will."[46] While the organic metaphor was originally applied to the Church specifically (the Body of Christ or *corpus Christi*), and was sometimes applied to society in the abstract, by the late Middle Ages it had come to be applied predominantly to the political community (the body of the *respublica* or *corpus rei publicae*).[47] In this context, the "'members' of [the] body were ranks or groups: individuals entered the picture as occupants of certain 'offices' performing appropriate 'duties' (*officia*)."[48] To be certain, various thinkers certainly differed with respect to the details of offices, duties and functions—indeed, as Nederman has argued, despite broad agreement on some of the basics, the organic metaphor was less a fixed idea than a "site of intellectual and political struggle among many contending interpretations and interests."[49] Generally speaking, however, the ranks or offices that comprised the body politic were thought to be the prince, who was typically equated with the head of the body; "the various 'organs' of government," which functioned as the "senses and viscera" of the office of the crown; the clergy, who were likened to the soul; the "knights and lesser royal officials [who were analogized to] the hands"; and the peasants, who played the role of the feet.[50] Beyond this, the metaphor typically likened the law to the "muscles and sinews, or perhaps the central nervous system" of the body politic and analogized the common good of the community to the health of the body.[51] The significance of this metaphor was that it tended to naturalize both the idea of what Aquinas called "complete community" and the belief that such communities must necessarily be internally ordered along hierarchical lines. As originally articulated by John of Salisbury, the corporeal analogy was also significant in that it represented an attempt to "fit the functions of the state within the dominant ideology of the time, which conceived of Christendom as a society of three orders—those who prayed (oratores), fought (bellatores) and worked (laboratores)."[52]

Significantly, in the late medieval political imaginary the body politic was understood in territorial terms. Although they do not use the conceptual language employed by Ruggie, historians such as Perroy, Guenée, Pennington, Black, Watts and Reynolds all paint a picture of late medieval political life in which units of rule were *territorial* (in the sense that they were defined by geographical contiguity rather than consanguinity or some other principle), *territorially fixed* (in the sense that they mapped onto "natural" or "historical" spaces) and *territorially exclusive* (in the sense that political communities were mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion).[53] There were debates, of course, between those who believed the optimal scale of the political community to be the city-state versus and those who believed it to be the kingdom or Empire.[54] In principle, however, it was generally accepted that, whatever its scale, the complete community was territorially limited in nature. In short, by end of the thirteenth century, the constitutive norms that had licensed non-exclusive forms of territoriality during the high medieval era of lord-rulership had given way to a new norm of territorial exclusiveness. Supreme authority in temporal

affairs was thought to be vested in a single public body (not, as Ruggie claimed, "personalized and parcelized within and across territorial formations") and membership in a political community was thought to be a function of residence within increasingly hard (i.e. non-porous) borders.

Despite the conventional wisdom among IR constructivists, there is considerable support among historians of this era for the proposition that late medieval people (or at least late medieval social and political elites) also understood political communities in terms of ethnic or national identity. As Black puts it:

> It is commonly thought and partially true that *national* divisions became sharper during the later Middle Ages. The European peoples had always kept their own languages, laws and customs; and many had a distinct consciousness of themselves as political units under their own king, to be governed by their own native traditions. Many people, as individuals and as communities, were aware of their national identity and regarded it as a significant social fact about themselves: English, Franks or Frenchmen, Spaniards, Magyars and so on. In the later Middle Ages there were trends towards a more articulate self-consciousness of nationhood.[55]

At the dawn of the late Middle Ages, these national divisions may have assumed the form of "a limited consciousness of cultural, ethnic and linguistic distinctions among societal elites" or "peasant xenophobia."[56] Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, national identity grew in political significance. During the era of feudal monarchy, political communities were typically held together through the institutions of vassalage, marriage and ultimately war. While these strategies persisted through the late medieval era (and, indeed, well into the modern), by the early fourteenth century "marriage and lines of succession were unable to create or sustain any State."[57] Increasingly, the viability and stability of political communities (whether city-states, simple kingdoms, composite kingdoms or even the Empire) was dependent on its political elite's ties of blood, language, law, custom, government and territory—i.e., a common national identity.[58] Guenée succinctly summarizes this dynamic thus: "in order to flourish and endure a State had to be grounded in a nation."[59] These nations were constructed, of course: the point Reynolds, Guenée and (especially) Watts are making is that "'national' identities were more properly 'regnal' identities, deriving their solidarity from common government" and the efforts of regnal authorities to weave shared language, customs, (imagined) blood ties and institutions into a single *gens* (people) or *natio* (nation). And the definitive alignment of national identity and political community, of course, did not occur until the modern era; despite its growing salience, during the late Middle Ages national consciousness did not "possess the primacy over other identities—political, regional or social—that it

was to later acquire."[60] Nevertheless, the "coalescence of political, ethnic and juridical identities was one of the most significant developments in later medieval political culture."[61] Relatively weak at the beginning of the epoch, the view that nation, government and territory should coincide to form an Aristotelian "complete community" was powerfully shaping both the internal and external policies of states by the end.[62]

In some ways most importantly, during this period political community was understood largely in terms of the Roman law concept of the corporation (*universitas*). Originally developed in classical times to refer to "associations of persons in both public and private law,"[63] by the twelfth century the concept was being taken up by jurists to define the structure of small groups within the Church (a cathedral chapter, for example) as well as the universal Church itself. In both cases, they defined the corporation as a community (a) possessing a distinctive legal personality, (b) shaped by its own unique customs, purpose and composition and (c) simultaneously "composed of a plurality of human beings and an abstract unitary entity perceptible only to the intellect."[64] The jurists also fashioned a doctrine of the proper relationship between the corporation, its members and its "head." Basically, the head of the corporation was the embodiment of the legal person of the corporation and enjoyed considerable authority to act autonomously on its behalf. Significantly, however, corporation theory also placed strict limits on this authority. Above all, the head of the corporation was required to honor the customs and constitution of the corporation, to seek the counsel and consent of its members and to act in its best interests. Breach of this contract between the head of a corporation and its members constituted grounds for the removal of the head.[65]

From the thirteenth century on canonists and jurists readily applied corporation theory to the essentially political question of how to reconstruct public authority and political community in the aftermath of the crisis of lord-rulership. During the course of the fourteenth century, for example, jurists such as Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357) and Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400) applied corporation theory to the thorny issue of the constitutional relationship between the Empire and the independent cities and kingdoms within and around it. Seeking to establish a legal foundation for the political communities that were emerging out of the wreckage of the high medieval/feudal order, these and other jurists came to conceive of emerging political communities as "political corporations." As such, they had several defining characteristics. First, political communities were understood to be simultaneously a collection of individual human beings and an "abstract unitary entity."[66] Second, as an abstract entity, the political community-as-corporation "possessed a juridical personality distinct from that of its particular members."[67] As Canning puts it, "through a constructive use of fiction the [thirteenth and fourteenth century] jurists had created a legal entity with legal capabilities and a purely legal existence: the corporation was, in short, a fictive person (*persona ficta*)."[68] Third, the fictive person of the political community was immortal. It possessed an undying legal

personality that transcended the mortal existence of the persons it comprised. Finally, they came to view rulers of political communities as public figures embodying the corporation. In Roman corporation law, all power had resided in the corporation and was delegated to the leader. In late medieval corporation theory, ultimate power was understood to reside in the political-community-as-corporation and was delegated to the sovereign. As a result, the sovereign was considered to be greater than any individual member of the corporation, but was subordinate to the corporate whole from which he derived his authority.[69]

In the imaginative structure of the late Middle Ages, the flourishing of political-communities-as-corporations was understood to require "government"—that is, a public institution capable of steering the community to its appointed end.[70] In the preceding high medieval period, of course, the classical concept of government as public authority had been effectively eclipsed by the ideal and reality of "lordship"—that is, rule over dependent persons (peasants, knights, vassals) through personal command and direct domination.[71] This mode of political organization was based on the practical and conceptual fusion of ownership and rulership. "Moreover, the right to govern was confused with all kinds of other rights and powers: with property rights in the secular world, with sacramental power of orders in the Church and, in both spheres, with a mere capacity of the wise to discern pre-existing law."[72] In such a system, "political" obligation and allegiance was to a superordinate *person* rather than a public *office*. Throughout the twelfth century, however, the revival of Roman law and the rediscovery of Aristotelian political science enabled and encouraged medieval thinkers to reinvigorate classical notions of public authority and territorial "jurisdiction" (a term connoting legitimate public authority to judge and command within a given territory). Of particular importance in this connection, the Roman law distinction between private law (*ius privatum*) and public law (*ius publicum*) encouraged a sharper distinction to be drawn not only between the public and private realms, but between owning and governing.[73] Under the influence of both canon and civil jurists, the former came to be defined as the proprietary right to own, use and even alienate property, while the latter came to be understood as the public authority to judge, legislate and command for the "common good." Armed with this distinction, jurists and political thinkers were subsequently able to conceptualize government as a properly political order of power "distinct from other orders (military, religious, economic and so on)."[74] According to this new or revived ideal, governments exercised jurisdiction over a territorially defined political-community-as-corporation. This jurisdiction might be regnal (i.e. pertaining to the Empire, kingdom or principality) or merely municipal in scale, but by definition it necessarily involved public authority to rule over a territorially bounded corporate entity.

Reflecting the logic of corporation theory, the jurisdiction possessed by government was understood to be a bundle of rights, prerogatives and

powers that inhered in the corporation (whether city-state, kingdom or Empire) rather than the individual office-holder or, as in the preceding era, the person of a banal lord. Formally at least, this meant that office-holders exercised public authority on behalf of the corporation. This was especially true of the supreme public office-holder, the prince, who was widely understood to be a personification of the entire community-as-corporation. As Canning puts it, the "immortal corporation of the kingdom established a similarly undying legal person, the royal office or *dignitas*, which it conferred on its mortal king for him to operate."[75] In contrast to the norms of early medieval lord-rulership, this meant that for later medievals political obligation and allegiance was not to a superordinate *person* (a lord), but to a *corporate political community* that was institutionalized in the office of the "crown" and embodied in the public persona of the prince.[76]

## The Moral Purpose of the Late Medieval State

By the thirteenth century, then, these various streams of political thought had merged to produce the basic constitutive ideal of the late medieval governed political community. But what were the ends of such a community? What was the fundamental social good toward which it was ordered and from which it derived it legitimacy? In short, what was the *moral purpose* of the late medieval state?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to trace some of the main lines of thought regarding the "common good" (*bonnum commune*, *bonnum rei publicum*, *utilitas publica*, etc.), "the phrase most frequently used in official documents and philosophical treatises [of the period] when referring to the goal or morality of government."[77] In the late medieval political imaginary, the common good referred to the good of all members of society, as opposed to one or a few. Some thinkers understood it to be the sum total of the individual goods of the members of the community; others as the corporate good of the community as a whole. Some understood it in fairly utilitarian terms (peace, security); others in more ethical terms (justice, liberty); and still others in terms of "sufficiency" and virtue. Whatever the specific meaning imputed to it by various thinkers, however, there was broad agreement that the common good either was superior to the individual good or that there was no real tension between the two. There was also a broad consensus that promotion of the common good was the purpose of all authority, temporal as well as spiritual. As Thomas Aquinas put it, "The first duty of the ruler is to govern his subjects according to the rules of law and justice with a view to the common good of the community as a whole."[78] Indeed, to the later medievals the commitment to—and ability to cultivate—the common good was viewed as "the bench-mark of valid law and government";[79] and the "determining criterion for the legitimacy of the political community."[80] In short, the promotion of the common good constituted the moral purpose of the state.

Underpinning, informing and delimiting the diversity of views regarding the nature and content of the common good were two main currents of philosophical thought. The first, deriving from the works of Augustine of Hippo, framed the common good in terms of peace, order and security.[81] *Contra* Aristotle's views (which he knew only indirectly through the works of Cicero), Augustine argued that the common good had nothing at all to do with the shared pursuit of virtue or morality—indeed, he argued that such a common enterprise was a logical impossibility. All human political communities, according to Augustine, comprised a mixture of the citizens of the Heavenly City (i.e. the just and virtuous) and the Earthly City (the unjust and vicious). As these two groups had radically opposed supreme "loves" or values—one, God; the other, Man—they simply could not share a common set of fundamental interests, purposes or ends. In other words, there could be no such thing as the "common good" in the Cicernonian or Aristotelian sense. All that was possible was a qualified agreement on limited number of intermediate goods that had a "common usefulness" (*communis utilitas*): peace, concord, "the satisfaction of material needs, security from attack and orderly social intercourse."[82] On this view, the *communis utilitas* was an essentially amoral phenomenon having to do exclusively with the material security and well-being of the community and its members. The realization of this set of shared objectives in some meaningful measure might, of course, provide a context within which people could act virtuously—Christians could take advantage of it to seek fuller communion with God—but it could also benefit non-Christians pursuing the decidedly more worldly ends of personal glory and material self-interest. Ultimately, for Augustine and those influenced by his thought, the common good (redefined as *communis utilitas*) was understood in terms of peace and *order* rather than peace and *virtue*.

Entailed in this conception of the common good was an understanding of the moral purpose of the institutions through which this good was to be promoted—the state. For Augustine, the moral purpose of the state was restricted to promoting a limited set of intermediate (and instrumental) interests by imposing what he calls "earthly peace."[83] As Markus puts it, for Augustine:

> The business of government is not the promotion of the good life, or virtue or perfection, but the more modest task of cancelling out at least some of the effects of sin. Its function, summarily stated, is to resolve some of the tensions in society and to contain those that cannot be resolved. In the condition of radical insecurity—"this hell on earth"—political authority exists "to safeguard security and sufficiency (*securitatem et sufficientam vitae*)."[84]

The Augustinian state was thus Janus-faced: internally its moral purpose was to maintain peace and order; externally, it was to provide a

defensive carapace within which Christians could use this peace and order to seek God (which for Augustine was the definition of virtue) even as the pagans used them for other purposes (which for Augustine was the definition of vice).

As Kempshall has argued, later medieval understandings of the common good and the moral purpose of the state were deeply indebted to, and powerfully shaped by, this Augustinian view of the nature and purpose of political life.[85] But the political thought of this era was also had an important Aristotelian dimension. Drawing heavily on the recently reintroduced works of Aristotle (especially his *Politics* and *Ethics*), later medieval thinkers such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Ptolemy of Lucca and Remigio de Girolami developed a concept of the common good that was firmly rooted in the Aristotelian notion of "life of virtue." For Aristotle, of course, a truly ethical life—the "good life"—involved the fulfillment of man's distinctive purpose or nature (*telos*), which he defined as his capacity both to reason (i.e. to be rational) and to order his life according to the dictates of reason (i.e. to live a life of virtue or moral excellence). Building on this, Aristotle went on to argue that the purpose of associating in political communities was the fulfillment of its members' distinctively human nature—that is, their full flourishing as rational, moral and social animals—through education and through laws which prescribed certain actions and prohibit others.[86] As he put in the *Ethics* (1099b30): "The end of politics is the best of ends; and the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions." On Aristotle's view, then, the common good of the political community was not merely the provision of the material necessities of life, but rather the promotion of what he called the "good life" (the life of virtue). Commenting on and applying these arguments in the later medieval context, thinkers in this tradition tended to agree with Aristotle's definition of the *bonum commune*: for them, the common good was primarily about moral goodness and the life of virtue.[87] To be sure, there were significant debates among these later medieval Aristotelians: nominalists like William of Ockham, for example, viewed the common good as nothing more than the sum total of individual goods, while so-called realists tended to view it in more corporate terms.[88] And later medievals typically disagreed with the Philosopher on the nature of complete human fulfillment: while Aristotle emphasized humanity's independent capacity to fulfill its own nature, medieval political thinkers assumed and insisted that true fulfillment (*beatitudo*) was dependent both on God's grace (the Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection) and, *ipso facto*, on the Church as a sign and instrument of that grace. At a very basic level, however, all agreed with Aristotle that the ultimate moral purpose of associating in political communities was to fulfill human nature and enable the virtuous life of the citizenry.

In turn, this less pessimistic understanding of the common good gave rise to a less pessimistic view of the moral purpose of government and

the state. In the works of significant political thinkers and writers such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Brunetto Latini, Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent we find discussions and debates about the positive role to be played by the state in promoting the common good of the community and its constituent elements. *Contra* Augustine, these thinkers argued that the fundamental moral purpose of the state was not to punish and remedy sin, but to promote true human fulfillment (often called in the political context "happiness" or *felicitas*). Although there were differences in emphasis, Aristotelian political thinkers argued that this required the state to engage in moral regulation and education; "coordinate the division of labour and other complexities" inherent in political communities;[89] promote economic security and prosperity; provide welfare for those most in need, "notably in biblical categories (the poor, orphans, widows)";[90] uphold the law; promote justice; maintain social peace; "repress those prone to vices"; and defend the political community against aggression or injury from external sources.[91] They invariably justified such activities in essentially Aristotelian terms: they were necessary in order to create the conditions within which citizens could enjoy lives of peace, order, material sufficiency and moral virtue—that is, to live the Aristotelian good life. While sin and the Fall were certainly not absent from this intellectual tradition, they played a far less central role in morally grounding the state than they did for Augustine and his successors.

It is important, of course, not to overstate the discreteness of these two traditions. The preference of late medieval thinkers "for eradicating contradiction wherever possible, their practice of transferring arguments and terms from one context to another, their shared Latinity and shared methodology, such as the tradition of glossing authoritative texts, or the practices of syllogistic reasoning, all combined to make the ideas and terms used one branch of learning available to those in other branches."[92] As a result of this synthesizing tendency, by 1300 these two "political languages" had to a considerable extent become fused, constituting "a common stock of words, themes and images to which every specific political attitude had to pay attention or adapt itself."[93] To be sure, the labels "Augustinian" and "Aristotelian" provide a serviceable framework for identifying currents or tendencies within late medieval political thought. But almost all historians of political thought now acknowledge that during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries these two traditions became interwoven to such an extent that they constituted a single pool of political "words, themes and images." This being the case, it makes little sense to see the later medieval conception of the moral purpose of the state as an either-or proposition pitting an Augustinian emphasis on peace and security against and Aristotelian emphasis on "happiness." Rather, contemporary historiography suggests that if we really want to grasp the fundamental moral purposes of the state in this era, we must begin with the assumption that it is a somewhat fuzzy, "syncretic," norm involving peace, security *and* happiness.[94]

What, then, were the specific elements of this syncretic norm? Simply put, by the end of the thirteenth century, the moral purpose of the state had come to be widely understood as involving the provision of a limited set of public goods necessary to the full flourishing of both the constituent elements of the political community (individuals, families and the Church) and its corporate personality. While there were certainly differences in emphasis among various political thinkers, the provision of two broad types of public good were widely acknowledged to be central to the moral purpose of the state. *Internally*, "everyone agreed that the fundamental task of the State was to ensure peace."[95] Emerging largely in response to the twelfth century crisis of lord-rulership, the state was in effect genetically ordered toward the suppression of private violence, the pacification of the domestic political life of the community and the regulation of internal conflict. Reflecting the views of both Augustine and Aristotle, the late medieval political imaginary emphasized the role of the state in promoting "concord" (*concordia*), "defined, not as agreement on the common good of virtue, but simply by its opposite, by the absence of discord and contention."[96] *Concordia*, it was generally believed, was a necessary precondition for political community; internal peace and the "tranquility of order" (*tranquilitis ordinis*) a prerequisite for the benefits of social life. In the late medieval political imaginary, the fundamental end to which the state was ordered was peace and concord (*pax et concordia*).

But if maintaining peace was the fundamental purpose of the state, "the only means of ensuring peace was to establish justice."[97] The promotion of justice thus constituted a second element of the moral purpose of the state; as Guenée puts it, it was the very "dynamic and purpose of the State."[98] This, of course, begs the question: what do we mean by justice? Or rather, in more historicist terms, how did late medieval Latin Christians understand the concept of justice? Anthony Black provides a succinct and useful answer to this question:

> Justice could refer to objective norms such as the Ten Commandments and the classical virtues (*honestas* and so on); or, again, to "subjective" rights, honours, liberties and privileges, which belonged to particular groups or individuals on the basis of custom or charter. These included the respective status of lord and serf, the rights and liberties of towns, and rights such as those enumerated in the English Great Charter of 1215. To a certain extent these objective and subjective aspects coincided: not to murder, steal, commit adultery, bear false witness meant respecting the persons, properties and good names of others. When justice was defined, following the *Digest*, as "to give each his due (*ius suum cuique tribuere*)", this could refer to either aspect, but especially the subjective ("*his* due"). Philosophers and theologians tended to emphasize objective justice; jurists and William of Ockham tended to emphasise subjective rights.[99]

Justice, in other words, was a matter of maintaining the morally correct ordering of things and of protecting the objective and subjective rights of the constituent elements of the political community. With respect to the latter, while the rights claimed by individuals and collectivities varied considerably across the polities of Latin Christendom (and, indeed, over time as well), the state was universally conceived of as the institution that ensured that each received "his due." In the late medieval political imaginary, then, upholding objective and subjective rights, and providing reliable means of redress when these were violated, was central to the moral purpose of the state. Indeed, for the later medievals as for Aristotle, "the administration of justice [was] the very structure of the political community."[100]

In practical terms, the law was the primary mechanism through which the abstract notion of justice was made manifest within late medieval political communities. While individual thinkers might differ with respect to details, generally speaking the late medieval political imaginary posited three basic types of law: eternal or divine law, or the rational plan by which God ordered all of creation; natural law, or the binding rules of moral behavior rooted in human nature and reason; and human law, or the laws and customs made by human beings. "Whereas eternal and natural laws are immutable, positive law . . . varies with time and place, and is even perfectible; it is possible to make alterations to correct its defects and to make it correspond more exactly to the exigencies of natural law."[101] Within this imaginary, the moral purpose of the state was to respect divine and natural law; to enforce human law; to reform customary and positive laws in order to make them conform more closely to natural law and to serve the common good; and to adjudicate legal disputes. In a very real sense, then, the late medieval state was a "law state"—that is, a state genetically ordered to upholding the law through its civil and criminal courts and other offices.[102] Its very *raison d'être* was to maintain the domestic peace by perfecting and enforcing the law.

*Externally*, the political community was understood as having moral purposes related to the pursuit of its corporate "common good" within a broader society of states. In this connection, the most fundamental moral purpose of the state was the defense and security of its associated political community. Aquinas, summing up the common sense of the era, put it thus: "Just as the rulers of a city-state, kingdom or province rightly defend its public order against internal disturbance . . . so too rulers have the right to safeguard the public order against external enemies, by using the sword of war."[103] Beyond this, however, it was widely believed that states were morally obliged to assert, defend and recover the corporate rights of the political community within the broader society of states. As Watts puts it, "From a juridical perspective, it was entirely proper to pursue one's rights, regardless of the social and political damage inflicted—indeed, since the whole order of the universe was rooted in law and justice, it could be improper not to."[104] This applied to states as well as individuals and other collectivities, all of which

jealously guarded and vigorously asserted what they took to be their customary, feudal or legal rights. Simply put, the vindication of a state's subjective rights, or even that which state officials felt was due the political community on the basis of objective justice, was one of the defining elements of late medieval culture. Typically, this took place within courts or through arbitration. When these institutions failed, however, states (though not individuals and other non-state actors) were within their rights—indeed, were morally obliged—to take up arms to in pursuit of their cause.

### *Sovereignty in the Late Middle Ages*

In late medieval Latin Christendom, the constitutive ideal of the state also included a historically specific norm of sovereignty. The crystallization of this norm was a complex phenomenon that began not with Bodin or Hobbes in the sixteenth century, but with the reintroduction of Roman law to Latin Christendom in the late eleventh. Classical Roman law, of course, held that the Emperor enjoyed supreme *imperium* or *potestas*—that is, the authority to legislate, command and judge—even going so far as to state that "the prince [Emperor] is not bound by the law."[105] On this view, the will of the prince was held to be absolute; as the classical Roman jurist Ulpian famously put it: "what pleases the prince has force of law."[106] Against the backdrop of the reformist institution-building efforts of the papacy from the eleventh century onwards, during the twelfth century canonists grafted these ideas onto pre-existing Christian understandings of episcopal authority to construct a specifically ecclesiastical notion of sovereignty: *plenitudo potestatis* or fullness of power. Also known as *plena potestas* (full power) and *libera potestas* (unlimited power), this concept was used by canonists to convey the unique nature of the pope's supreme ecclesiastical authority, his ability to promulgate new canon laws, his supreme judicial authority and his role as pastor of the entire universal Church.[107] Under the influence of the canonist Hostiensis, further refinements were subsequently made to the idea of papal sovereignty over the Church, the most important of which was the introduction of the concept of *potestas absoluta* or absolute power. According to Hostiensis, *potestas absoluta*—significantly, deriving not from the corporate community of Christian believers, but from the pope's authority as vicar of Christ—placed the pontiff above the law, much as classical Roman law deemed the Emperor to be above the law. Within the Church, at least, this meant that the pope enjoyed the kind of undivided and absolute sovereign authority that Bodin would theorize in connection with states several centuries later. While the fourteenth century conciliar movement would later dissipate/dilute papal sovereignty to some degree, and while it would migrate into the temporal realm in a somewhat modified form, the concept of sovereignty—not modern sovereignty to be sure, but sovereignty nonetheless—was decisively reintroduced into European political thought and practice by the end of the twelfth century.[108]

Based partly on these developments and partly on the continuing study and application of Roman law, from the twelfth century onwards canon and civilian jurists also developed concepts of *political* sovereignty.[109] "According to classical Roman law, the emperor's sovereignty encompassed all lesser kings, princes and magistrates."[110] It is perhaps not surprising, then, to find pro-imperial political thinkers expressing similar claims regarding the Emperor's sovereignty in late medieval times. As John Watts has put it, "From the 1150s, [Emperor] Barbarossa and his heirs employed Roman law terminology and claimed the sovereign, and remarkably complete, legislative and judicial rights which the Roman people were thought to have handed over to their ruler" via the *lex regia*.[111] In the words of the German canonist Johannes Teutonicus, who wrote several authoritative glosses on the *Decretum* and subsequent papal decretals (including Pope Innocent III's *Venerabilem),* "the emperor is over all kings . . . for he is lord of the world [*dominus mundi*] . . . all things are in the power of the emperor."[112] On this view, just as the Emperor of ancient Rome had enjoyed *imperium*—i.e. the supreme authority to legislate, command and judge—so too did his later medieval "successor," the Holy Roman Emperor. In 1231 Frederick II promulgated a new imperial constitution, the *Liber Augustulis*, in which he formalized this claim to universal *imperium*. Citing the classical Roman *lex regia*, Frederick asserted that as the successor to the Roman Emperors of antiquity he had inherited the supreme temporal authority that his predecessors had originally received from the Roman people. Whatever Frederick's ability to give practical effect to this claim to *imperium*, it is clear that by the mid-thirteenth century at the latest the *concept* of temporal sovereignty had fully crystallized in the imaginative structure of Latin Christendom.

While Roman law had explicitly vested full temporal sovereignty in the Emperor, the political realities of late medieval Latin Christendom were such that other authorities could also claim to be sovereign. As early as the eleventh century, kings and princes had begun proclaiming "their sovereignty by taking the title of emperor and adopting his attributes."[113] These claims were recognized (to varying degrees) in the political thought of the era: "Roger II of Sicily had his sovereignty recognized by the papacy and adopted a closed crown like that worn by the Emperors; Galbert of Bruges called Louis VI *imperator Franciae*; John of Salisbury said of Henry I of England that in his own realm he was *rex, legatus apostolicus, patriarcha, imperator.*"[114] Perhaps more importantly, they were also given increasing legal weight and precision in both canon and civil law. In his famous decretal, *Per venerabilim* (1202), Pope Innocent III stated that the king of France recognized no superior in temporal affairs.[115] Canon lawyers subsequently developed two doctrines of regnal sovereignty. The first stated that the king was Emperor in his own kingdom (*rex in regno suo est imperator regni sui*). Originating in the works of Alanus Anglicus *c*. 1200, "during the course of the thirteenth century, jurists . . . elaborated this formula as a claim to

the sovereign independence of kings in the sense that the king within the territory of his kingdom exercised the same authority as the emperor did in the empire as a whole."[116] The second doctrine, deriving directly from commentary on *Per venerabilem*, held that certain kings were sovereign in that they recognized no superior in temporal affairs (*rex qui superiorem non recognoscit*).[117] Significantly, thirteenth century canonists commenting on *Per venerabilem* disagreed as to whether it established *de facto* or *de iure* sovereignty. For those subscribing to the former view, regnal sovereignty was derived from and legitimated by the universal authority of the Empire; for those holding the latter view, the Empire was but one of many territorially limited sovereign states, and regnal sovereignty was in no way derived from imperial sovereignty. With the proclamation of Pope Clement V's bull, *Patoralis cura*, in 1313, however, canonist thinking seems to have crystallized in favor of the *de iure* interpretation. Written to support Robert of Naples in his dispute with Emperor Henry VII over the sovereignty of the kingdom of Sicily, this bull definitively established the canon law precepts that the Empire was a geographically limited state, that the Emperor possessed sovereign authority only within that state, and that states beyond the Empire were sovereign in law and without reference to the (non-existent) universal jurisdiction of the Empire.[118]

In civil law, two parallel approaches to the issue of sovereignty evolved. On the one hand, the jurists Bartolus and Baldus, building on the earlier writings of French and Italian Commentators such as Jacobus de Ravannis, Petrus de Bellapertica and Cynus de Pistoia, developed a doctrine of *de facto* sovereignty.[119] For these jurists, regnal or municipal sovereignty was not merely arrogated political power exercised in defiance of the law. Rather, it was a form of legitimate supreme authority exercised in those places where effective imperial jurisdiction had lapsed or been rejected. For Bartolus, this authority was to be found in customary law. Custom, he argued, was made by (tacit) consent of the people and did not require the formal authorization of superior. Thus, if a city expressed through customary law—i.e through practice over time—that it was a free people (*populus liber*), and that it did not recognize any superior authority, it became a *civitas sibi princeps*—a "city that was its own emperor." Such a city could then legitimately exercise the same jurisdiction within its borders as the Emperor exercised in the Empire as a whole. On this view, although the Empire continued to possess the highest or purest form of sovereignty (*de iure*), self-governing municipalities could claim a lesser, but still fully legitimate and lawful, form of sovereignty (*de facto*). For Bartolus' student Baldus, *de facto* sovereignty was similarly justified in terms of acting in the place of the Emperor (*vice principis*) and unilaterally exercising his sovereignty. He also developed a philosophical (as opposed to merely legal) foundation for *de facto* sovereignty, grounding it in both natural law and the *ius gentium* expression of that law.[120]

On the other hand, a number of civilian lawyers made the case that sovereignty was *de iure*. The jurist Marinus da Caramanico (d. 1288), for example, argued that as the Roman Empire of classical times had been based on force, its medieval successor could claim sovereignty only where it was able to impose it by force; where it could not, the *ius gentium* vested sovereignty in kingdoms.[121] Also grounding his argument in the *ius gentium*, Oldradus da Ponte (d. *c*. 1337) "denied that the Roman emperor was *de iure* lord of the world on the grounds that the Roman people, themselves lacking any just title to dominion over other nations, could not through the *lex regia* transfer any such authority to the emperor."[122] He also maintained that, as the *ius gentium* was superior to Roman civil law, the claims of kingdoms to sovereignty derived from the former were superior to those of imperial sovereignty derived from the latter. Similarly, Andreas de Isernia (d. 1316) argued that with the fall of the Roman Empire the world had returned to a pristine, pre-imperial, condition in which sovereignty had reverted to the once-independent kingdoms that had been forcibly subjugated by Rome. For him, as for many other civilian jurists, the medieval world thus comprised "a plurality of kingdoms with the empire being but one territorial body amongst several."[123]

Paralleling and reinforcing these developments was the evolution of a concept of private property that would play an important role in shaping late medieval discourses of sovereignty. That there is a strong correlation between property regimes and political structures has become something of a commonplace within the constructivist IR literature. Authors such as Ruggie, Kratochwil, Onuf, Burch and Holland have all independently advanced the argument that the revival of Roman private property law had a profound constitutive effect on the modern state and state-system. For Ruggie, Kratochwil, Onuf and Burch, an absolute and exclusive concept of property provided a "generative grammar" or framing analogy for an absolute and exclusive concept of sovereignty. For Holland, it furnished a concept of "representation" (*representatio*) that did important work in the development of the early modern theory of the permanent state, the territorial state and the nation-state.

The proposition that a transformation in property discourses can lead to a transformation in sovereignty discourses is not in question here. This insight is both conceptually fruitful and (at least potentially) historically illuminating. What is in question is the timing of the transformation described by Ruggie, Kratochwil, Onuf and Burch. The idea that the concept of absolute private property emerged only in the modern era and that this concept constituted sovereignty as *modernity's* defining mode of differentiation sits uncomfortably with the findings of historians of the late Middle Ages. To begin with, there is considerable support in the relevant historiography for the propositions that the concept of absolute private property was *not* a modern invention. Rather, it was a late medieval

innovation, emerging primarily as a consequence of the revival of Roman law in the twelfth century and parallel efforts on the part of scholars such as Thomas Aquinas and John of Paris to synthesize Christian theological views regarding human nature with Aristotelian and Ciceronian views of private property.[124] Second, as I have just argued, neither was *sovereignty* a modern invention. It, too, crystallized as a constitutive ideal of political life with the twelfth century revival of Roman law. Finally, as neither absolute private property nor sovereignty were products of modernity it is difficult to see how they could have been constitutive of the *modern* international system—at least not directly. In short, there simply is no warrant in the relevant historiographical literature to support the claim that private property, sovereignty and modern international relations are causally or even temporally connected in the way that Ruggie, Kratochwil, Burch and Onuf suggest.

What, then, *was* the relationship between property rights and crystallization of the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state beginning in the thirteenth century? Or, put slightly differently, how did changing conceptions of property both enable the emergence of the ideal of the corporate-sovereign state and shape that ideal in important ways? Although the answer to this question is necessarily complicated, in broad strokes it can be articulated as follows. First, by 1200 medieval people were able to distinguish between "*dominium* and *jurisdictio*, the right to govern one's own and the right to administer what was not one's own."[125] In other words, they were able to differentiate between the right to administer, hold and alienate property inhering in a person (*dominium*) and the legitimate authority to judge and command inhering in a ruling office (*jurisdictio*).[126] In effect, during the course of the thirteenth century they reversed the conflation of private and public power that characterized the preceding era of lord-rulership, at least conceptually. Second, having distinguished private property from public authority, the late medievals redefined the concept of *dominium*. In the era of lord-rulership, of course, property had been conditional: land was held "in tenure as a fief that carried, along with specific rights to exploit the peasantry, military and administrative duties to the land-granting overlord."[127] Property was thus not owned, but held—and held only on condition that terms of the grant were honored. By the thirteenth century, however, a number of factors—including the commercial revolution; the revival of Roman law; the rediscovery of Aristotle; and debates between the Franciscans and Dominicans over the Church's right to possess worldly goods[128]—had converged to give rise to a new concept of property. This new concept emphasized the natural, unitary, absolute and exclusive nature of property.[129] On this view, lay property was *natural* in the sense that it existed prior to government; it was *unitary* in that ownership rights were vested in a single person; it was *absolute* in the sense that "title" was in no way dependent on proper use or the fulfillment of feudal obligations; and it was *exclusive* in that owners were able to exclude

others from their land or from the use and enjoyment their goods. Although lords continued to enjoy the right to nominal dues over their tenants, all mutuality and conditionality had been drained from both the theory and practice of property rights. By 1300, property was *owned*, not *held* (at least in practice). Finally, even though the two concepts were clearly distinguished in the late medieval imaginative structure, *dominium* came to exert a powerful influence on the discourses of *jurisdictio*. As Kratochwil has argued "the historical roots of the institution of sovereignty are in the conception of exclusive property rights under Roman private law."[130] Property and property rights provided a model and vocabulary for thinking about political authority.[131] As a result, just as property rights came to be understood as unitary, absolute and exclusive, so too did political authority: by 1300, sovereignty was understood to be absolute and a territorially exclusive jurisdiction, at least in temporal matters.

Thus far, the account I have been developing has purposefully foregrounded the continuities between the late medieval and early modern norms of sovereignty. For reasons outlined in Chapter Two, however, at this point it is necessary to cut against the grain of this argument and highlight some of the ways in which the late medieval norm of sovereignty differed from it early modern counterpart—that is, to highlight its "medievalness." A review of both the rupture and continuity literatures suggests four such distinctively late medieval attributes or aspects of sovereignty. First, late medieval states claimed and exercised sovereignty only with respect to temporal affairs, sharing sovereignty with the Church in spiritual matters. Although there were "detailed differences of opinion on matters such as taxation of clerical possessions and the extent of the application of ecclesiastical jurisdiction," the underlying norm—codified in law and reflected in jurisprudence and political thought—was that the clergy and laity constituted two distinct groups and that laymen could not make laws for the clergy.[132] Indeed, while it is possible to identify a *longue durée* tendency toward the "regnalization" of the Church during this era,[133] and to point to thinkers like Marsilius who advocated the subordination of the clergy to the temporal authority, at no point did the norm of sovereignty include claims to a complete regnal authority over ecclesiastical personnel or affairs. Viewed against the backdrop of the doctrine of the Two Swords, it becomes clear that the spiritual sovereignty of the universal Church complicated late medieval sovereignty in ways that were unique to that era. Second, in late medieval Latin Christendom, sovereignty was vested, not in a person (the "prince"), nor even in an office (the "crown"), but in the political-community-as-corporation (the "*populus*"). In the early modern era, of course, one of the defining elements of the norm of sovereignty was that it inhered in the person of the prince. During the late medieval era, however, sovereign authority was part of the bundle of rights possessed by the fictive person of the political corporation. It could be *exercised* by a prince, of course, but only in his capacity as embodiment of the immortal entity of the *populus*.

Absolutism, which vested (unqualified) sovereignty in the prince, and *raison d'état* were post-medieval phenomena that the late medievals would have neither understood nor endorsed.[134] Third, and in a related vein, late medieval sovereignty entailed or connoted *supreme*, rather than *absolute*, temporal authority. In practical terms, this meant that while the prince was the *highest* political authority within a given jurisdiction his power was neither unlimited nor unconstrained. Among the constraints imposed on sovereignty were *ius divinium*, *ius naturale*, *ius gentium*, positive law, reason, custom, the nature of the office of the "crown" and rights of the governed, all of which placed historically specific limits on the sovereign will of the prince. This is in marked contrast to the Absolutist monarchs of the early modern era who were seen as being above all law and custom and whose will (*voluntas*) was actually considered to constitute law.[135] Finally, quite unlike the modern state system, the late medieval society of states was organized in part at least around the principle of "sovereign inequality."[136] I will discuss this in greater depth below. For now, suffice it to say that in the late Middle Ages there was no norm of automatic, reciprocal recognition of claims to sovereignty. These had to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. And, as part of this dynamic, one type of polity (the kingdom) was considered to be a more historical and/or natural locus of sovereignty than all the others. In practice, this meant that kingdoms had the most legitimate claims to sovereignty and were therefore more likely to be recognized as sovereign states by other polities. Principalities, communes and leagues (the other types of polity populating the system) were seen as legitimate claimants of sovereign authority, but somewhat less so than kingdoms. They thus had more difficulty securing the recognition of their claims to sovereignty and as a result were constantly exposed to the threat of absorption or subordination by top-layer regnal authorities.

### War-making Units: The Actually Existing Corporate-Sovereign State

From the mid-thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, political authorities across Latin Christendom enacted this script of corporate-sovereign statehood, creating a constellation of recognizably public authorities possessing a significant war-making capability. Initially at least, the enactment of this script against the backdrop of the complexity that characterized early thirteenth century Latin Christendom meant that these were anything but hard-edged, juridically discrete, territorially disjointed states. Indeed, quite the opposite: reflecting the legacy of the preceding era of lord-rulership, these political structures overlapped and perforated one another in multiple and complex ways. Over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, the progressive enactment of this script meant that these "regnal polities" did come to resemble more closely the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state. To be sure, this was never a linear process; the vicissitudes of war and internal conflicts over jurisdiction and

rights combined to ensure that such polities "could expect to rise and fall, to grow and shrink, to move through phases of relative harmony and disharmony."[137] Nor was it uniform: the internalization of this constitutive norm "depended on the extent to which ruling elites and their advisers were exposed to [it], whether through education in the relatively small number of universities and *studia* that existed before 1300, or through the density of contact with Romanising influences . . ."; and the pace at which this happened necessarily varied from region to region.[138] Despite all this, however, "a general trend toward the further consolidation of territorial states could be perceived" throughout these centuries.[139] Whereas in 1250 such states were porous, perforated and contested, by 1550 they were more or less consolidated regnal polities reflecting—if always imperfectly—the constitutive ideal described above.

But what did these states look like? Or, more precisely, how did the various power-holders that emerged out of the wreckage of the system of lord-rulership give practical effect to the constitutive norm of the corporate-sovereign state? Simply put, the answer to these questions is that the enactment of this norm gave rise to not a single type of state, but to several distinctive variations on the theme of corporate-sovereign statehood. The most common and significant of these were kingdoms, principalities, communes and leagues.

### Kingdoms and Principalities

The kingdom or *regnum* was a territorial political community bound together by common customs, laws and (imagined) descent and ruled by a king or emperor who recognized no superior temporal authority.[140] While kingdoms had existed prior to the late medieval era, of course, during the feudal or high medieval era they had been hollowed out or broken up as public authority was usurped first by great magnates of the realm and then by lesser lords. And while kings had retained many of their historical rights and privileges during the era of lord-rulership, they had lost much of their power, and even authority, to rule. Indeed, in kingdoms such as France the king was both poorer and weaker than many of his nominal subjects, directly governing little more than a royal demesne that was considerably smaller than the lands ruled by the great dukes and counts of the realm. As kings and their officers began enacting this new cultural script, however, kingdoms were reconstituted and reinvigorated, asserting themselves ever more effectively over their claimed, historical or imagined territories. At the risk of oversimplification, this process can be said to have involved the development of four new "media" or "technologies" of rule. The first of these had to do with policy-making and public administration. From the late thirteenth century onward, regnal authorities across Latin Christendom developed increasingly differentiated and specialized governmental structures through which to give effect to the constitutive norm of corporate-

sovereign statehood. This process began with the separation of the king's personal household from the regnal government. From about 1300 onward, the former "confined itself to the personal service of the prince and his entourage," and largely comprised such offices as the kitchen, the Wardrobe and the Chamber and such officers as the steward and the butler.[141] The latter, on the other hand, was responsible for the "business of administering the State," and originally comprised the office of the crown (the transpersonal body of regnal rights and powers required for the rule of the realm), the chancery (the office responsible for the production and transmission of official documents), the royal or privy council (comprising the king's counselors and responsible for advising him on matters of state) and the regnal-level representative assembly (comprising representatives of the political community—typically organized into "estates"—responsible for making the most difficult decisions affecting the realm, acting as high court, and making new laws). This process didn't end there, however: throughout Latin Christendom the centuries following 1300 saw the development of numerous specialized councils and offices responsible for administering the judicial, fiscal, diplomatic and military affairs of the kingdom. At the top level, these could be either distinct institutions or departments (the Exchequer in England, for example) or more informal arrangements within the privy council (diplomacy, for example, was typically administered by a few experienced members of the council). At the lower levels, this process of administrative ramification took the form of the creation of innumerable specialist offices such as sheriffs, *bailli*, *prèvôtés*, escheators, tax assessors/collectors, coroners, seneschals and so on to keep the king's peace, raise the revenues needed by the regnal government and otherwise serve the interests of the crown.[142] Whatever the form, however, it is clear that the sinews of governance were impersonal and institutional—that taken together they constituted what has been called a *Beamstenstaat* or "civil service state."[143] While the personal power and influence of office-holders from the crown on down mattered, by 1300 the late medieval kingdom had become an "apparatus of power whose existence remain[ed] independent of those who happen[ed] to have control of it at any given time."[144]

A second set of technologies-of-rule developed in this period had to do with justice and law. During the preceding era of lord-rulership, judicial power and authority—the right and ability to adjudicate legal disputes and enforce the law—had hemorrhaged from the public authorities of the Carolingian Empire into the hands first of great magnates and then lesser lords. The administration of justice was in private hands and was dispensed through the private courts of the manor or lord-dominated local courts. As kings and their chancery officials began enacting the script of corporate-sovereign statehood, however, they began looking for ways to restore the judicial primacy of the crown. Perhaps the most obvious example of this was in England where Edward I famously "set about demanding to know *quo warranto* ('by what warrant, title, or right?') landowners held judicial

franchises when they were, in principle, his" and then taking steps to reclaim these franchises.[145] Kings across Latin Christendom, however, also engaged in similar programs intended to restore the regnal monopoly (or at least regnal hegemony) over judicial authority and to impose the jurisdiction of the crown over all temporal authorities within the realm.[146] To this end, kings and their officers set about codifying customary law, promulgating new legislation, bringing the most serious crimes (felonies) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the crown, establishing central courts for civil litigation and restricting the prerogatives of ecclesiastical courts. They also created various quasi-judicial commissions and offices designed to deal with serious outbreaks of violence, and appointed regnal judges to dispense royal justice in areas where law had hitherto been absent or ineffective. Perhaps most importantly, however, they sought to undermine the judicial autonomy of subordinate lords by creating or strengthening high courts with appellate and corrective powers. Across Latin Christendom, supreme courts such as the Paris *Parlement*, created by Louis IX around 1250, were empowered to hear appeals from parties dissatisfied with the justice they had received in the courts of lower or ordinary jurisdiction. By these and other means, regnal authorities were able to overturn local decisions, thus eroding the power of those seigneurially controlled inferior jurisdictions and undermining one of the pillars of the system of lord-rulership. To be sure, this process was not uniform—while in England local jurisdictions were effectively destroyed or subordinated to royal authority, in "the looser kingdoms of central, eastern and northern Europe, royal judicial authority was a stage more confined and contested, existing alongside large ecclesiastical communities and more-or-less independent land courts that typically dispensed local custom under local control."[147] Nor was it linear: in France, the Leagues of 1314–15, for example, slowed and partly reversed the efforts of regnal authorities to assert jurisdiction over an ever-greater range of *cas royaux*. Overall, however, the system-wide trend was clear. During this era, the efforts of regnal authorities to assert royal jurisdiction produced a system that combined private and public local jurisdiction with regnal appellate jurisdiction to produce a mixed legal framework in which the balance of judicial power increasingly lay with the crown. This, in connection with efforts to impose a uniform regnal legal framework on the entire realm, led to the crystallization of what has been called the "juridical kingdom"–that is, a territorial political community bound together first and foremost by a single set of laws that was increasingly administered by the king and his officers.[148]

Money also constituted a new technology-of-rule in the late medieval era.[149] To begin with, kings remonopolized the control of coinage. During the era of lord-rulership, the right to mint coins had slipped from the exclusive hands of regnal authorities and into the hands of a wide range of powers. From the late thirteenth century onwards, however, seigneurial mints were either closed down by the king or became subcontractors to the royal mint.

As a result, non-royal coins soon disappeared from circulation and "coinage became what it had been during the Carolingian period: the exclusive concern of the State."[150] Significantly, while kings imposed an increasingly effective monopoly over their regnal currencies, they did so in their capacity as public office-holders embodying the community of the realm. Money was not "owned" by the king, nor did he exercise unrestricted control over it. Rather, the crown was merely the office through which the political community managed its regnal currency for the collective and individual benefit of its members. Summarizing the conventional wisdom of the era, the fourteenth century philosopher Nicholas Oresme put it thus:

> Money is established and devised for the good of the community. And since the prince is the most public person of the community, it follows that he should make the money for the community and stamp it with a suitable design.[151]

The sovereign prerogative of controlling the coinage was thus vested in the political community-as-corporation, not in some feudal suzerain or local lord. To the extent that the community of the realm monopolized coinage, it was able not only to consolidate the regnal economic space, but to use images of the sovereign to foster a sense of regnal identity and solidarity. In other words, regnal currencies not only facilitated the operation of regnal markets (and taxation), but the sense of belonging to an (imagined) regnal community as well.[152]

Along with control of coinage, regnal authorities also increasingly used taxation as a technology of rule, developing fiscal systems that not only generated needed resources, but also generally strengthened the administrative structures and presence of the state.[153] "Taxation was not, of course, invented in the thirteenth century, but it would be fair to say that it was transformed towards the end of that century and in the succeeding one."[154] Reflecting the revived Roman law notion that the king was guardian (*tutor*) of the realm and therefore was entitled to raise the resources necessary to defend it, late medieval monarchs—at first only in principle, but quickly in practice too—restored exclusive power and authority to levy taxes to the crown.[155] Following a period of experimentation, and with varying degrees of success, kings across Latin Christendom set about raising the resources necessary for the defense of the realm through land taxes, tithes on the clergy (typically in support of a crusade), sales taxes, customs dues, salt taxes, river tolls and any other kind of tax they could think of. As we have seen, they also developed an increasingly ramified administrative infrastructure for assessing and collecting these taxes. While these new taxes and their associated institutions were initially resisted, over time conflicts over taxation both habituated people to the principle of royal taxation and created opportunities for striking bargains that significantly eroded that resistance. As a result, by the early fourteenth century, a "fiscal revolution"

had taken place across Latin Christendom. Prior to that date, kingdoms can be characterized as "domain states" with the crown subsisting on the proceeds of seigneurial revenues and feudal prerogatives. After this date, they are more accurately described as "tax states"—that is, states financed largely through the general taxation of the entire realm. While the pace at which this transition took place varied from kingdom to kingdom—by the mid-fourteenth century states such as England, France and Castile established workable fiscal regimes involving relatively high levels of taxation made sustainable by relatively high levels of consent, while those such as Aragón and the Empire had more regimes, involving lower levels of taxation and lower levels of consent—it eventually encompassed all the major kingdoms of Latin Christendom.[156]

Finally, regnal war-making capabilities also underwent profound changes from the late thirteenth onward—changes that made them decisively less feudal and decidedly more state-like.[157] During the preceding era of lord-rulership, kings had raised military forces through a combination of feudal and communal levies. Feudal levies, of course, involved the mobilization of the king's vassals under the terms of tenurial obligation (*servitium debitum* or "service owed"): in return for the grant of a fief, the king's lordly tenants were not only obliged to provide their own martial services, but also to furnish the services of their household knights, knights whom they themselves had enfoeffed (under the obligations of "knight-service"), and even hired warriors (*solidarii, stipendiarii, conducti milites*)—all of this at no cost to the king for up to forty days per year. Communal service, on the other hand, involved the mobilization of non-noble troops on the basis of their membership in the community of the realm and their obligation to defend the kingdom and the king (the "common good" and "necessity" were often invoked). It typically yielded large numbers of foot soldiers (*pedites*), primitively armed, who could either accompany the king on an expedition or serve as a kind of local militia with primarily defensive responsibilities. In conjunction with the king's household troops, the feudal host formed the core of the royal armies of the high Middle Ages; non-noble troops, while sometimes numerically superior, invariably played a supporting, even subordinate, role. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the way in which kingdoms raised and sustained regnal armies was transformed in several ways. To begin with, by the middle of this century the feudal host had effectively disappeared from the historical scene. The reasons for this are complex, but can be boiled down to the fact that kings of this era needed terms of service both more flexible and dependable than those permitted under the feudal levy. As Guenée put it, " . . . it soon had to be admitted that the [*servitium debitum*] had had its day. The vassals did not necessarily have any inclination for war and the diverse and limited services they owed no longer corresponded to the needs of contemporary warfare."[158] This was compounded by the fact that kings had, in any case, come to believe that regnal wars imposed a duty on all

of the king's subjects, not just his vassals. As a result, by the early 1300s kings had abandoned the feudal levy. Emblematically, Edward III of England last summoned the host in any meaningful way in 1327. "When the young Richard II assembled his vassals in 1385, this final summons of the feudal host was merely an exercise in prestige, an act more political than military."[159]

In place of the feudal levy, kingdoms introduced two innovations that enabled them to raise and sustain truly regnal armies. The first of these was designed to enhance the capacity of the kingdom to mobilize troops under the terms of communal service. In kingdoms across Latin Christendom, regnal authorities legislated royal rights to the military services of noblemen and non-noblemen alike. In France, for example, the former took the form of the *semonce des nobles*, the latter the *arrière-ban*. French royal Charters establishing communes also specified quotas for urban troops to be furnished to the kingdom in times of need.[160] In England, the Statute of Westminster (1285) required all able-bodied Englishmen between fifteen and sixty fight for the kingdom when the King deemed it necessary.[161] While it is true that in practice this form of service was quite selective (only certain types of militarily effective men were called up; the rest commuted their service through money payments), and that its popularity with kings ebbed and waned, this type of legislation provided the foundations for the emergence of non-noble specialist troops such as the English longbowmen and Swiss pikemen as major elements of the military forces of most kingdoms during the late Middle Ages. The second new means of raising regnal armies was through the use of paid or contracted forces. These were raised either through so-called "indentures of retainer" (such as *fief-rentes*, *tierras* and *acostamientos*) that obliged an individual knight to serve his king in return for payment of an annual pension or through the use of contracts with magnates or captains who in turn raised, equipped and paid troops to be put at the disposal of the crown. These latter could be raised either from among the king's subjects or from beyond the regnal community.

Given these changes, it is not going too far to say that that the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries witnessed a true "military revolution." In fact, two such revolutions can be identified. On the one hand, as Clifford Rogers has demonstrated, there was a significant cavalry-to-infantry shift in the fourteenth century.[162] This revolution involved the rise to prominence on the battlefield of pole-armed foot soldiers such as Swiss halberdiers and pikemen and archers such as Welsh and English longbowmen. As I have argued elsewhere, this can best be characterized as a transformation in the dominant "war-fighting paradigm," a term I use to refer to the prevailing configuration of military technologies, doctrines and organizational forms in a particular historical context.[163] On the other, the period also saw a rapid transformation in what I have labeled the "social mode of warfare"—that is, the way in which an entire state-society complex organizes for and prosecutes war. This second revolution was deeper and broader than the first,

and for the purposes of this study at least, considerably more important; for the transformation in the way in which kingdoms raised armies during this period gave birth to a form of "war state" that, alongside and intertwined with the "judicial state" and "tax state," defined the basic contours of the actually existing corporate-sovereign kingdom in the late Middle Ages.

As a result of the development of these new technologies of rule, during the late Middle Ages kingdoms came to resemble ever more closely the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state outlined above. This picture of the actually existing late medieval kingdom, however, would not be complete without including a discussion of the "composite" nature of the late medieval kingdom. Composite states, as Daniel Nexon has recently noted in the IR context, are polities that "unite several independent political communities without erasing their distinctive legal identities."[164] They were formed as a result of the tendency among late medieval kingdoms to assert sovereignty and jurisdiction over sub-regnal polities within their imagined or historical borders; and of the tendency of late medieval monarchs to pursue the right-to-rule that they had acquired through marriage or conquest. As Nexon puts it,

> In this process, state-builders often lacked the capacity or opportunity to entirely eliminate the independent character of towns, counties, duchies and other political units. Instead they subordinated them, connected local actors to the center through patronage, and otherwise established contractual relations that implicitly or explicitly specified varying rights and obligations between center and periphery.[165]

All such composite states involved *indirect rule*, in which "superordinate authorities control subordinate political segments through intermediaries who enjoy some significant autonomy over local rule making and enforcement."[166] To the considerable extent that this applied to war-making affairs, composite kingdoms can thus be said to have *controlled* or *coordinated*, but manifestly not to have *monopolized*, the means of violence. Nor, obviously, did they exercise sovereignty in a uniform manner; the agglomerative process produced composite states ranging from fairly unitary kingdoms containing a small number of "liberties," to federations held together by "homonomous" contracts between central and subordinate polities, to empires (including the Holy Roman Empire) in which center and periphery were bound by "heterogenous" political arrangements.[167] Nor, though, were such composite kingdoms merely the feudal "possessions" or "dynastic agglomerations" of a single sovereign.[168] While assembled in part as a result of the assertion of feudal and dynastic rights, it is more accurate to describe the relationship of the monarch to the various territories of the composite kingdom, with an excusable degree of anachronism, as a type of federal arrangement in which the crown-in-council played the role of federal government and the intermediary executive, judicial and legislative

offices of the various subordinate polities played the role of state or provincial governments.

To summarize: beginning in the late thirteenth century, the enactment of the script of corporate-sovereign statehood produced kingdoms that (a) claimed and exercised internal sovereignty (in the form of regnal judicial supremacy within the realm) and external sovereignty (in the form of the non-recognition of any superior judicial authority—in temporal matters—beyond the realm); (b) justified and exercised sovereign rule in the name of peace, justice and security, suppressing private violence and defending the realm against external aggression; and (c) pursued the goals of peace, justice and security within territorial (though sometimes composite) political communities governed *by* a king and *through* the administrative offices of the crown. The crux of my argument, here as elsewhere, is not that fully evolved sovereign states populated Latin Christendom from 1300 on, but that a constitutive script of corporate-sovereign statehood had come to define the political imagination of the era, and that the enactment of this script was the defining dynamic of late medieval political life.

Closely related to the kingdom was the principality. The principality was a territorial political community ruled not by a king, but by a "prince"—that is, a great magnate, typically a count or duke, though sometimes an actual prince, who was the "first magistrate" of the community. Examples of principalities include the Duchy of Burgundy, the Palatinate of the Rhine, the County of Flanders and the Principality of Novgorod. Throughout the late Middle Ages, principalities enacted the same script of corporate-sovereign statehood, through the same technologies of governance, as kingdoms. Principalities, for example, developed their own internal judicial hierarchies (culminating in their own appellate courts); levied direct and indirect taxes on their subjects; and raised armies using the same combination of feudal levy, communal service and indentures of retainer as kingdoms. They were also similar in terms of scale—indeed, the largest principalities were larger than all but the most extensive kingdoms—and could acquire the institutional solidity, mythic legitimacy and historical connection to a people and place realized by the late medieval kingdom. But there were important differences between these two types of state that makes them two distinct manifestations of a common cultural script of corporate-sovereign statehood. To begin with, principalities were not ruled by kings and thus were inferior in status to those states that were. The revival of Roman law and the subsequent crystallization of the ideal of corporate-sovereign statehood, it will be recalled, led to kings being sharply distinguished from other lords within the political imaginary of the era, elevating them normatively above all other lords and princes. By extension, polities that were governed by kings also came to enjoy a status superior to those that were not. Coupled with the widespread belief that kingdoms were the most natural and normal type of polity (see above) and a picture of the inferior status of the principality comes into focus. Another difference was

that principalities typically lay within the bounds of one or more larger imagined or historical kingdoms. They were thus not only normatively inferior to kingdoms, but politically subordinate as well. The degree to which this subordination was given effect, of course, varied according to a number of circumstances. Princes sometimes embraced the overlordship of a king, exploiting this to enhance their own legitimacy, power, status or authority within their county or duchy. Other times, however, they sought to minimize the king's influence and maximize their own autonomy. As a result, some principalities were able to act as if they were autonomous, sovereign entities (even if the prince grudgingly acknowledged the nominal overlordship of a king) while others were highly autonomous but clearly part of a kingdom. To be sure, kings too could accept the overlordship of others, either directly (most commonly that of the Pope) or indirectly (the kings of England were famously vassals of the kings of France in right of their title to the duchy of Gascony). Generally, however, kings "had more success in limiting its impact, and typically emphasised their freedom from any mediating power."[169] Finally, principalities differed from kingdoms in that the latter typically had the institutional and (especially) normative solidity to survive dynastic crises and wars, while the former often did not: "Kingdoms were historic dignities, sustained by a variable mixture of myth, authority and political infrastructure: they tended to survive dynastic crises, albeit not without considerable disturbance, and it was unusual for them to be swallowed up in wars or treaties."[170] In contrast, small- to medium-sized principalities in particular were both considerably more vulnerable to the vagaries of dynastic affairs or war and considerably more inclined to seek shelter within kingdoms if the opportunity arose for them to do so on favorable terms.(Though it must be said that the larger principalities like the Duchy of Burgundy that more closely resembled kingdoms also tended to persist as *de facto* or *de iure* independent states.)

### Communes and Leagues

In addition to kingdoms and principalities, the late medieval international order was populated with urban communes. Generically speaking, a commune was a "sworn association with common interests and some form of self-regulation."[171] While such an association could take a variety of forms—guilds, fraternities, etc.—for the purposes of this study, the most significant form was the urban commune or city-state. Like kingdoms and principalities, urban communes were territorial political communities; unlike those other polities, however, they existed on a more limited scale (the city and its surrounding *contado*), were dominated by merchants and artisans (although nobles could also play a significant role), and governed themselves through some combination of assemblies, councils and magistracies. Such urban communes could exist within regnal polities and principalities—indeed, they could be chartered and created by them to advance

their interests. But they could also assert their independence from any such superordinate polity, as the urban communes of northern Italy were famously to do throughout the late Middle Ages. Significantly, although urban communities certainly pre-dated the crisis of lord-rulership and its associated period of institutional renovation, beginning in the twelfth century city-states across Latin Christendom enacted the script of corporate-sovereign statehood in much the same way as regnal polities. During the late Middle Ages, city-states such as Venice, Florence, Genoa and Lübeck developed fiscal systems (including direct and indirect taxation), promulgated legislation and regulations (related to moral and social life, as well as economic and political affairs), asserted their jurisdiction (*over* themselves and their surrounding hinterlands, and *against* kingdoms, principalities, local lordships and other communes), developed judicial and policing systems (to keep the peace), created significant military forces (some combination of urban militias and paid military companies) and generally set about building the institutions of corporate-sovereign statehood. Although they typically built these institutions within the borders of a top-layer regnal structure "a few of the powerful (chiefly Italian) cities achieved something like full political autonomy in their own right."[172] Alongside kingdoms and principalities, these autonomous (indeed sovereign) city-states constituted an important type of war-making unit throughout the late Middle Ages.

A final type of polity populating the late medieval international order was the league. In the extant IR literature, leagues have either been ignored or portrayed as a form of polity radically different from the state.[173] In actual fact, although leagues were quite diverse, those relevant to the study of international order are more properly understood as a variation on the theme of corporate-sovereign statehood than as an alternative to it. This becomes clear if we first grasp that, generically, leagues were nothing more than an association or alliance comprising peer actors pursuing or defending common interests. At one level, such leagues could take the form of associations of lordships, towns or other peer groups banding together to assert or defend their political rights in the face of regnal or other state-building projects. Examples of this type of league include the *hermandades* of Castile and Léon and the *Landfrieden* of the Empire, both of which were political alliances *within* states, not too different from the "estates" through which particular communities or status groups were represented in the central governments of kingdoms and principalities. At another level, however, leagues could take the form of alliances of political units that were themselves enacting the script of corporate-sovereign statehood. This type of league took one of two forms. The first was the city-league, an alliance of city-states banding together to assert or defend their autonomy from regnal authorities or to fill the void where such authorities were absent, decadent or otherwise ineffective. The most fully evolved of these, the Hanseatic League, were able to achieve something like full political autonomy in their own right—externally, they were able to negotiate

treaties, raise armies, conduct wars and otherwise behave like a sovereign power; internally, they were able to raise taxes, issue laws and regulations and enforce the decisions of its central government (the Hansetag).[174] In short, the Hanseatic League was a composite corporate-sovereign state made up of urban communes like Lübeck and Hamburg that were themselves corporate-sovereign states. The fact that its constituent elements were not contiguous made it different from the surrounding kingdoms and principalities, but did not make it something other than a state.[175] The second form of state-like league was the territorial confederation, of which the Swiss Confederacy was the most notable example. Founded in 1291 by the rural communes of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden (later joined by the cantons of Glarus and Zug and the city-states of Lucerne, Zurich and Bern), the purpose of this league was to promote trade and peace among its constituent units and to assert their collective jurisdictions in the face of similar efforts by their nominal Habsburg overlords. Again, although the constituent units retained a great degree of autonomy (even on occasion pursuing their own foreign policies), the confederation developed common taxes and administrative structures much like those being developed in kingdoms, principalities and city-states. Over time, the league acquired a permanence, institutional solidity, *de facto* (later *de iure*) sovereignty and corporate identity that placed it on par with late medieval kingdoms such as England, France and Castile.

### The Late Medieval Mode of Differentiation

The late medieval international system, then, was populated with a number of kingdoms, principalities, city-states, urban leagues and territorial confederations capable of mobilizing military resources to advance or defend the (socially constructed) public interests entailed in the constitutive norm of corporate-sovereign statehood. But what of the translocal structures within which these war-making units were embedded? I have already discussed the translocal *intersubjective* or *normative* structure that specified the meaning of corporate-sovereign statehood. In this section, I extend this discussion by examining the "mode of differentiation" that completed the structure of the late medieval international system.

By the thirteenth century, the revival of the Roman law concept of sovereignty had given rise to a distinctively late medieval "mode of differentiation" or set of "principles on the basis of which the constituent units [of an international order] are separated from one another": the constitutive norm of corporate-sovereign statehood.[176] According to this norm or ideal, the constituent elements of the late medieval international order were territorial, functionally similar political corporations claiming (and ultimately realizing) supreme temporal authority within their borders. *Pace* Ruggie, this set of principles *did* in fact give rise to "a form of segmental territorial rule that had" many of the "connotations of possessiveness and

exclusiveness conveyed by the modern concept of sovereignty."[177] It both defined the grounds on which the political units populating Latin Christendom—kingdoms, principalities, communes and leagues—were separated from one another and vested those units with supreme legitimate political authority. To be certain, polities conformed to the norm of corporate-sovereign statehood more fully in 1500 that they did in 1300. But the norm was firmly embedded in the political culture of Latin Christendom from the thirteenth century on, providing both an organizing principle and "global cultural script" that shaped the late medieval international system no less powerfully than those associated with the dynastic-sovereign, territorial-sovereign and national-sovereign states in the modern era.[178]

Significantly, though, while the late medieval mode of differentiation was predominantly segmentary, it also contained elements of both stratification and functional differentiation. The common view in IR is that stratification in the late medieval world assumed the form of feudal, imperial or ecclesiastical hierarchy. By 1300, however, the constitutive norms underpinning these translocal or universal systems of rule were increasingly being displaced by a new constitutive norm of the corporate-sovereign state: a territorially exclusive polity in which supreme temporal authority was vested in the community-as-corporation. From this point on, hierarchy was progressively encapsulated within states. On the one hand, as argued above, feudal and ecclesiastical hierarchies were increasingly reconfigured on a regnal basis as corporate-sovereign states sought to subordinate both to the logic of the corporate political community. On the other, the putatively universal Empire had in fact become little more than a territorial state (and not even the biggest or most powerful at that).[179] As a result, at least among polities that could effectively enact the script of corporate-sovereign statehood, anarchy/segmentation rather than hierarchy/stratification became the ordering principle of translocal political interaction.

How, then, was the late medieval international system stratified? Like all international systems, of course, this one was hierarchical in that some states were more powerful than others. More importantly for the purposes of this study, however, the late medieval international system was stratified in that it entailed inferior and superior forms of corporate-sovereign statehood. As we have seen, the enactment of the script of corporate-sovereign statehood in the concrete conditions of the late medieval era had given rise to several analytically distinct versions of the state: kingdoms (including the Empire), principalities, city-states, urban leagues and territorial confederations. But while all of these forms of corporate-sovereign state were manifestations of a common constitutive ideal, they were not normative equals. Simply put, in the political imaginary of the late Middle Ages the *kingdom* enjoyed a status that elevated it above all other types of corporate-sovereign state (city-states, principalities, etc.). The kingdom, of course, had long been considered to be the most natural, fundamental and legitimate form of political rule.[180] When combined with the newer constitutive ideal

of the corporate-sovereign state—which recognized neither "local immunities nor overarching empire"—this normative legacy generated a process of differentiation that tended to legitimize the sovereign claims of kingdoms and to delegitimize those of lesser regnal authorities.[181] In short, it created a two-tier system in which the corporate-sovereign kingdom was always normatively advantaged over other forms of corporate-sovereign state.

An important result of this was that over the course of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries kingdoms slowly but inexorably subordinated lesser polities, bringing them within their legal jurisdiction and incorporating them into their political structures.[182] Sometimes this was achieved through the use of force, sometimes through dynastic alliance and sometimes through negotiation and political bargaining.[183] While the process was anything but linear, by the fourteenth century the basic trajectory of political development within this world order had nevertheless become clear: largely on the basis of its privileged status within the imaginative structure of Latin Christendom, the kingdom was emerging as the basic constitutive unit of rule within that world order. While this process of regnal consolidation would not come to full fruition until well into the modern era, the seeds for the eventual triumph of what we have agreed to mislabel the "sovereign state" (actually the form of state known as the *regnum* or kingdom) were thus planted with the revival of Roman law and the recovery of Aristotelian political science in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively.

But what of the claim, implicit in the heteronomy thesis, that the constituent elements of the late medieval international system were *functionally* differentiated? There is less to this claim that is commonly supposed. As we have seen, most of the major "alternatives" to the territorial state (city-states, urban leagues, etc.) were actually variations on the theme of corporate-sovereign statehood. They were underpinned by the same constitutive norm, had access to similar technologies of rule and performed the same set of political functions as the territorial kingdom. In short, the kingdoms and other manifestations of corporate-sovereign statehood were functionally isomorphic rather than functionally differentiated. There was, however, one unit of governance (with a significant war-making capacity) that was not simply a variant of the corporate-sovereign state: the universal Church. I will address this polity in greater depth in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to say that while the Church shared a number of institutional features with the state, and employed (even pioneered) many of the same media of rule, it was an artifact of an entirely different constitutive norm. It had a different moral purpose, a universal (rather than territorially delimited) ambit, and claimed a different form of sovereignty than the corporate-sovereign state. Significantly, as we shall see, it also raised military forces in a distinctive way. To the extent that Church and State constituted qualitatively different forms of polity—but only to that extent—the late medieval international system can be said to have been functionally differentiated.

## STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS

The crux of my argument thus far is not that fully evolved sovereign states populated Latin Christendom from the early thirteenth century on, but (a) that a constitutive script of corporate-sovereign statehood crystallized during the thirteenth century, and (b) that the enactment of this script was the defining dynamic of late medieval political life. In this section, I extend the argument by sketching the structural antagonisms—i.e., the fundamental configurations of contradictory, incompatible or otherwise irreconcilable core interests within a given world order—that derived from the competitive enactment of this script against the backdrop of the concrete historical circumstances of the late Middle Ages.

What were the structural antagonisms inherent in the late medieval world order? Simply put, while the proximate causes of conflict in this era were manifold, the focal point or principal axis for almost all disputes between polities lay in contradictory or irreconcilable claims to "jurisdiction"—a term, as we have seen, that connoted not only the authority to enforce laws and pronounce legal judgments, but to govern more generally as well. These disputes were the result of two contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, during this era kingdoms were attempting to assert new rights over territories and peoples whom they believed to be subject to their political authority and legal jurisdiction. Through a combination of legal, administrative and fiscal means kingdoms increasingly sought to embrace and perforate the non-regnal polities that lay within their historical or imagined realms. The goal was to assert regnal sovereignty over these polities, even if kingodms were willing to accept formal or informal arrangements that allowed inferior powers considerable autonomy once they had acquiesced to regnal claims to supreme authority. On the other hand, however, the inferior polities within, alongside or astride the top-layer regnal states were also enacting the script of corporate-sovereign statehood. These polities, too, had access to the various technologies of rule described above and throughout the era were busy attempting to strengthen their own capacities to judge, legislate and command within what they saw as their legitimate territorial boundaries. Consistent with the moral purpose of the corporate-sovereign state, both top-layer and inferior powers were also busy asserting, defending or attempting to recover their rights as they understood them. In an era in which, initially at least, hierarchies, boundaries and competencies were poorly defined and fluid, this competitive enactment of the script of corporate-sovereign statehood—on multiple scales, within varying institutional frameworks and against the backdrop of the untidy political legacy of the era of lord-rulership—inevitably resulted in the proliferation of disputes over who had exclusive or superior authority to judge, legislate and command within a given territory.

As indicated above, these jurisdictional conflicts were of two types. The first was horizontal, involving the clashing political project of top-layer

polities or kingdoms. Given the political legacy of the high Middle Ages it is perhaps not surprising that regnal jurisdictional claims often overlapped and that these overlapping claims were a ubiquitous source of conflict. In some cases, these horizontal conflicts were rooted in incompatible claims to a specific territory, as in the conflicting claims of the kings of France and England to Gascony and Ponthieu. In other cases, they were by-products of the contested claims on the part of one king to dynastic, juridical or historical rights of suzerainty over another, as in the case of "Peter III of Aragón (1276–85) to Sicily, or Otakar II of Bohemia (1253–78) to Austria/Styria."[184] And in yet other cases, they were the result of novel attempts to impose ultimate legal jurisdiction, as in the conflict between England and France over the increasingly vigorous attempts of the latter to have the Paris *Parlement* act as the supreme court for cases heard in the local courts of Edward III's territories in Aquitaine. Finally, in some instances, such as the conflicts between England and Scotland around the turn of the fourteenth century, they were grounded in all of these. While it is true that kings and kingdoms had been embroiled in conflicts with other kings and kingdoms throughout the high Middle Ages, these late medieval structural conflicts were both different and more widespread: different in that they were expressions of both (a) a norm of corporate-sovereign statehood that encouraged the maximum pursuit of jurisdiction and rights, and (b) technologies of governance that strengthened their capacities to do so; more widespread in that the more or less simultaneous enactment of this script across Latin Christendom created many more instances of friction than had been the case when kings had less ambitious goals and less effective means of pursuing them.

The second type of structural antagonism inherent in the late medieval world order was vertical, involving kingdoms on the one hand and the principalities, city-states and leagues that lay within, around and astride these top-layer polities on the other. Kingdoms, as we have seen, exploited both old and new technologies of rule to give effect to the norm of corporate-sovereign statehood and assert regnal authority over their kingdoms. Within these kingdoms, however, lower-level polities were also asserting jurisdiction, building administrative capacity and extracting economic surplus through various forms of taxation. To be certain, sometimes these lesser polities accepted, even embraced, the effort of kings to consolidate regnal authority. For relatively vulnerable or incoherent towns or principalities, incorporation into a powerful kingdom on favorable terms offered obvious advantages. But just as certainly, even as they acknowledged regnal sovereignty, these lower-level polities typically sought to preserve their "ancient" liberties, historical rights and customary prerogatives in the face of regnal state-building efforts. When these where endangered by the intrusive policies of the regnal government, these lesser polities—individually or in leagues—would sometimes seek redress within the representative institutions that were proliferating throughout Latin Christendom. This was the

case in the County of Flanders, which was formally added to the lands of the French crown in 1297, but which resisted the centralizing policies of the French regnal government to the point of going to war.[185] In extreme cases, like those involving the Empire and the city-states of northern Italy, they might even seek to secede from a kingdom if they felt that their liberties, rights and prerogative were threatened by assertions of regnal jurisdiction and power. And, of course, there were lesser polities—principalities and even kingdoms—that simply resisted incorporation into a regnal polity in the first place. The was famously the case when the kingdom of Scotland resisted incorporation into the composite kingdom that King Edward I of England was seeking to build in the British Isles and western France. Simply put, the competitive enactment of the script of corporate-sovereign state-hood not only generated significant jurisdictional antagonisms between kingdoms, but also between these "top-layer" states and lower-layer ones. Any explanation for the copious conflict that characterized late medieval political life must begin with a recognition of the way in which this dynamic played itself out along both horizontal and vertical axes.

In an anarchic system such as this—comprising plural forms and numerous instances of corporate-sovereign state, with overlapping juris-dictional claims, the armed might to assert of defend those claims and no superordinate political power capable of authoritatively adjudicat-ing disputes—one might expect that the tendency would be for the more powerful kingdoms simply to expunge those less powerful kingdoms, principalities and city-states within, around and straddling their fron-tiers. One might further expect that, over time, this process would lead to the winnowing out of smaller and weaker polities and the consolidation of political authority and power in the hands of a relatively small num-ber kingdoms. To some extent, of course, this is exactly what happened. Kingdoms simultaneously leveraged their superior normative standing and other political resources to assert their sovereignty over lesser polities and, less frequently, neighboring kingdoms, expunging rival autonomous states in the process. To be certain, this was not a linear process; but as even a cursory glance at the political map in 1400 and 1500 reveals, there were far fewer autonomous states of all sorts at the end of this era than at the beginning. It is important to recognize, however, that this dynamic (a) affected top-layer states and lesser states in dramatically different ways, and (b) that the reason for this differential lay in the distinctive culture of anarchy that shaped the way in which the structural antagonisms dis-cussed above were worked out on the ground.

How should we characterize this culture of anarchy? Drawing on the work of Alexander Wendt, the answer can perhaps best be expressed in the following terms. On the one hand, relations between *kingdoms and other forms of corporate-state* were governed by a "Hobbesian" form of anar-chy. As Wendt argues, Hobbesian anarchy is a social structure in which the constituent units do not recognize each other's right to exist. In such a

structure, "states may *claim* external sovereignty, but others do not recognize it as a *right*."[186] The result approximates a Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*. In the late Middle Ages, kingdoms typically did not recognize the claim to external sovereignty of polities such as city-states, urban leagues or principalities within their historical or imagined territories, even if these were able to exercise what Wendt calls "empirical" external sovereignty. They viewed these polities as properly a subordinate part of the kingdom and as such subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of the crown. Drawing on their superior normative standing, kingdoms thus worked to subordinate these lesser states, incorporating them into their political structures through force, negotiation or dynastic inter-marriage as circumstance dictated. The result was a *longue durée* tendency toward the elimination of rival polities within the imagined territories of kingdoms. Again, this process was anything but linear—sub-regnal polities sometimes had great solidity and could impede, and even temporarily reverse, the efforts of states to perforate and subordinate them. Nevertheless, during the late Middle Ages the long-run dynamic was for kingdoms to enforce their superior claims to sovereignty and gradually to extinguish the independent existence of the lesser polities within their ambit.

On the other hand, relations *between kingdoms* were governed by a type of "Lockean" anarchy. Lockean anarchy, as described by Wendt, is a social structure in which the sovereignty and basic right-to-exist of the constituent units is universally accepted (or nearly so). In such as system, states recognize each other's external sovereignty as a right and tend, therefore, "not to conquer each other, not because they cannot, but because recognition implies a willingness to live and let live."[187] In the late medieval international order, structural antagonisms between kingdoms were often converted into violent conflict, but typically within limits established by this basic right-to-exist. War between mutually recognized sovereign kingdoms was thus limited and constrained; their violent elimination exceptional and rare. Over the course of the late Middle Ages, regnal polities became progressively more stable, bounded, governed and permanent. With some notable exceptions (such as Edward I's refusal to accept Scotland's claim to be a kingdom, likening it instead to a principality like Chester or Durham), kings respected each other's external sovereignty and recognized the basic territorial contours of their respective realms. "Kingdoms were historic dignities, sustained by a variable mixture of myth, authority and political infrastructure" and kings tended to see them as such and accept their fundamental legitimacy. To be sure, during this era there were plenty of inter-regnal conflicts regarding jurisdiction, boundaries and rights—conflicts that often resulted territories changing hands or boundaries being adjusted. But, by and large, the sovereignty and political discreteness of kingdoms was preserved. While the plasticity of these top-layer states remained a feature of political life throughout the late Middle Ages (in the sense that they could expand or contract depending on the vagaries of war, diplomacy, mediation

or dynastic affairs), the kingdoms in existence in 1300 were typically still in existence in 1500; indeed, as Wim Blockmans has pointed out, many of the kingdoms created in this era have persisted in one form or another to the present day.[188] The same cannot be said for lesser polities, most of which were ultimately either incorporated into kingdoms as sub-regnal units or erased from the political map of Latin Christendom altogether.

## THE INSTITUTION OF PUBLIC WAR

In Chapter 2, I defined the institution of war is a complex of deeply embedded intersubjective beliefs regarding the ontology, (moral) purpose and meaning of "war" that make certain kinds of organized violence both conceivable and legitimate. Such institutions, I argued, entail three constitutive elements: (a) a basic concept, understanding or ontology of war; (b) a set of norms regarding legitimate authority to wage war; and (c) an ensemble of beliefs about the moral purposes of war. I further argued that, when viewed from the temporal perspective of the *longue durée*, the institution of war appears not simply as a mechanism for solving the coordination and collaboration problems of states, but rather as a complex of prior/deeper constitutive norms and ideals that actually make war conceivable, meaningful and legitimate as a social practice within a given world order. I concluded by stating that this institution constitutes or makes possible the practice of war by constructing it as a behavioral possibility within the cultural repertory of "rightful actions" available to political actors. In this section, I sketch the late medieval institution of public war, highlighting the way in which this normative complex enabled certain structural antagonisms, in certain circumstances, to be converted into certain types of *violent* conflict.

### The Ontology of Public War

As argued in the preceding chapter, fundamental ontological beliefs with respect to war entail ideas regarding the nature of war, the roots or causes of war and the extent to which war is a natural, inevitable or universal element of the human condition. What did these belifes look like in the late Middle Ages? Or, put slightly differently, how was war conceptualized in the political imaginary of late medieval Latin Christendom? In order to address these questions, it is useful to look to the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas; for, in this context as in others, these works expressed, shaped and defined the basic contours of late medieval political culture. What, then, were the views of these scholars? On the one hand, Augustine viewed war as a consequence of humanity's fallen nature.[189] In prelapsarian times, human society was well ordered and peaceful; all humans were naturally subject to what Augustine calls the "bonds of peace" and contention was absent. In these circumstances, there was neither the need for a coercive

state to guide human activity nor the "contestation by force" which results from the disordered pursuit of selfish ends. With the fall of humanity and its division into the Two Cities, however, war was decisively introduced into human affairs. This occurred because citizens of the Earthly City, distinguished from those of the Heavenly City by their lust for material goods and for domination over others, discovered that they could use individual and collective violence to further their selfish ends. They could, in a word, successfully pursue their unjust and vicious goals through war. Augustine thus fundamentally understood war to be a consequence of sin—that is, of humanity's rebellion against God and its selfish pursuit of its own selfish ends. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a kind of corollary to this he also viewed war as a more common state of affairs than peace. Indeed, Augustine believed that war was the natural and normal state into which fallen humanity had descended; peace, when it broke out, was little more than an interlude between ongoing bouts of violent conflict and contestation.

But if Augustine undeniably viewed war as a *consequence* of the Fall he also saw it as a *punishment* and *remedy* for sin. With respect to war as a punishment for sin, Augustine argued that the pain, suffering and loss that war inevitably brings in its wake is just reward for the Earthly City's rebellious disposition toward God and the inherent immorality of its citizens. Regarding war as a remedy for sin, Augustine argued that it was a means of chastising the immoral and rebellious and thus of compelling then to act righteously. As he himself put it:

> For God's providence constantly uses war to correct and chasten the corrupt morals of mankind, as it also uses such afflictions to train men in a righteous and laudable way of life, removing to a better state those whose life is approved, or else keeping them in this world for further service.[190]

For Augustine, then, war was a means of scourging sinners and of moving them toward repentance and reform. In the event that it did not bring about such a change of heart, however, it could nevertheless serve the lesser, but non-trivial goal, of subduing the unjust and restraining them from perpetrating their immoral acts.

On a different plane, Augustine also saw war as an instrument for achieving the common "intermediate goods" that the state provided to the citizens of both the Earthly and Heavenly Cities: peace, concord, "the satisfaction of material needs, *security from attack* and orderly social intercourse."[191] Augustine, it will be recalled, rejected the notion that the state could serve the "common good" in the Cicernonian or Aristotelian sense of promoting the good life, virtue or perfection. All that was possible, he argued, was a qualified agreement between the citizens of the Two Cities on a limited number of intermediate goods that had a "common usefulness" (*communis utilitas*). Accordingly, for Augustine the moral purpose of the state was

merely "to safeguard security and sufficiency (*securitatem et sufficientam vitae*)."[192] Against this backdrop, war provided another, qualitatively different, type of remedy for the consequences of the Fall: it was an instrument both for defending the (imperfect but still morally defensible) state against external attack and for restoring what Augustine called "earthly peace." As security and earthly peace were conducive to the Christian pursuit of fuller communion with God, he considered wars fought for these purposes to be not only lawful, but at times a "stern necessity."

It is worth emphasizing at this point that Augustine made a clear distinction, no doubt grounded in the legal and political realities of the era in which he lived, between private violence and public war. The former, he argued, entailed private individuals using force to advance private interests. To him, such violence was both sinful and illicit, even if committed in self-defense. The latter, on the other hand, entailed legitimate public authorities using force to defend the community and its legitimate rights and interests. As such it was inherently just and lawful. Indeed, according to Augustine the legitimate civil ruler not only has the authority to wage war on behalf of the political community, but the positive moral obligation to do so. Failure to wage war in defense of the community would be an abrogation of the ruler's responsibility both to his compatriots and to God.

Finally, and to some extent pulling all this together, Augustine made a clear ontological distinction between just and unjust wars—a distinction that was to persist through the late Middle Ages and, in a slightly modified and secularized form, into the late modern era. The impulse behind drawing this distinction derived primarily from the desire to provide Christians, who had little chance of insulating themselves from the ubiquitous conflicts of the Earthly City, with some guidance regarding how to judge and justify war. After refuting the arguments in favor of pacifism, Augustine drew on the works of Cicero and Ambrose to develop the argument that wars were just and licit—and therefore worthy of the support of Christian kings and their subjects—if and only if they met certain criteria. First, he argued, a just war must be declared by a competent and legitimate authority, by which he meant kings and emperors acting on behalf of a political community. Second, he argued, to be considered just, a war must have a just cause such as defending the state from external aggression; avenging injuries against the state; punishing another state for failing to redress injuries perpetrated by its citizens; restoring illicitly seized property to its rightful owner; and defending the Church against heresy. And third, Augustine argued that a just war was one prosecuted with right intent—that is, with an inward disposition toward restoring peace rather than conquering territory or subjugating people; and toward acting out of Christian love rather than hatred, greed, pride or the will to dominate. Unjust wars, Augustine argued, were those that failed to meet one or more of these standards.

Later medieval understandings of the nature and purposes of war were deeply rooted in, and powerfully conditioned by, this Augustinian

perspective. But the ontology of war particular to this era also had an important Aristotelian dimension, expressed most systematically in the works of Thomas Aquinas and his continuators Peter of Auvergne and Ptolemy of Lucca.[193] Drawing heavily on the recently reintroduced works of Aristotle, but also on the works of Augustine himself, these scholars largely accepted the Augustinian argument that the roots of war lay in humanity's Fall. But whereas Augustine saw war as a punishment and remedy for sin, or at best a means of defending a state that was itself a punishment and remedy for sin, Aquinas and his circle characteristically saw it as a necessary and legitimate means of securing the morally more positive Aristotelian political community. For them, the common good served by war was related to the goal of creating and securing a political community that enabled its citizens to lead a truly ethical life—the "good life"—ordered to the fulfillment of humanity's distinctive capacity both to reason (i.e. to be rational) and to order life according to the dictates of reason (i.e. to live a life of virtue or moral excellence). In the unjust and imperfect world of fallen humanity, this sometimes required the use of force to defend the community, restore peace or punish wrongdoers. The Thomists' ultimate contribution was to inject the Aristotelian notions of the common good, rather than the more limited Augustinian concept of public utility, into the late medieval ontology of war. While they largely accepted the Augustinian criteria for just war, they thus regrounded just cause in Aristotelian political science. In a similar way, they also regrounded the prince's war-making authority in Aristotelian terms, arguing that it derived not so much from God (as Augustine had argued) as from the king's role as guardian (*tutor*) of the kingdom.

Beyond this, Aquinas also clearly articulated the difference between war and other forms of politics and violence. As Aquinas put it,

> War, properly speaking, is against an external enemy, one nation as it were against another, and brawls are between individuals, one against one or a few against at few. Sedition in its proper sense is between mutually dissident section of the same people, when, for example one part of the city rebels against another.[194]

On this view, which Philippe Contamine argues is representative of late medieval thought, feuds and other forms of private war are not, properly speaking, war at all, but fall into an altogether different class or order of violence.

To the extent that these two traditions defined the horizons of the late medieval political imagination, they effectively worked together to embed and naturalize an ontology of war comprising the following beliefs: war was a natural and inevitable (if lamentable) aspect of the human condition; war was an instrument of the state necessary to secure peace and order; and war was a legitimate means of pursuing rights and promoting justice. This ontology also emphasized the categorical differences between

public war on the one hand and various forms of private violence on the other. While some might emphasize the Augustinian strain and others the Thomist, few would have understood the nature of public war in terms other than these.

## Public War: Just Cause and Legitimate Authority

Taken together, this complex of basic ontological beliefs situated war in the moral and political imagination of late medieval society, making it both conceivable and meaningful. At a somewhat more concrete level, however, the late medieval institution of war also entailed a set of *legal norms and principles* regarding the legitimate authority to make war. In the remainder of this section I develop a picture of these norms and principles as seen through the lens of canon law.[195]

Canon law was the legal framework that governed the clergy and other actors subject to the jurisdiction of the Church—especially with respect to "wills, offences against God, oaths and war."[196] Up until the twelfth century, this body of law was little more than an inchoate collection of legal tracts assembled "according to no critical or rational principle, containing legal propositions that contradicted each other and even some flagrant forgeries."[197] Beginning in the middle of the eleventh century, however, ecclesiastical legists began the task of codifying and systematizing this corpus of disorganized and often discordant regulation into a coherent legal framework. Originally, this work was carried out by German canonists who tended to oppose the kind of papal absolutism favored by the Gregorian papacy. In the aftermath of the Gregorian Revolution, however, the work of codifying canon law was reassigned to "Italian scholars who were strongly inclined to the doctrine of papal plenitude of power."[198] By 1140, this process of synthesizing and codifying canon law (in ways that favored the papacy, of course) had reached its apotheosis with the publication of Gratian's *Concordia Discordantium Canonum* (*Concordance of Discordant Canons*)—the most complete, rational and systematic statement of Church law to that time. While subject to commentary and interpretation in subsequent centuries, the *Decretum* (as Gratian's compendium was more commonly known) was quickly granted canonical status and ultimately came to constitute the foundational substructure upon which all subsequent ecclesiastical law would be constructed. For the purposes of this study, Gratian's *Decretum* is significant because it is both reflective and partially constitutive of a wider set of discourses pertaining to the institution of war in medieval Latin Christendom.

But what, precisely, did Gratian have to say about the institution of "war"? To begin with, following Augustine, he argued that wars could only be waged by those possessing legitimate authority. In Augustine's time, of course, the locus of war-making authority had been obvious: the Emperor and the imperial state. The feudal realities of Gratian's

time, however, made this a far more problematic issue. Consequently, the *Decretum* was less than precise in its specification of the loci of secular war-making authority; indeed, it "could be read as suggesting that the emperor, kings, princes, barons and even vassals could all legitimately launch war in certain circumstances."[199] To be sure, there was less ambiguity in connection with ecclesiastical war-making authority— the papacy, Gratian concluded, had a clear mandate to wage war against heretics, infidels, those disputing papal authority and those persecuting orthodox Christians—but even here the *Decretum* exhibits a troubling degree of imprecision and inconsistency.[200] As Russell argues, underpinning this imprecision was the lack of a "clearly understood concept of public authority that could render viable distinctions between public and private initiative and superior and inferior jurisdiction."[201]

With respect to the *moral purpose* of organized violence, the *Decretum* argued that there existed only one justification for war: to right past or present injustices. According to Gratian, such "injustices" could take one of three forms. First, they could assume the form of an attack against either a *patria* (particular political community within Christendom) or the Christian commonwealth as a whole.[202] Second, an injustice could take the form of a legal injury (*iniuria*)—that is, an infringement of a legal right derived from statutory law, natural law, the *ius gentium*, feudal law, biblical commandments or canon law. Finally, it could take the form of illicit seizure of goods or property. In making these arguments, Gratian also formalized the distinction between two types of war, both of which were considered "just." On the one hand, he defined "just wars" proper— i.e. wars "declared by secular authorities to right a prior wrong" (especially to repel attacks and avenge legal injury).[203] On the other, he defined "holy wars" as wars "declared by ecclesiastical authorities to defend the faith and its orthodoxy."[204] Such wars, he argued, were primarily "waged to avenge injuries done to Christianity or the Church by heretics, excommunicates and infidels."[205]

While Gratian's summary of canon law usefully illuminated the general grounds for war, it failed to provide practical operational answers to two of the most pressing legal questions of the later twelfth century: what "causes" could be said to justify war; and who possessed the "legitimate authority" to declare war? Between approximately 1140 and 1190, canon lawyers commenting on Gratian's *Decretum* (known as the Decretists) answered these questions in the following ways. First, they broadened the definition of "just cause" to include (in addition to those elements articulated by Gratian) defense of the *patria* or territorial political community, "defence of the right to free passage (denial of which breached *ius gentium*), the imprisonment of heretics, preservation of the peace, suppression of rebellion and recovery of stolen goods."[206] Simply put, "just cause" was defined in terms of punishing injuries to God and His Church, of repelling unlawful violence and of righting manifest wrongs.[207] Second, they argued

that "legitimate authority" to wage war resided in the "public authorities" of the Church, the Empire and the various Christian "princes" who populated the post-imperial political landscape (although they were not successful in articulating a precise definition of "prince"). The canonists also argued that the temporal powers, by reason of the duties of their temporal office, were obliged to heed the summons of ecclesiastical rulers to take up arms in defense of the Church and its spiritual interests.

Toward the end of the twelfth century, canonists turned their attention away from Gratian's *Decretum* and focused instead on contemporary papal pronouncements on canon law (called papal "decretals"). The primary contribution of these canonists (known to history as the Decretalists) to the definition of the institution of war was to provide additional clarity with respect to the perpetually vexing question of who possessed legitimate authority to wage war in the patchwork of competing jurisdictions that constituted Latin Christendom in the high medieval era. The majority of the Decretalists seem to have agreed with the Decretists that only the pope, the Emperor and Christian princes could declare war. Hostiensis and other twelfth and thirteenth century canonists, however, went beyond this general and somewhat nebulous assertion to articulate a definition of the term "prince" (*princeps*) that they hoped might introduce a legally meaningful degree of conceptual clarity into the just war discourse. Their solution: (a) to define a *princeps* as a temporal authority subject to no superordinate temporal authority; and (b) to argue that wars could therefore be waged by the Church, the Empire, kingdoms, principalities and even city-states, providing that they did not recognize a superior secular authority.[208] For the purposes of this study, this was an important innovation for two reasons: it provided the first definitive answer to the question of the locus/loci of legitimate war-making authority in the late medieval era; and it sharpened the discursive distinction between private or small-scale violence (*guerra*) and larger-scale violence conducted by public authorities for "just cause" (*bellum*).

Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, then, a distinctively medieval institution of "just war" crystallized within the culture and legal infrastructure of Latin Christendom. Viewed through the window of canon law, this institution can be said to have had two defining characteristics. First, a "just war" had to have a "just cause." Throughout the era, this was understood primarily in terms of righting injustices—that is, to repel attack, to return stolen property or to avenge injuries done to the Church or *respublica Christiana* by pagans, heretics, schismatics or others opposing papal authority. Second, a just war had to be waged by a "legitimate authority." On the one hand, canon law was clear that the Church constituted one such authority and that it was unambiguously warranted to declare and direct war. On the other, Church law reflected and codified a certain confusion regarding the loci of war-making authority in the secular realm: was legitimate war-making authority vested in the

Emperor and great kings alone? Or were other secular powers (city-states, principalities, etc.) similarly warranted to wage war? Even in this connection, however, canon law was less ambiguous than some have suggested. Throughout this era, there was a consistent sense that only "princes" could wage war. The only real question—inevitably vexing in the later medieval political context—was which of the great temporal political powers could claim the mantle of "prince." By the time of the Decretalists, even this question had been answered: a "prince" was a sovereign leader subject to no superior temporal authority.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Between the late twelfth and mid-sixteenth centuries, the configuration of material and ideational factors discussed above made possible a historically specific constellation of public wars in medieval Latin Christendom. This constellation can be characterized as having two main variants. The first of these I call "constitutive wars" which I conceptualize as wars over the very existence of certain political units (and types of political units) as sovereign states.[209] These wars were characteristically the result of vertical structural antagonisms—that is, antagonisms between states with unequal or mutually unrecognized claims to sovereign statehood. Typically, they involved violent conflicts between kingdoms seeking to assert regnal sovereignty within what they considered to be their natural, rightful or imagined borders and sub-regnal states (principalities, communes, leagues) seeking to resist these efforts and/or assert their own claims to sovereign statehood. On occasion, however, they could also stem from the claim of one kingdom to hegemony or overlordship over another.

   The wars fought by England and Scotland between 1296 and 1357 provide an illustrative example of constitutive war. On the one hand, the Plantagenet kings of England (Edwards I, II and III) were seeking to incorporate Scotland into the composite state that Rees Davies has called the "first English empire."[210] As Davies argues, English monarchs had long seen themselves as high kings of a state that encompassed all of the British Isles as well as Aquitaine in southwestern France. Prior to the mid-twelfth century, they had worked at subduing Wales and Ireland, but had not pressed their claims in Scotland too forcefully, contenting themselves with a loose feudal overlordship that conferred little real authority and nothing approaching sovereignty. Two developments, however, were to alter this situation in later twelfth century in ways that exacerbated the structural antagonisms between the kingdom of Scotland and the English empire. First, the English regnal government began enacting the script of corporate-sovereign statehood. Indeed, England was precocious in this respect, developing the technologies of rule described above early on and using them to give effect to their vision of corporate-sovereign statehood earlier than most other

polities. This predisposed the English government to look for opportunities to assert sovereignty over, and consolidate their administrative hold on, those territories that they viewed as falling within their Empire. Second, a succession crisis in Scotland provided Edward I with the leverage the English needed to press their claims to sovereignty over the Scottish kingdom. In the mid-1290s, the extinction of the Scottish royal line forced the magnates of the realm to appeal to England's Edward I to arbitrate competing claims to the throne (and thus avoid civil war). Seizing the opportunity, Edward agreed, but only on condition that the successful claimant recognize his sovereignty over Scotland. Thus, when John Balliol assumed the throne in 1292 he swore homage to Edward, effectively reducing the kingdom of Scotland to the status of English vassal state. When, chafing under this new dispensation, the Scottish king defied Edward and entered into an alliance with France, the English invaded Scotland. Both sides saw their war as "just" in legal and cultural terms. The English understood their invasion in terms of the legitimate assertion of the rights of the English crown in Scotland; the Scots as a war for the very existence of the *patria* against foreign enemies.[211] The war ended in 1328 with the signing of the Treaty Northampton, which formally recognized the sovereignty and independence of the kingdom of Scotland. Fighting was renewed by England's Edward III in 1332 as part of his general effort to assert, defend and recover the rights of the English crown throughout the territory of the English empire. This second war concluded in 1357 with the signing of the Treaty of Berwick. This treaty named Edward as the successor to the Scottish throne, thus creating the kind of dual monarchy often associated with composite kingdoms.[212]

The second variant, "configurative wars," on the other hand, were wars fought not over the existence of polities, but over the territorial configuration of mutually recognized sovereign states. They were characteristically the result of horizontal structural antagonisms—that is, antagonisms between states with reciprocally recognized claims to sovereign statehood. In most cases, these wars involved violent conflicts between principalities or kingdoms that, while recognizing each other's right to exist, disagreed about the territorial boundaries or borders separating them. But they could also be about the assertion, defense or recovery of non-territorial "rights" or to right perceived injustices. While constituting different *species* of war, however, constitutive and configurative war both belonged to a common *genus*—public war. Both were products of the competitive enactment of a common cultural script of corporate-sovereign statehood in the concrete historical conditions of the late Middle Ages.

Perhaps the quintessential example of a late medieval constitutive war was the Hundred Years War between England and France (1337–1453). This war erupted as a result of the collision of two state-building project that were accelerating in the late twelfth and early-thirteenth centuries.[213] On the one hand, as mentioned above, the English crown was working to

consolidate its hold on all the territories believed to belong to its empire. On the other, the French crown was working to restore its sovereign authority over the territories it viewed as properly part of the kingdom of France. The flashpoint was Aquitaine, a large territory in southwestern France held by the English crown as a vassal state from the king of France. As the French attempted to assert their control over the principality (through the use of judicial appeals and the exploitation of previously only lightly exercised feudal rights) they clashed repeatedly with English kings seeking to minimize French authority in the territory and avoid the subordination entailed in acts of homage. The underlying issue, of course, was a dispute over the configuration of the two contending states: would Aquitaine be a constituent territory of the English empire or an integral part of France? On three occasions in the decades on either side of 1300 this underlying horizontal antagonism led to war between England and France: the War of 1294–98; the War of Saint-Sardos (1324–27); and the Hundred Years War proper in 1337. Again, both sides justified and understood these wars in terms of the prevailing discourses of "just war," each claiming that they were using force merely to vindicate their right-to-rule in the province.

If the account developed above is correct, then wars like these were expressions of neither the timeless logic of anarchy nor the feudal mode of production/exploitation. Nor were they simply concrete geopolitical manifestations of socially constructed *mentalités collectives*. Instead, they were organic expressions of a distinctive late medieval historical structure of war. This structure comprised three elements. The first of these was the evolution of a distinctive political architecture of war comprising the corporate-sovereign state and a Hobbesian-Lockean structure/culture of anarchy. The second was the crystallization of a constellation of structural antagonisms along both horizontal and vertical axes. And the third was the evolution of the social institution of "public war"—an institution that licensed and legitimized wars fought for the rights and interests of the political community-as-corporation. This historical structure did not "cause" the interregnal and other public wars of the late medieval era—or, perhaps more accurately, it did not do so directly. Rather, it established the fundamental conditions-of-possibility that made such wars conceivable and meaningful during the late Middle Ages. Once this historical structure of war had crystallized in the thirteenth century, public war became an always-immanent feature of the geopolitical relations of Latin Christendom; with its passing in the sixteenth century, the specific forms of public war that had characterized the late Middle Ages passed from the historical scene.

# 4 Religious War
## The Wars of the
## Corporate-Sovereign Church

## INTRODUCTION

The "crusades"—a series of wars launched by the Latin Church between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries—were a defining, distinctive and unprecedented feature of the geopolitical relations of the later Middle Ages. They were defining in that they "dominated the thoughts and feelings of western Europeans between 1095 and 1500."[1] Conducted on a vast scale, they touched the lives of people from every corner of Latin Christendom and from almost every walk of life. They influenced the culture and politics of Latin Christendom, shaped its frontiers and powerfully conditioned its relations with the pagan, Muslim and Byzantine worlds beyond those frontiers.[2] They were, to put it directly, a near-ubiquitous element of life in medieval Catholic Europe—one that placed a clear and defining imprint on cultural, social and political fabric of that historical world order.

These ecclesiastical wars were also understood by contemporaries to be both distinctive—i.e., qualitatively different from the other wars of the era—and unprecedented. They were seen as distinctive in two ways: unlike other forms of organized violence, they were *sanctified wars*, authorized by the pope on Christ's behalf; and, they were *penitential wars*, involving a spiritual reward—the "remission of sin"—not granted for service in any other form of war. They were seen as unprecedented in that, previously, popes had neither authorized wars nor offered spiritual rewards to those fighting in them. In fact, quite the opposite: prior to the crystallization of the crusades, only temporal powers were viewed as having the authority to wage war; and the killing involved therein was seen as inherently sinful (and therefore requiring atonement)—not something to be encouraged or rewarded by the Church. Throughout the high and late Middle Ages, the crusade was thus understood to be *sui generis*—to use the language of this study, not public war, but a form of organized violence "of its own kind."

These defining and distinctive ecclesiastical wars pose a significant unresolved puzzle for IR Theory. Realists have sought to explain them in terms of the structural logic of anarchy, arguing that the Church-sponsored military campaigns against its various enemies were little more than a particular

instance of the timeless pursuit of power by self-interested actors seeking power and wealth. Similarly, historical materialists have sought the roots of the crusades in the "land-hunger" generated by new forms of property relations ushered in as a consequence of the "Feudal Revolution" of the late tenth century. Finally, constructivists have attempted to account for the crusades by specifying the pervading (religious) *mentalités* that made them both possible and meaningful. None of these approaches, however, provide an adequate or satisfactory explanation for the ecclesiastical wars of the later Middle Ages. Nor can the framework of public war developed and demonstrated in the preceding chapter shed much light on this phenomenon. While the interaction of evolving corporate-sovereign states under conditions of Hobbesian-Lockean anarchy (in the context of prevailing institution of just war) generated the basic conditions-of-possibility for the majority of wars fought within late medieval Latin Christendom, this dynamic cannot account for the wars of the Church. This leaves us with an intriguing puzzle: how *can* we account for one of the most distinctive elements of the "international relations" of later medieval Latin Christendom? What were the motive forces behind these ecclesiastical wars? Were they material or ideational? Were they religious or mundane? Were they a function of translocal social structures (anarchy, feudalism) or artifacts of unit-level (second-image) dynamics? In short, how should we theorize the crusades and what are the implications of this historical phenomenon for IR theory?

In this chapter, I use the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 to address these questions. My argument is that the crusades were neither expressions of the timeless logic of *realpolitik*, nor a historically inevitable consequence of the crystallization of a new social property regime in the aftermath of the Feudal Revolution. Nor were they simply the geopolitical derivatives of socially constructed identities or *mentalités collectives*. Nor, finally, were they expressions of the logic of public war developed in the preceding chapter. Rather, the crusades were an incredibly complex geopolitical phenomenon, ultimately explicable only in terms of the convergence of four historically contingent developments: the crystallization of a new constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign Church as a result of the eleventh century "Gregorian Revolution"; the enactment of that script and the subsequent evolution of the Church as an autonomous unit of rule with a distinctive war-making capacity; the development of a web of structural antagonisms as a result of the pursuit of the interests entailed in the identity of the corporate-sovereign Church; and the existence of "just war," "holy war" and "penitential war" discourses that—against the backdrop of the perceived historical injustices perpetrated by Muslims (and, later, others) against the *respublica Christiana*—provided the raw materials out of which the radically new social institution of "crusade" was constructed in the eleventh century. Taken together, these constituted the conditions-of-possibility for each of the concrete manifestations of "crusade" during

the later medieval era; absent these conditions, crusading would have been a historical impossibility.

## THE CORPORATE-SOVEREIGN CHURCH AS A WAR-MAKING UNIT

Drawing heavily on constructivist theorizing regarding the "national interest,"[3] the case that I make in this section is that the roots of the crusades are to be found in the socially constructed institutional interests of the post-Gregorian Latin Church and the armed laity. My argument proceeds in two parts. In the first, I trace the (re)constitution of the core identity of the Latin Church during the eleventh century from a junior partner of the Carolingian Empire to an independent and divinely inspired agent of spiritual renewal within the Christian commonwealth. The dynamics of identity construction are well-attended in the constructivist literature, and need not be recapitulated here.[4] Suffice it to say that in this section I provide a "unit-level" constructivist account of the eleventh century reconstruction of the Church's identity—one that emphasizes the way in which the reformers reworked the core elements of the Church's fundamental "sense of self" in light of the changing material context of post-Carolingian Latin Christendom.[5] In the second part, I demonstrate how the interests entailed in this reconstructed identity placed the Church in a structurally antagonistic relationship with a range of other actors within and beyond the bounds of Latin Christendom—in the process establishing the fundamental conditions-of-possibility for the medieval ecclesiastical wars now known as the crusades. The relationship between identity and interests, of course, is also well-established in the constructivist literature.[6] Throughout the chapter, I build on the core insight of this literature—that "identities are the basis of interests"—to demonstrate how the transformed identity of the post-Gregorian Church entailed within it a new set of ecclesiastical interests.

### The Constitutive Ideal of the "Corporate-Sovereign Church"

Although stratified horizontally (i.e. into various classes) and vertically (i.e. into regular clergy, secular clergy, cathedral clergy), the Christian priesthood constituted a more or less unified social force with its own sense of collective agency and its own portfolio of socially constructed identities, interests and strategies of reproduction. As Perry Anderson argues, the animating logic of this social force was "not to be found in the realm of economic relations or social structures, where it has sometimes mistakenly been sought."[7] Rather, it was to be found in the "cultural realm"—that is, in the realm of the "identity-interest complex" that provided these officials with both an interpretive framework that allowed them to make sense of the world and a cultural script that specified how they should act in that world.

This does not, of course, mean that the clergy did not have any material interests related to the pursuit of wealth and power. Given that the priesthood had to reproduce itself in an environment where such things mattered greatly, and that all institutions ultimately develop such material interests, it would be naive in the extreme to argue that this was the case. Rather, it is to make the point that the *constitutive* social logic of the clergy—as a distinctive social force both claiming and exercising a monopoly of power within the spiritual realm of Latin Christendom—is not reducible in any way to medieval social property relations or other strictly material factors related to the mode of production. Instead, it was a product of the "cultural sphere"—i.e. of the socially constructed *Christian* identity-interest complex that provided members of this social order with their distinctive cosmology, identity and (entailed) interests.[8]

The basic thread of this constitutive discourse, as first articulated by the Church Fathers, was one of building and perfecting what Augustine had called the City of God (*civitas Dei*)—a potentially universal moral/spiritual community founded on Christian love (*caritas*) and dedication to God. In this connection, the role of the Church, as the embodiment and instrument of the Holy Spirit, was to "communicate God's will and love" to humanity.[9] This required not only extending the spatial limits of the community of Christian believers or *corpus Christianum*—to be achieved by evangelizing and Christianizing the peoples beyond the pale of the Christian world and continually expanding the *respublica Christiana* beyond its existing frontiers—but also working to create the conditions necessary for the City of God to flourish within the borders of the Christian world.[10] Evangelization was thus the fundamental motivation for all Church action, extending the bounds of Christendom it's very *raison d'être*.

During the earlier Carolingian era, the Frankish clergy had enacted this fundamental cultural script by entering into an alliance with the imperial monarchy—prospering enormously as a consequence of the resulting imperially supported program of ecclesiastical reform, renewal and reorganization. With the demise of the Empire and the onset of the feudal revolution in the tenth century, however, the Latin Church entered into a period of moral and institutional decline. Simply put, with the loss of its royal benefactor and protector, the Church became enmeshed in the processes of violent social and political reordering unleashed by the feudal revolution: Church property was violently appropriated by secular lords; ecclesiastical benefices were transformed into a feudal fiefs; the bishops, abbots and lesser clergy were incorporated into the emerging feudo-vassalic networks; and ecclesiastical governance became increasingly personalized, secularized and decentralized. As a result, lay nobles came to exercise control over countless churches, monasteries and bishoprics. Even the papacy fell under the influence of various aristocratic factions. The inevitable result of these developments was not only loss of power, wealth and prestige, but an ineluctable collapse of ecclesiastical discipline and an associated increase in various forms of corruption, immorality and spiritual decay.[11]

Given the basic identity-interest complex of the Latin Christian clergy, periods of moral decline and institutional decay such as that associated with the fall of the Carolingian Empire have almost invariably triggered a counter-movement intended to renew and revitalize the Church. In the eleventh century, this movement materialized as reform monasticism—a historically specific ecclesiastical reaction to the decay unleashed by the feudal revolution that emphasized obedience, chastity, moral purity and the conduct (through the performance of an elaborate liturgy) of a "spiritualized form of feudal combat" intended to defend the realm against natural and supernatural enemies alike.[12] Powerfully shaped by the ideals and practices pioneered at the monastery founded by the Duke of Aquitaine at Cluny in 909, this social force was constituted through a specifically "Cluniac" version of the basic ontological narrative of the Latin clergy that constructed the reformers as architects of a restored *respublica Christiana*. According to this narrative, over the preceding centuries the Christian commonwealth had entered a period of potentially terminal decline: it had been diminished geographically due to conquest, fractured ecclesiastically as a result of schism and undermined spiritually as a result of the moral decay and corruption. Compounding this, the social force charged with the pastoral care of the Christian commonwealth and with building the City of God on Earth had also entered into a period of decline, largely as a result of the moral corruption and decay that inevitably resulted from excessive entanglement in the affairs of the *mundus*. The only way to reverse this process of terminal decline, according to this narrative, was first of all to *purify* the clergy and then to *restore* it to its rightful position of social and political leadership within the *respublica Christiana*. This was to be achieved primarily through the monasticization of the clergy—that is, through the imposition of the essentially monastic ideals of personal piety, moral purity and spiritual discipline that had proven so effective in earlier periods of reform. As Workman puts it, however, these latter day reformers believed that "Instead of seeking to realize the monastic ideal as heretofore by fleeing from the world, it [was] better to infuse the ideal into the world [starting] with the Church itself."[13] Against the backdrop of "social turmoil, millennial uncertainty and a spiritual pessimism reminiscent of the fourth century," then, the Cluniac narrative and ideal provided a powerful cultural rallying point for all those dissatisfied with the state of both *ecclesia* and *mundus* in Latin Christendom.[14] Simply put, it provided the constitutive discourse around which crystallized an element within the Latin clergy whose members saw themselves as divinely inspired agents of moral and spiritual renewal within the Christian commonwealth.

By the middle of the eleventh century, this social force found itself dominant, if not yet hegemonic, within the Latin Church. Seizing this opportunity, popes Leo IX, (1048–1054), Nicholas II (1059–1061) and Alexander II (1061–1073) all took specific steps to address the ills they perceived to be at the heart of Latin Christendom's moral corruption and spiritual

decay—especially the "immoral" practices of simony (the purchase of clerical office and the related practice of lay investiture of abbots and bishops) and clerical concubinage. With the accession of Gregory VII in 1073, however, this process of renewal and revitalization took a different tack: it evolved from being an essentially legal and hortatory effort—involving both the promulgation of canons prescribing these practices and a variety of efforts designed to delegitimize them—to one focused on transforming the papacy into a powerful institution capable of more effectively pursuing the socially constructed values and interests of the reform faction of the clergy. Thus, in addition to his efforts to continue the work of his predecessors and extirpate the sins of simony and clerical concubinage, Gregory also took steps to assert control over the bishops and to strengthen the administrative apparatus of the papacy. This was the Gregorian or Papal Revolution of the eleventh century, a phenomenon perhaps best understood as an enactment of the basic constitutive script of the Latin clergy in the distinctive conditions of post-Carolingian feudal Europe.[15] Whereas in Carolingian times, the "rational" strategy for the clergy had been to play the role of junior partner in a political alliance with the monarchy, with the end of the Empire and the spread of feudalism such a strategy was no longer viable; nor, given the perceived connection between growing lay interference and the decay of the Church, was it seen as desirable. Instead, the revitalization and purification of the clergy—and the pursuit of its founding mission in the concrete historical conditions of the high Middle Ages—required the creation of a "papal monarchy" that was a powerful institution of governance in its own right.[16] The Gregorian reforms advanced this goal by consolidating the reformers' control of the papacy, strengthening papal control over the Church, and deepening the Church's control over the spiritual life of Latin Christendom.

The constitutive ideal of the Latin Church, then, was distinct from that of the corporate-sovereign state. Given that these two scripts were assembled out of a common stock of cultural raw materials, however, and recognizing that there were myriad transmission belts that allowed ideas to move freely between the realms of temporal and spiritual governance, it should perhaps not be too surprising to find that there were also points where these two constitutive ideals overlapped. Two of these are particularly important. The first has to do with sovereignty. As Pennington has argued, "the canonists incorporated Roman legal definitions of sovereignty into older ecclesiastical traditions, and during the course of the twelfth century, they described the pope's power over the church as being his *plenitudo potestatis*, fullness of power, with increasing frequency."[17] In the course of the twelfth century, canonists such as Laurentius Hispanus and Hostiensis further refined and elaborated on this concept, arguing that popes exercised two kinds of sovereign power: *potestas ordinata* (ordinary power) and *potestas absoluta* (absolute power). The former referred to the pope's authority to act routinely according to positive law; the latter emphasized his ability,

in certain extraordinary circumstances, to exercise unlimited power as Christ's vicar on Earth. In effect, the doctrine of *potestas absoluta* placed the pope above the law, at least in matters of "necessity," and vested the office of the papacy with unlimited authority to act as judge, administrator and pastor within and over the Church. In this respect, it was closely paralleled by a second concept, *plena potestas* (full power—also known as or *libera potestas* or unlimited power), a Roman law precept that normally referred to plenipotentiary power to act on behalf of person or persons. While similar, and often used interchangeably, the two concepts differed in one important respect: whereas *potestas absoluta* was a power thought to derived from the papal vicariate held from Christ, *plena potestas* was viewed as a power delegated by the Christian people or the corporation of the Church. Together, though, they reflected a constitutive ideal of the Church in which the pope had absolute authority to govern the Church, to change old laws and promulgate new ones, and to sit as supreme judge. As with temporal sovereignty, there were limits on the pope's sovereign authority: "Even those [jurists] who described papal authority in the most exalted terms always acknowledged that the pope had limitations imposed on him by the unwritten constitution of the church, the *status ecclesiae*, and the liability of the pope to err."[18] The pope, however, recognized no superior authority (save Christ Himself) either within the Church or beyond it.

The second point of intersection has to do with corporation theory. I have discussed this theory at some length in Chapter 3 and need not reproduce that discussion here. Suffice it to say that just as corporation theory was an essential element of the constitutive ideal of the late medieval state, so too it was an integral component of the constitutive ideal of the late medieval Church. Articulating and elaborating this norm, the canonists argued that the Church both comprised a number of lesser corporate entities and constituted one itself. On this view, "the bishop and his cathedral chapter constituted the most important corporate group within the church."[19] This group was viewed as constituting a discrete juridical personality, governed by the bishop acting with considerable discretion in routine affairs, but requiring the consent of the chapter in extraordinary matters. Similarly, the Church as a whole was also viewed as a *universitas* or corporation, comprising both the *congregatio fidelium* (the "congregation of the faithful" or all baptized Christians) and the institution of the visible Church (the ordained priests and prelates and the organizational infrastructure they staffed). This corporation was understood to be represented and governed by the pope and his cardinals, in much the same way as a diocese was said to be represented and governed by the bishop and his canons.

Pulling all of these threads together, we have the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign Church: an independent "church-state" responsible for governing the spiritual realm of the *respublica Christiana* and claiming authority over the entire corporation of the *congregatio fidelium*. Within this corporate church-state, the office of the papacy was

sovereign, recognizing no superior authority either within or beyond the Church. Following the Gregorian revolution, the "moral purpose" of this church-state was to reform Latin Christendom, recall sinners from error to truth, act as agents of moral and spiritual renewal and intervene in the world to restore justice, all of which required liberty of the Church. Although by the fourteenth century some of the energy had run out of this project, this basic portfolio of interests—and especially the liberty of the Church and the defense of the *respublica Christiana* and the Catholic faith—had become deeply embedded in the Church's self-understanding and remained powerful drivers of ecclesiastical policy throughout the later Middle Ages.

## The Actually Existing "Corporate-Sovereign" Church

As a system of political rule, the medieval Church actually comprised three inter-related structures. First, there were the Papal States, sometimes called the Patrimony of St. Peter. Originally little more than a narrow concentric band of territories surrounding Rome, by the eleventh century it had expanded to include Ravenna, the Pentapolis, the Duchy of Benevento, Tuscany, Corsica, Lombardy and a number of Italian towns and cities. During the era of lord-rulership, the emergence of powerful city-states and petty principalities, coupled with the machinations of both the Holy Roman Empire and the commune of Rome, seriously weakened papal authority in these lands. Nevertheless, the Papal States survived as a political unit throughout the medieval era and constituted an important aspect of the Church's political infrastructure. Second, Church rule took the form of an episcopal-monastic complex that extended throughout Latin Christendom. The basic organizational unit of the Church was the diocese (an administrative unit supervised by a bishop) and archdiocese (aggregations of bishoprics, roughly equivalent to an Imperial Roman province, administered by an archbishop), which together were responsible for recruiting, training and supervising the priesthood and for providing religious services directly to the laity. Within this structure, bishops and archbishops had significant autonomy—indeed, they were typically subject only to the dictates of doctrinal orthodoxy as agreed at periodic episcopal councils. They also had enforceable rights of taxation (the "tithe") and could raise revenues from Church lands as would any feudal lord. Paralleling this structure was a network of monasteries—centers of communal living in which "regular" clergy and lay members pursued lives of piety, learning and economic self-sufficiency. These, too, could be significant land-holders, exercising feudal control over their serfs and appropriating economic surplus from them. This episcopal-monastic complex remained highly decentralized until the Gregorian Revolution of the eleventh century, at which point the papacy began to assert its supremacy and improve hierarchical control and central administration within the Church. Subsequent to Gregory VII's papacy,

the Church's ability to exercise translocal rule over the episcopal-monastic complex improved dramatically. Finally, there was the "universal" dimension of ecclesiastical rule: the direct authority of the pope and his episcopate to command and forbid in spiritual matters throughout all of Latin Christendom. Following the Gregorian Revolution, the Church also asserted authority to command and forbid in certain secular matters as well—i.e. to insist on the right to invest or depose temporal rulers who had failed (in the Pope's judgement) to meet their responsibilities to God—although this authority was never effectively imposed or universally recognized throughout the medieval era.[20]

In the aftermath of the Gregorian Revolution, ecclesiastical authorities began reconstructing the Church along more corporate-sovereign lines.[21] Paralleling, indeed often anticipating, developments in the temporal sphere, the Church developed the various technologies-of-rule needed to pursue its constitutive moral purposes and assert its claim to external sovereignty. "Like all other monarchs," for example, "the Pope possessed a court or curia, which combined his household, chief administrators, advisers and officers and the wellsprings of his jurisdiction, or judicial authority."[22] During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, this court developed an accessible and highly regarded appellate system through which the decisions of lower ecclesiastical courts could be appealed and reversed. This enabled the papacy to break "the potential independence of intervening layers of by making their authority conditional upon repeated papal endorsement."[23] The curia also developed a system of "provisions" through which major and minor ecclesiastical benefices were assigned by the papacy rather than by local officials (whether temporal or spiritual). Along with the expansion of papal jurisdiction, the extension of papal control over ecclesiastical appointments served to propel the papacy to nearly complete dominion over the Church by the thirteenth century.

During the fourteenth century, the curia further evolved into the nerve center of the papal administrative structure. By 1350 it had come to comprise several offices or ministries, each having specialized responsibilities and powers related to the administration of the Church. The first of these was the apostolic chancery, which was responsible for producing letters issued in the pope's name and for maintaining the papal registers. This office, headed by the vice-chancellor, responded to petitions (common letters), appointed judges to hear particular appeals (letters of justice), transmitted letters related to papal benefices (letters of provision) and issued correspondence related to administrative, diplomatic and financial matters. It also had its own court for hearing cases related to letters of justice. The second was the apostolic chamber, the curia's financial department. Its heads were the chamberlain and the treasurer. This was the office responsible for administering the papal revenue system, which grew considerably in both scope and sophistication during these years. Among the revenues collected through this office were the service tax (*servitia* paid upon receipt

of a major papal benefices, *annates* upon receipt of minor ones), the *fructus intercalares* (the revenues of vacant papal benefices), general taxes on clerical income (ten percent of income), charitable subsidies (special taxes on clergy for special purposes), the *ius spolii* (which involved the appropriation of the moveable property of deceased clergy) and "the census due from the kingdoms that were papal fiefs . . . and from vicars in the Papal State."[24] The chamber also maintained a court that adjudicated financial disputes. The third major office was the *Rota*, a court dealing with cases related to papal benefices. Finally, the curia included the office of the penitentiary, which was "able to provide absolution from sins and ecclesiastical censures, to grant marriage dispensations, and to commute vows and penances."[25]

The medieval Latin Church, then, had a number of characteristics that made it a unique unit of authority (that is, unlike other forms of medieval polity): its *raison d'être* was to govern the *spiritual* life of Latin Christendom; it monopolized authority over religious matters; it exercised universal jurisdiction in spiritual matters and sometimes claimed it in temporal ones; it had a well-developed—and distinctive—administrative structure; and it had access to revenues unavailable to any other unit of authority. It was not, in other words, simply another medieval kingdom like those that were emerging in England and France. Nor was it an empire like the one that had evolved in Germany and Northern Italy. Nor, finally, although it was centered on the city of Rome (and for a time Avignon), was it some form of urban polity. In other words, it was not a product of the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state. Rather, in the aftermath of the Gregorian Revolution, it evolved as a distinctive institution of rule—the "corporate-sovereign Church"—existing alongside, and to some extent superimposed upon, the various forms of corporate-sovereign state that were evolving in Latin Christendom.

Significantly for the purposes of this study, in the later eleventh century the Latin Church began to evolve into a distinctive—and powerful—*locus of control of military power.* At the most basic level, of course, the Church had long been a feudal land-holder and was thus able to generate armed force in the same way as other feudal lordships and feudo-vassalic networks: either by summoning vassals to provide obligatory military service or by accepting payment in lieu of service and hiring paid troops. But ecclesiastical landlords tended to raise fighting forces in this manner only when obliged to do so by their temporal overlords—not to fight on behalf of the Church. Beginning in the mid-eleventh century, however, the Latin Church also developed the capability to generate military power for its own purposes. This it did in ways that reflected its unique constitutive social relations, institutional capacities and place in the collective imagination of the lay and clerical populations. Specifically, unlike temporal authorities, the Church developed a capacity to mobilize secular nobles through its monopoly power within the spiritual domain of Latin Christendom. At a very general level, of course, this monopoly power manifested

as the "moral authority" of the Church to define "just causes" for war, to specify "enemies of the Church" and to command the secular authorities to employ their material power resources in support of ecclesiastical interests.[26] As Alkopher has pointed out, the Church's ability to mobilize secular force was also a function of its ability to define the "common discourse, intersubjective meanings, and shared definitions of reality, which made [the crusades] imaginable" and which made potential crusaders at least potentially responsive to the summons.[27] More concretely, however, the Church's ability to mobilize secular authorities depended on two sociopolitical mechanisms. The first involved the Church's authority to punish secular authorities who failed either to answer the Church's call to arms or to fulfill their crusader vows. In this respect, punishment typically included excommunication and the interdict. Perhaps more importantly, the Church also developed the capability to mobilize the secular powers in support of its interests through its monopoly power to remit sins in return for military service. In the early decades of the new millennium, lay piety had intensified dramatically throughout Latin Christendom, ultimately coming to constitute a key element of the constitutive narrative of the nobility.[28] Obviously, however, the new script of "devout Christian" (with its entailed norms of humility, asceticism, Christian love and public displays of piety) could only ever co-exist uneasily with the older script of "noble warrior" (with its associated norms of ambition and honor and its defining practices of violence and conspicuous consumption). As a result, the members of the nobility became "painfully aware of their own sinfulness and its terrible consequences, and deeply anxious to escape from them."[29] Against this backdrop, the Church was able to summon kings, noble lords and their knightly retinues to fight on behalf of its temporal and spiritual interests by providing a means of resolving this tension—that is, by offering members of the nobility a means to atone for their sins while actually enacting the script of "warrior" (if in support of carefully delimited religio-political objectives). This was the institution of the "crusade" which I will discuss in some depth below.

Finally, no picture of the distinctive nature of the Church as a locus of control of military force would be complete without a discussion of the military religious orders.[30] These were monastic institutions dominated by a class of lay brothers (not priests, who were barred by canon law from bearing arms and fighting) who were warriors dedicated to the defense of Christendom. In most respects, they differed little from the other monastic institutions that had become such a commonplace within the Church: they were organized into similar monastic communities, took similar vows, followed similar rules of life (including the monastic *horarium*), performed the same holy office, were similarly exempt from the jurisdiction of secular powers and the episcopate, etc. Moreover, as with non-military monastic orders, some (such as the Order of Santiago) were decidedly local/regional in scope and scale, while others (such as the Templars and the Hospitallers)

were truly centralized, translocal orders of the Church. Where they *did* differ was with respect to their mission/vocation and the way in which they served the Church. Simply put, the primary calling of the members of these orders was twofold: to purify themselves through the pursuit of the monastic ideal and to purify the world by fighting the enemies of the *respublica Christiana*. As Contamine puts it, the members of these orders were both knights and monks, fighting a "double combat of flesh and spirit."[31] Not only were they dedicated to defeating the "enemies of the cross of Christ"[32] and defending the rights of Christians within and beyond the political reach of the Christian commonwealth, they also believed that such a vocation was a devotional act of Christian love (*caritas*) equivalent to the care of the poor and sick.[33] For members of these orders, warfare was not a cultural imperative (as it was for knights), nor a temporary act of devotion (as it was for crusaders); rather, "it was a devotional way of life."[34] Typically well-supported by wealthy patrons, highly disciplined (having submitted to both *disciplina militaris* and *disciplina regularis*) and enjoying a steady stream of recruits, these orders provided the Church with a reliable and very effective source of military power that it could and did use to advance its interests within and beyond Latin Christendom. Needless to say, this mechanism for generating armed force was unique to the Church—nothing like the military religious orders existed within the secular realm.

To summarize: in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, the Church became a significant and distinctive locus of control of organized violence within the medieval Latin world order. To be sure, ecclesiastical mechanisms for generating military forces were imperfect and somewhat clumsy: while the Church did come to develop its own directly controlled military forces (the military religious orders), for the most part it was forced to mobilize the resources of the armed laity to fight on its behalf. These forces were not subject to strict hierarchical control and the ability of the papacy to direct these forces was always somewhat attenuated.[35] However, in an era when states typically did not exercise either a clear monopoly over or strict control of the legitimate use of force, this was also true of the kingdoms and lesser principalities that comprised the medieval Latin geopolitical system. The difference between these states and the Church in this connection, I would argue, was one of degree rather than kind. For all intents and purposes, the Church was just as much a war-making unit as the kingdoms and lesser principalities that populated the late medieval Latin world order.

## STRUCTURAL ANTAGONISMS

By the later decades of the eleventh century, then, the reform elements of the clergy were not only firmly in control of the Latin Church but had developed many of the institutional mechanisms necessary for carrying out

their program of moral and spiritual rejuvenation. As they set about pursuing their socially constructed interests, however, they quickly became enmeshed in a web of structural antagonisms involving those polities and social forces pursuing contrary interests. In this section, I address two questions: (a) what, precisely, were the socially constructed values and interests that motivated and constrained the actions of post-Gregorian Latin Church; and (b) what structural antagonisms were generated by the pursuit of these interests?

Deriving directly from their collective identity as spiritual reformers charged with restoring the decaying regime of justice within Christendom, this faction of the clergy articulated four basic interests or objectives. First, in response to the spiritual renewal that swept Latin Christendom in the eleventh century (itself partly a reaction to lordly violence and anarchy), ecclesiastical authorities sought to reassert their monopoly power over the spiritual domain by reforming and revitalizing the clergy. This monopoly had been called into question in the eleventh century by a combination of rising lay piety and growing ecclesiastical corruption, both of which necessarily undermined the "natural" leadership role of the priesthood in spiritual affairs. In response, Pope Gregory VII formulated and initiated a revolutionary program designed to re-establish the moral authority and spiritual hegemony of the Church. As noted above, the broad thrust of this program was the separation of the clergy from the laity; of the *ecclesia* from the *mundus*. In practice, however, its key manifestations were campaigns against clerical concubinage and the newly articulated sin of simony. Second, the medieval papacy developed a powerful interest in not only extricating the Church from the control of temporal authorities (*libertas ecclesiae*), but (more ambitiously) in actively asserting ecclesiastical supremacy over those authorities. The ideological roots of this variant of "political Augustinianism," of course, can be traced back to both Augustine and Pope Gelasius I in the fourth and fifth centuries. In the eleventh century, however, Pope Gregory VII pressed with unprecedented vigour the case that within the *respublica Christiana* "papal authority alone was universal and plenary, while all other powers . . . were particular and dependent," effectively committing the Church to a set of policies that irreconcilably contradicted the interests of both the secular authorities and its allies within the episcopate.[36] Third, the Latin clergy articulated as one of its central interests the goal of Christian unity (under papal leadership). One the one hand, this involved maintaining the doctrinal purity of the Latin Church in the face of social movements constituted around various heterodox beliefs and practices. On the other, it involved the reassertion of Latin hegemony over the Orthodox Church, which was held to be in rebellion against Rome.[37] Finally, the reform clergy came to believe that the liberated Church had a duty to intervene vigorously in the affairs of the lay world to ensure "justice."[38]

With the accession of the reform faction in the eleventh century, then, a new portfolio of socially constructed interests and values began to motivate

the actions of the papacy. But what, if anything, does all this have to do with the emergence of the crusade as an organic element of the geopolitical system of medieval Latin Christendom? Simply put, the argument I am making here is that, as the newly hegemonic monastic-reform faction of the Latin clergy began to pursue its socially constructed portfolio of interests, it quickly found itself locked in structural conflicts with a number of irreconcilably contradictory social forces over the nature and extent of the Christian commonwealth. These structural antagonisms materialized in four concrete dyads. First, the interests of the post-Gregorian Church clashed with those of the Empire. The reformers' efforts to liberate the Church from lay interference by abolishing the Emperor's right to appoint and command bishops threatened Imperial access to the military, financial and political resources of the bishops—resources that had become essential elements of the Emperor's power base and the Empire's administrative infrastructure.[39] Similarly, efforts to liberate the Church by weakening Imperial power *in Italy* threatened the Emperor's access to both the enormous wealth of these lands and the political resources they provided in his nearly continuous power struggle with the German dukes.[40] Finally, efforts to press the claim that the Church alone enjoyed plenary power within the *respublica Christiana* necessarily threatened the Emperor's own identity as the supreme temporal authority within Latin Christendom.[41] While there were periods of relative peace, co-existence and even alliance between Church and Empire during the central Middle Ages, this basic structural antagonism ensured that episodes of conflict—like the Investiture Controversy (1046–1122)—would erupt over and over again throughout the later medieval era.

Second, as they began to shape the actions of the Church, the interests and values of the newly hegemonic reform faction of the clergy generated irreconcilable conflicts between the papacy and social forces that, while Christian, espoused unauthorized religious doctrines (heresies). At the beginning of the period under consideration, "heresy" was not considered to be a pressing problem within Latin Christendom. The great heresies of the patristic period (Donatism, Arianism, Pelagianism, etc.) were known to Church officials, of course, but there had been no major heretical movement since that time. Indeed, as late as the end of the eleventh century the term was typically used to refer to the sin of simony rather than to unauthorized programs of belief or practice.[42] Perhaps ironically, however, the emergence of the reform movement within the Church was paralleled by the re-emergence of the existential "threat" of heresy (at least in the collective imagination of the clergy). On the one hand, this was a perhaps inevitable by-product of intensified religious consciousness; the heightened sense of piety that characterized the era was accompanied by a heightened awareness of, and tendency to demonize, those who deviated from the orthodox teachings of the Church. On the other hand, the very cultural factors and social impulses that drove the reform movement to seek to purify the Church also generated more extreme religious movements that rejected the Church's

teachings (and authority) altogether. Partly as a result of the weakening of clerical authority associated with attacks on corrupt and simoniacal priests, partly as a result of the desire to live a more "apostolic life" based on New Testament teachings, and partly as a result in the improved level of clerical education (which allowed priests unmediated access to the scriptures) new forms of worship, preaching and religious community began to proliferate. While some of these (such as the Beguines) were accommodated under the big tent of "reform," others (such as the Cathars and Waldensians) were viewed as being inherently incompatible with the teachings and authority of the Church and were anathematized.[43]

Third, the clergy was locked in a structural conflict with both the Muslim polities that governed in formerly Christian lands and the Islamic faith itself. The roots of this conflict were to be found in the reformers' core identity-interest complex, which framed Islam as a particularly obdurate form of heresy and Muslim rule in formerly Christian lands as inherently "unjust"—on the grounds that it was predicated on the unlawful seizure of property that was rightfully Christian and involved the persecution of Christians—and therefore in need of remedy. This was particularly true of the Holy Land, which was viewed as the cosmological center of the Christian world, but it was also true of Spain, Sicily and other once-Christian lands occupied by Muslims. From the perspective of the constitutive narrative of the reform papacy, these injustices *demanded* that steps be taken to recover territory that rightfully belonged to Christians and to punish those responsible for the unjust treatment of Christians in these illegally occupied lands. This placed them in an irreconcilably antagonistic relationship with those Islamic polities that occupied these once-Christian lands (and that, for reasons of their own core identity-interest complex, were violently opposed to returning them to Christian rule).

Finally, the clergy was enmeshed in a structural conflict with pagan polities that resisted evangelization. As we have seen, evangelizing the peoples beyond the pale of the Christian world and continually expanding the *respublica Christiana* beyond its existing frontiers was the underlying motivation for all Church action; building a truly universal Christian commonwealth it's very *raison d'être*. This placed the clergy in a structurally antagonistic relationship with all those non-Christian polities that opposed evangelization or resisted incorporation into the Christian commonwealth.

## THE INSTITUTION OF THE CRUSADE

The Church, then, had socially constructed interests that placed it in structural conflict with a range of social forces within and beyond Latin Christendom. As late as the mid-eleventh century, however, the Church had neither the institutional means nor the "moral authority" to employ

armed force in pursuit of these interests.[44] In order for these structural antagonisms to be converted into violent conflict between the Church and its adversaries, two further conditions-of-possibility would have to be met. First, the Church would have to be reconstituted as a legitimate war-making unit—that is, it would have to be transformed into a corporate entity with the widely accepted legitimate authority to employ violent force in pursuit of its interests. And, second, the armed nobility that provided the core of Latin Christendom's war-fighting capacity would have to be in some way reconstituted as "soldiers of Christ" (*milites Christi*) willing and able to fight on behalf of the Church and its interests. Both of these preconditions, I argue, were only met with the crystallization of the institution of the crusade in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.[45]

What, then, was the nature of this institution? What were the ontological raw materials out of which it was assembled? And how did it make possible the ecclesiastical wars of the later medieval era? To begin with, the institution of the crusade was constructed in part at least out of the raw materials afforded by the cultural narrative of Christian "holy war" (*bellum sacrum*). As Carl Erdmann first argued in his 1935 monograph *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, the crusades were in fact the culmination of the historical evolution of the Christian institution of "holy war," which he defined as "any war that is regarded as a religious act or is in some way set in a direct relation to religion."[46] According to Erdmann, this institution evolved in three historical phases.[47] First, in the fifth century, Augustine established its foundations by introducing the idea that the preservation of the unity of the Christian Church constituted a just cause for war. Faced with the threat posed to the doctrinal and institutional unity of the Church by the Donatist movement, but also conscious of the doctrinal proscription against forced conversion,[48] Augustine ultimately came to argue that (military) force could be used to restore to the true faith those believers who had fallen into doctrinal error (i.e. heretics, schismatics and apostates).[49] In effect, Augustine's scattered and inchoate writings on the topic of organized violence introduced two related but distinct discursive currents into the medieval institution of war: "just war" or war waged on temporal authority to combat injustice; and, "holy war" or "war sanctioned by God [*bellum Deo auctore*] in which . . . one side fights for light, the other darkness; once side for Christ, the other the devil."[50] Second, under Pope Gregory I (d. 604 AD) the moral purposes of such wars were expanded to include the forcible subjugation of pagans. In effect, Gregory introduced the doctrine of what Erdman called "indirect missionary war"—that is, war fought to subjugate pagans, not as a means of forcible conversion, but as "the basis for subsequent missionary activity that would be protected and promoted by state authority."[51] Finally, the early reform popes—Leo IX, Alexander II and Gregory VII—faced with significant translocal military threats emanating from the Islamic world, introduced the idea that war could legitimately be fought in defense of the Church and Christendom.[52] They also initiated the

practice of offering remission of sins as a reward for military service against the enemies of the Church.[53] From this, Erdmann concluded, it was but a short evolutionary leap from *holy war* to the *crusade* to liberate the Holy Land launched in 1095.

Needless to say, since first advanced over seven decades ago, the "Erdmann thesis" has been subject to intense scrutiny and vigorous debate. But while there may be little consensus in the extant historiographical literature on the degree to which the crusades were holy wars, for the purposes of this study, three conclusions seem warranted. First, it seems irrefutable that a rich and powerfully resonating discourse of holy war was at least part of the geopolitical imagination of Latin Christendom. Second, this discourse could be said to entail the following defining elements: holy wars were fought on God's authority; they were declared and directed by the clergy; they were a means of defending the Church against its internal and external enemies; and, they were associated with spiritual rewards. Finally, there can be little doubt that the architects of the prototypical First Crusade were heavily influenced by the practices and discourses of holy war when imagining the campaign to liberate the Holy Land. In this respect, one need not accept Erdmann's claim that the crusades were *nothing more than* holy wars. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, the institution of the crusade was (a) assembled at least in part out of cultural materials provided by the discourse of *bellum sacrum*, and (b) that it therefore necessarily had many of the characteristics of a Christian "holy war."

But if it is true that the institution of the crusade perpetuated the legacy of the older institution of holy war, it is also true that it shared more than a little genetic material with the pre-existing discourse of *bellum justum* or "just war." Indeed, the institution of the crusade incorporates so many elements of that older discourse that some have argued that, in effect, it constituted little more than the "just war of the Church." What, then, were the key just war elements of the discourse of crusade? At the risk of eliding important differences within and between schools of canonical jurisprudence, the answer to this question can be summarized in the following terms. With respect to the issue of just cause, the canonists held that the Church could declare and direct a just war in response to certain injustices perpetrated by infidels. These injustices included attacks on the Christian commonwealth, infringements on the legal rights of Christians and/or the illicit seizure of goods or property "lawfully and legitimately held by Christians in accordance with divine law and the *ius gentium*." The only real debate seems to have been whether, to qualify as such, an "injustice" required a (violent) *act* or whether the mere denial of the Christian faith as defined by the Latin clergy constituted an injury to divine law and/or the Church sufficient to justify war. In any case, proponents of both views argued that wars to recover lands lost to Muslims (especially the Holy Land), to punish and coerce heretics or to defend the Church and Christendom against enemies of the faith (*inimici ecclesiae*),

unambiguously met the standards of just cause established in canon law. With respect to the issue of "legitimate authority," the canonists also defined the locus of war-making authority within a just war frame, arguing that while the Church was obviously vested with the authority to declare and direct a crusade, ultimately the pope (as the Vicar of Christ and thus enjoying a unique "plenitude of power") was the clerical official "most suited to exercise this authority."[54] In this way, as Russell has argued, the somewhat vague concept of "holy war" was concretized in the crusade as the *just war* of the Latin Church.[55]

Finally, it is simply not possible to grasp fully the constitutive ideal of the "crusade" without tracing its connections to the established religious discourse of "penance." [56] As Bull has demonstrated convincingly, lay pietyp. intensified dramatically during the era of lord-rulership, ultimately coming to constitute a key element of the constitutive narrative of the nobility.[57] This new script of "devout Christian," however, was from the beginning in tension with both the older script of "noble warrior" and the actual quotidian *practices* of the lordly nobility (which, given the Christian ontological narrative, could only be framed as "sinful"). That these tensions generated considerable spiritual anxiety is well attested in the literature, [58] as is the desire it induced in many nobles to atone for their sins by performing acts of penance.[59] The Latin Christian penitential system, of course, had long offered noble (and other) sinners a mechanisms for earning the remission of their sins: contrition, confession, acts of penance (fasting, pilgrimages to Rome of the Holy Land, the devout performance of meritorious works, etc) and absolution all being part of an elaborate system for making satisfaction to God for transgressions against His law. It thus offered individual nobles a way of moderating the anxieties resulting from simultaneously enacting two constitutive scripts that were ultimately contradictory. But this penitential system was not without its limitations. Prior to the late eleventh century, the Church typically required noble penitents to accept punishments (such as forswearing martial activities) that amounted to a denial of key aspects of their core identity as warriors—a requirement that generated powerful tensions and anxieties of its own. In the decades immediately preceding the First Crusade, however, a new form of penance evolved that offered members of the nobility a means of expiating their sins without denying their warrior identity: sanctified violence directed against infidels, apostates and other enemies of the Church. Beginning with the pontificate of Gregory VII, the Church began to teach that "taking part in war of a certain kind could be an act of charity to which merit was attached and to assert that such an action could indeed be penitential."[60] With this revolutionary innovation, "the act of fighting was put on the same meritorious plane as prayer, works of mercy and fasting."[61]

How were these disparate intellectual and institutional elements brought together to form the radically new institution of the crusade? Simply put, this synthesis can be said to be the result of an extended

process of experimentation and *bricolage* initiated by ecclesiastical officials in the eleventh century. The mounting military pressure experienced by Christendom during this period,[62] coupled with the growing sense that the occupation of formerly Christian lands by Muslims was inherently unjust,[63] provided these officials with a powerful incentive to begin looking for ways to mobilize Christendom's military capacity first to defend the *respublica Christiana* against further incursions and then to liberate those territories that had already been lost to Islam. The result was a series of so-called *précroisades*—instances of penitential warfare that prefigured the crusades proper—which included "wars of the Germans against the Slavs, the combats of the Normans in southern Italy and Sicily, the early campaigns of the Spanish *Reconquista*, and naval raids carried out by Italian sea-powers."[64] The key catalytic event in the evolution of the crusade proper, however, appears to have been the embassy sent by the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus to a council of Latin bishops at Piacenza in March 1095.[65] Through this embassy the Byzantines, hard pressed by Turks advancing through Asia Minor toward Constantinople, asked the pope to encourage western Christians to render military assistance to their eastern co-religionists in order to stem the Muslim tide. Pope Urban II, long concerned about the Muslim threat to Christendom's eastern frontier (and hoping to restore the unity of *respublica Christiana*) responded to this appeal by preaching a "war of liberation" (carefully framed to conform to the criteria of just cause and with the reformers' core narrative of *libertas ecclesiae*) in which both Christians and the Christian Holy Places were to be freed from Muslim domination.[66] As an inducement to take part in this war, Urban offered remission of sins to those who completed their penitential (armed) "pilgrimage" to Jerusalem. The result: a massive military expedition to the east that not only liberated Jerusalem (1099), but established a series of Latin kingdoms in Syria and Palestine that were to persist for almost 200 years. While the success of this expedition was largely a function of fragmentation and internecine conflict within the Islamic world, it was viewed in Christendom as a "miraculous example of divine intervention and proof that the crusade really was what God wanted."[67] It thus proved to be critical juncture in the evolution of the institution of the crusade—i.e. a formative moment when a historically contingent cobbling together of elements of pre-existing institutions for a specific purpose congealed into a new institution that, while evolving in a path-dependent way, would persist essentially unchanged for several centuries.[68]

By the late eleventh century, then, the institutions of holy war, just war and penance had converged to constitute what Villey called a "new synthesis": the institution of the "crusade."[69] This institution framed the basic cultural understanding or constitutive ideal of what Hostiensis called "Roman War" (*bellum Romanum*)—that is, it constituted the crusade as a meaningful category of thought and action within the collective

imagination of medieval Latin Christendom. For the purposes of this study, three elements of this new institution are centrally important. First, the new institution constituted the crusade as a martial instrument for righting injustices and combating evil in the world. More specifically, it defined the crusades as a form of just war whose *moral purposes* were the liberation of Christians, the redress of legal injuries perpetrated against them, the restoration of heretics to the true faith, and the defense of Christendom and the Church from attack. Second, the crusade was constituted as an instrument of *ecclesiastical* statecraft. While secular powers could be (and typically were) mobilized to carry out any given crusade, authority for launching a *bellum Romanum* was reserved exclusively to the papacy. Finally, the crusades were constituted in the medieval imagination as an act of piety, penance and Christian love (*caritas*).[70] Ecclesiastical leaders and would-be crusaders alike had a common understanding of the crusades as both an instrument for building a more just world order and as a mechanism for the remission of individual sin. To be sure, the institution of the crusade evolved significantly during the centuries following the First Crusade (crusades beyond the Holy Land; further refinements in canon law; developments in the theology of sin and penance; the creation of the military orders; etc.).[71] Throughout the later medieval era, however, the institution of the crusade retained its basic character as a penitential war-pilgrimage authorized by the pope and directed against the enemies of Christ and His Church.

## Summary

With the crystallization and institutionalization of the crusade in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, the final two conditions-of-possibility for the ecclesiastical wars peculiar to the later medieval era fell into place. First, the Church was decisively reconstituted in both law and the collective imagination of Latin Christendom as a geopolitical actor with a legitimate right to wage war. Prior to the eleventh century, the Latin Church had in effect been a subordinate partner to the Carolingian (later Holy Roman) Empire, lacking both the means and legitimate authority to wage war. From the mid-eleventh century onward, however, knowledgeable agents within and beyond the ecclesiastical hierarchy drew on existing cultural and institutional raw materials in an attempt to transform the Church into a legitimate war-making actor. Through a process of *bricolage* and synthesis, they subsequently created a new institution—embedded in canon law, theology and elite culture—that not only specified the nature and conventions of crusading, but that also decisively transformed the translocal normative and ideational structures that specified which types of unit were to be considered legitimate war-making actors within Latin Christendom. As a result, whereas prior to 1095 *princes* were the only actors authorized to wage public war (as opposed to private feuds), after 1095 *popes* were

also universally recognized as enjoying that authority. As Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt puts it, once papal authority had been established, the Church's "right to initiate and orchestrate these wars . . . was not disputed, and papal measures to facilitate this warfare were generally accepted even when they impinged on matters usually within the realm of royal authority."[72] Second, the institutionalization of the crusade served to reconstitute a significant portion of the armed nobility of Latin Christendom as "soldiers of Christ" (*milites Christi*) willing and able to fight on behalf of the Church.[73] Simply put, between the onset of the *précroisades* and the preaching of the First Crusade a new identity-interest complex—the "crusader"—emerged within Latin Christendom. This was essentially a penitential war-pilgrim: a warrior who sought remission of sins through sanctified military service to the Church. His primary interest was neither worldly enrichment nor personal aggrandizement, but salvation;[74] the primary means to this end was neither prayer nor fasting, but the performance of military service in the just wars of the Church. With the crystallization of this new identity-interest complex, a significant portion of the martial resources of Latin Christendom was placed at the disposal of the Church.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Between the mid-eleventh and late fifteenth centuries, the configuration of material and ideational factors discussed above made possible a historically specific constellation of religious wars. This constellation included Church-organized wars in the Holy Land, Iberia and along the Baltic frontier as well as within Latin Christendom itself.[75] The Crusades to the Holy Land were "wars of liberation" initially launched by the Church to restore Jerusalem to Christian rule. Following the First Crusade and the establishment of the crusader principalities (the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli and the Kingdom of Jerusalem—collectively known as *Outremer*), these expeditions were conducted primarily to defend the Holy Places against Muslim attempts at reconquest or, following its loss in 1187 and again in 1244, to recover Jerusalem for Latin Christendom. While authorized by, and fought on behalf of, the Church, these wars were prosecuted by princes, nobles and knights from every corner of Latin Christendom as well as by so-called "para-crusaders" (*milites ad terminum*), and members of military orders such as the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights.[76] They were fought primarily against a range of Muslim powers, although the Fourth Crusade ended up being waged largely against adherents to the Greek Orthodox rite. Although the idea of launching additional expeditions to liberate Jerusalem persisted for a considerable time, the Crusades to the Holy Land effectively came to an end with the fall of the last Christian stronghold in Palestine—Acre—in 1291.[77]

The Iberian Crusades were a series of military campaigns launched by the Church to liberate Christians from Muslim rule in what are now Spain and Portugal.[78] While undertaken against the backdrop of the *Reconquista*, they are neither reducible to, nor synonymous with, this much broader and more complex geopolitical phenomenon. Although it came to be seen as a sanctified enterprise, the *Reconquista* was in large measure a "political" process of conquest, conversion and colonization that unfolded over several centuries. The Iberian *Crusades*, on the other hand, were a series of discrete papally authorized, religiously motivated military campaigns that punctuated that centuries-long process.[79] The *Reconquista* was not, in other words, an "eternal" or "perpetual" crusade such as would emerge in the Baltic region.[80] To be sure, these two phenomena clearly exercised a reciprocal influence one another; just as clearly, however, they remained distinct expressions of the historical structure of medieval war.

Unlike the crusades in the Holy Land and Iberia, which were understood to be elements of the Church's eschatological struggle against Islam, the Northern Crusades were "indirect missionary wars" launched by the Church to create the conditions necessary for the subsequent evangelization of the pagan Baltic region.[81] As with their Iberian counterparts, these crusades were part of a broader phenomenon of territorial conquest and colonization—in this case, the medieval German *Ostseidlung* or "settlement of the East"—but were not reducible to it. Although in this case there was a dimension of "perpetual crusade" that was not found in Spain, the Northern Crusades were nevertheless discrete campaigns punctuating the three-centuries long process of conquest and colonization that Germanized and Christianized the Baltic region. As Peter Lock has argued, this process unfolded in five partly overlapping phases: the Wendish Crusades (1147–85), the Livonian and Estonian Crusades (1198–1290), the Prussian Crusades (1230–83), the Lithuanian Crusades (1280–1435), and the Novgorod Crusades (1243–fifteenth century).[82] While authorized by, and fought on behalf of, the Church, these wars were prosecuted by Danish, Saxon and Swedish princes as well as by military orders such as the Sword Brothers and the Teutonic Knights. They were fought primarily against a range of pagan adversaries—Wends, Livonians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Suomi and Prussians—although some were also waged against Russian Christian schismatics (i.e. adherents to the Greek Orthodox rite). By the early sixteenth century, these ecclesiastical wars—always only one element of broader process of the expansion of medieval Europe—had contributed significantly to extension of the northeastern frontier of Latin Christendom and the transformation of the Baltic from a pagan *mare incognita* into a Latin Christian lake.

The final expression or form of religious war, however, was not directed outward against Muslims or pagans, but inward against Christians within Latin Christendom.[83] These "internal crusades" were of two

types. The first involved Church-organized wars against schismatics and heretics such as the Cathars, Hussites and Waldensians. These heterodox religious movements were seen a "a threat to Christendom, a threat, as Hostiensis put it, to Catholic unity which was in fact more dangerous than to the Holy Land."[84] This type of crusade was thus seen as a defensive war fought against those who threatened the Church's spiritual authority. The second type of internal crusade involved wars launched by the papacy against temporal powers it believed threatened the Church's political authority. Examples include Pope Innocent II's 1135 crusade against the South Italian Normans "for the liberation of the Church" and Pope Innocent III's 1199 crusade Markward of Anweiler who, the pope charged, was impeding the Fourth Crusade. As Riley-Smith notes, these internal crusades were always framed as being necessary for the defense of the Catholic faith and/or the liberty of the Church.[85]

Reflecting the very different political conditions encountered in these distinct contexts, each of these types of religious war developed its own distinctive character. But each was also powerfully conditioned—indeed, made possible—by a common institutional and legal framework (the idea of the "crusade" as codified in canon law and theology), a common politico-military infrastructure (the crusader army, the military religious orders), and a common moral purpose (the defense of the Church and Christendom, the redress of injustice). Put slightly differently, each was a manifestation of a common historical structure of war. In the appendix, I illustrate this by looking more closely at each of the four forms of crusade.

If the account developed above is correct, then the crusades were artifacts of neither the timeless logic of anarchy nor the feudal mode of production/exploitation. Nor were they simply the geopolitical derivatives of socially constructed religious *mentalités collectives*. Nor, significantly, were they a function of the logic of the late medieval state-system. Rather, they were organic expressions of the historical structure of medieval religious war. This structure comprised three elements. The first of these was the development of a distinctive war-making capability on the part of the post-Gregorian Church. The second was the crystallization of a socially constructed identity-interest complex that placed this Church in a structurally antagonistic relationship with a range of other social forces both within and beyond Latin Christendom. And the third was the evolution of the social institution of "crusade"—an institution that both legitimized war as an instrument of ecclesiastical statecraft and reconstructed the armed nobility that provided the core of Latin Christendom's war-fighting capacity as "soldiers of Christ" willing and able to fight on behalf of the Church and its interests. This historical structure did not "cause" the crusades—at least not directly. Rather, it established the essential conditions-of-possibility for each of the specific crusades that took place during the later medieval era. Once it had crystallized, ecclesiastical war became

an always-immanent feature of the geopolitical relations of Latin Christendom; once it had passed from the historical scene, crusading—while formally persisting for centuries—became little more than a vestigial remnant of a bygone era, increasingly out of place in the post-medieval world order of early modern Europe.[86]

# 5 Epilogue

The basic patterns or configurations of violent political conflict associated with any given world order, I have argued, are generated by the "historical structure of war" inherent in that order. These structures comprise the ensemble of war-making units, structural antagonisms and cultural institutions that make war possible in any given historical setting. They also vary considerably from one historical setting to another. The character of war-making units and nature of the system within which they are embedded differ from one world order to another, as do the structural antagonisms deriving from their interaction and prevailing ideas regarding the meaning and purpose of war. It is this variation, I argue, that explains the distinct constellations of wars that are organic to, and characteristic of, different world orders.

Late medieval public war was made possible in the first instance by the emergence and rise to dominance of a new form of war-fighting unit—the corporate-sovereign state—in the aftermath of the twelfth century crisis of lord-rulership. As these states began to crystallize and interact with one another they gave rise to a hybrid structure combining a "Hobbesian" culture of anarchy prescribing and legitimating endemic warfare, the elimination of "unfit" states and power balancing among states not recognizing each other's sovereignty with a "Lockean" culture of anarchy that prescribed a less eliminationist form of rivalry among *kingdoms*. Out of this milieu emerged a historically specific configuration of structural antagonisms—defined as mutually incompatible core interests derived from the respective self-representations of states and exacerbated by the character of the anarchic system within which those states were embedded. Many of these antagonisms proved to be amenable to management or resolution through diplomacy, law or mediation. Where these institutions failed, however, the late medieval institution of the *bellum justum* framed war as a perfectly legitimate alternative instrument with which to pursue one's rights. Taken together, these three elements constituted what I have called the historical structure of war in late medieval Latin Christendom.

This historical structure of war gave rise to two basic types of "organic" political violence. The first I have called "public war," which I characterize as war between or within states—organized on various scales, through various pre-existing institutions of governance and around various configurations of social forces various—over such quintessentially *political* issues as

authority, sovereignty, jurisdiction, rights and territory. Late medieval public war can in turn be characterized as having two main variants: constitutive war and configurative war. Constitutive wars, I argued, were wars over the very existence of certain political units (and *types* of political units) as sovereign states. They were characteristically the result of *vertical* structural antagonisms—that is, antagonisms between states with unequal or mutually unrecognized claims to sovereign statehood. Typically, they involved violent conflicts between kingdoms seeking to assert regnal sovereignty within what they considered to be their natural or rightful borders and sub-regnal states (principalities, communes, leagues) seeking to resist these efforts and/or assert their own claims to sovereign statehood. On occasion, however, they could also stem from the claim of one kingdom to hegemony or overlordship over another. Configurative wars, by way of contrast, were wars fought not over the existence of units, but over the territorial configuration of mutually recognized sovereign states. They were characteristically the result of *horizontal* structural antagonisms—that is, antagonisms between states with reciprocally recognized claims to sovereign statehood. In most cases, these wars involved violent conflicts between principalities or kingdoms that, while recognizing each other's right to exist, disagreed about the territorial boundaries or borders separating them. But they could also be about the assertion, defense or recovery of non-territorial "rights" or to redress perceived injustices. The pre-history of the Hundred Years War provides a useful example of late medieval public war, involving both of these types of violent political conflict.

The second major form of war endemic to late medieval Latin Christendom I have called "religious war"—that is, war fought on behalf of the Church to defend or advance interests deriving from its core religious identity. Religious war was made possible by the convergence of three historically contingent developments in the later medieval period: the emergence of the Latin Church in the aftermath of the eleventh century "Gregorian Revolution" as an autonomous unit-of-rule with a distinctive war-making capacity; the rise of a particular faction of the Latin clergy (with a distinctive set of socially constructed identities, values and interests) to a position of hegemony within the Church; and the existence of "just war," "holy war" and "penitential war" discourses that provided the raw materials out of which the radically new social institution of "crusade" was constructed in the twelfth century. Taken together, these constituted the conditions-of-possibility for each of the four main variants of religious war during the later medieval era: the crusades to the Holy Land, the Iberian Crusades, the Northern Crusades and crusades within Latin Christendom against the enemies of the Church.

The history of late medieval Latin Christendom, then, was punctuated by three distinctive forms of war: constitutive war, configurative war and crusade. Proprietorial war, the dominant form of violent conflict during the high medieval era did not entirely disappear during this period, but was

progressively displaced as the *defining* form of violent political conflict beginning in the late-twelfth century. Underpinning this change in the prevailing configuration of public wars were deeper and prior changes in the historical structure of war: the emergence of the corporate-sovereign state; the crystallization of a Hobbesian-Lockean culture of anarchy; the proliferation of structural conflicts over jurisdiction, sovereignty and territory; and the evolution of the institution of "just war" that legitimized certain wars (and warmaking units) while anathematizing others. This historical structure of war and its associated constellation of war-types persisted from about the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth. By the mid-sixteenth century, however, this distinctively late medieval configuration had passed from the historical scene. Crusades were still being proclaimed, of course, but their character had changed in important ways and they were no longer one of the defining elements of Latin Christian international relations. Moreover, with the violence unleashed by the Protestant Reformations, new and unprecedented forms of religious war made their appearance on the political stage. Similarly, configurative wars were also still being fought after the middle of the sixteenth century, but by (and over) distinctively *early modern* states that were different in important ways from their late medieval predecessors. Constitutive wars—along with crusades, perhaps the defining form of war in late medieval Latin Christendom—did not disappear in the late sixteenth century, but they did recede into the background. Especially after the Westphalian settlement in the middle of the seventeenth century, conflicts over both the type of state populating the Latin Christian world order and the right-to-exist of the specific states comprising that order were delegitimized and became much less common. This transformation in the configuration of organic wars was underpinned by even more profound changes in the historical structure of war: the corporate-sovereign state gave way to the dynastic-sovereign state; Hobbesian-Lockean anarchy was superceded by a more Lockean variety; structural conflicts over territory and dynastic issues became paramount; and "just war" doctrine became increasingly inflected with the logic of *raison d'état*. This new historical structure of war persisted until the mid-seventeenth century when it gave way to one based on what Hall has convincingly characterized as the "territorial-sovereign state."[1]

These findings are intrinsically significant in that they tell us about both (a) the material and ideational factors that made war possible in the late medieval era, and (b) the specific configuration of organic wars that distinguished and (partly) defined that era. The content of this study, however, has significance beyond merely telling us something new about the deep socio-political character of late medieval war: it also has something to contribute to a number of ongoing IR debates, including those related to the nature of the late medieval international system, periodization in international politics, the historical triumph of the sovereign state over its competitors, the nature of international relations beyond the medieval case and the historicity of war.

## THE NATURE OF THE LATE MEDIEVAL
## INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

What does this study suggest regarding the nature of the late medieval international system? To begin with, it tells us that this system was in fact an *international* system. The prevailing common sense (in IR at least) is that this was an era of non-statist "feudal heteronomy," radically distinct from the early modern international system that superseded it sometime between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries. According to this view, the late medieval translocal order was not an international system, properly understood, for the simple reason that it did not comprise sovereign states interacting under conditions of anarchy. Rather, or so the conventional wisdom has it, the late medieval world was populated by a wide range of qualitatively different types of political unit—the Church, the Empire, kingdoms, towns, urban leagues, feudo-vassalic networks, etc.—interacting within a variety of hierarchies (feudal, legal, cosmological), and operating according to a non-exclusive territorial logic. On this view, sovereignty, a key requirement for the emergence of both the state and state-system proper, did not make its historical appearance until very late in the game when it was "invented" by early modern thinkers such as Machiavelli or Bodin or Hobbes. While some scholars—Spruyt, for example—are willing trace the origins of the sovereign state back to economic developments in the thirteenth century, almost none are willing to argue (or even accept) that long before Westphalia or Augsburg a historically distinct but recognizably *inter-state* system was operating within Latin Christendom.

This study suggests, however, that this is a deeply flawed characterization of late medieval world order, one largely without warrant in the contemporary historiographical literature. By the mid-thirteenth century, the convergence of new or revived discourses of sovereignty, territoriality, public authority, the "crown" and political community had given rise to a new "global cultural script" of sovereign statehood that was being enacted on various scales, around various social forces and through various institutional formations in every corner of Latin Christendom. Across the region, political authorities—whether imperial, royal, princely or municipal—promulgated new laws, extended and consolidated their judicial capacities, developed new and more effective means of extracting taxes and other revenues, improved and extended the mechanisms of public administration and record keeping and developed ever more extensive networks of patronage and influence. To be certain, these developments unfolded differently in different contexts, resulting in the emergence of a number of distinctive types or forms of state: the Empire was different from kingdoms such as Sweden, France or Aragón, and these differed not only from each other but from principalities such as the Duchy of Brittany, city-states such as Venice, the Papal States and the Baltic *ordenstaat* ruled by the Teutonic Order. But this diversity should not conceal the fact that a common, historically specific script of statehood was

being enacted across Latin Christendom. Expressed in the language of IR theory, the various forms of state that were crystallizing during this era may have been structurally differentiated, but they were functionally isomorphic (in terms of their common constitutive ideal and its practical expression). Ultimately, they were all states—distinctively late medieval states to be sure, but states nonetheless. Attempts to reserve this label exclusively to kingdoms such as England and France and to characterize other forms of polity (the Empire, principalities and urban communes) as being somehow categorically different (i.e. as something other than states) is simply to misunderstand the "state of the state" in the late Middle Ages.

This is not to suggest, of course, that the late medieval state or state system was indistinguishable from its modern counterpart. Quite the opposite: the preceding analysis has suggested at least seven characteristics of the constitutive norm of the late medieval state that distinguish it from its early modern counterpart:

- Late medieval states were sovereign only with respect to temporal affairs; they shared sovereignty with the Church in spiritual matters.
- In the late Middle Ages, sovereignty involved the *control of*—rather than *monopoly over*—legitimate violence.
- Late medieval sovereignty could be *de facto* as well as *de iure*.
- In the late Middle Ages, sovereignty was vested in the political-community-as-corporation rather than, as in the modern era, the state.
- Late medieval sovereignty was not uniform in that sometimes it was exercised through intermediary powers with substantial autonomy.
- In the late Middle Ages, sovereignty was not always reciprocally recognized (especially between kingdoms and lesser polities).
- The late medieval norm of sovereignty thus generated a mixed system of Hobbesia-Lockean—rather than simply Lockean—anarchy.

Ultimately, however, the difference between the late medieval and early modern state systems was more a variation on a theme than a difference in kind. If we push past the Othering and orientalization of the medieval era that so thoroughly permeates the IR common sense to reflect on the actual ideas, institutions and interactions of the period, we clearly see that a key—even defining—element of the late medieval world order was a historically distinct but recognizably "international" system.

## PERIODIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

All of this has implications for the way IR scholars periodize international history. The conventional wisdom within the field is that sometime in the mid-seventeenth century medieval geopolitical structures decisively gave way to the modern state and its derivative state-system/society. To

be certain, recent years have witnessed a growing number of scholars reject this point of view. Teschke, for example, views the "mode of production" as the determining criterion in this connection, arguing that, as the absolutist state was based on pre-modern social property relations (feudalism), it cannot be said to be modern. For him, that term is reserved for those states founded on (modern) capitalist relations of production and exploitation. Similarly, Reus-Smit has argued that the "constitutional order" is the determining factor. On this view, modernity can only really be said to emerge with the birth of the multilateral constitutional order of the nineteenth century. Others—including Anderson, Mann, Tilly, Wallerstein and Wight—argue that the modern world order emerged at least a century-and-a-half before Westphalia. By and large, however, the conventional view within the field is that the state is an artifact of modernity; wherever one locates the historical rupture that ushered in the modern era, there too one locates the birth or the moment of triumph of the sovereign state. Indeed, despite all the recent challenges to the "myth of 1648," within the mainstream IR literature the signing of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster in that year continue to mark "the emergence of a distinctive international system that would subsequently be imposed on the rest of the planet."[2]

This study, however, suggests an alternative way of thinking about the question of periodization in international relations. Specifically, it suggests that the history of the European state-system (which later became universalized and globalized) began not in 1714 (with the Treaty of Utrecht), nor 1648 (with the Treaty of Westphalia), nor in 1555 (with the Treaty of Augsburg), nor even in 1494 (with the Council of Constance); rather, this study strongly suggests that the birth of the European international system occurred sometime in the thirteenth century with the crystallization of a constitutive norm of sovereign statehood and the progressive enactment of this script over the succeeding centuries. This inference will certainly raise eyebrows within the IR community, but the argument developed above leaves little room for doubt. If we look at the main trends in this era, we see states competing and contending, often violently, with other states over quintessentially political "goods" such as jurisdiction, sovereignty and territory. These states pursued their socially constructed interests not in some exotic feudal, imperial or ecclesiastical hierarchy, but within a historically specific anarchic international structure. While the character of both the state and state-system that evolved in the aftermath of the twelfth century crisis of lord-rulership were decidedly "pre-modern," they were not so different from the early, high and late modern variants that succeeded them as to warrant exiling them beyond the pale of the history of international relations. Indeed, I would argue that the differences between the late medieval and early modern international systems, while significant, were not much greater than those between the early modern and high modern ones or between those of the high modern and late modern eras.

Drawing inspiration from medievalists such as Tierney and Oakley on the one hand and IR scholars such as Hall and Philpott on the other, let me suggest the following periodization schema to replace the standard disciplinary framework and its myriad variations. First, using the language of the geologic time-scale, let me suggest that the centuries from about 1200 until today constitute a single *epoch* in the period of international relations. During the entirety of this era, states were the predominant units of governance/warmaking units and anarchy was the prevailing structure within which they were embedded. In turn, this epoch can be divided into several discrete *ages*— the age of the "corporate-sovereign" state, the age of the "dynastic-sovereign state," the age of the "territorial-sovereign state" and the age of the "national-sovereign state"—each of which was characterized by its own historically specific form of state and culture of anarchy.[3] Such a framework, I think, would allow IR scholars to break decisively with the "myth of 1648" and its Ptolemaic variations (which move the date forward or backward by a century or so), to situate the late medieval era unambiguously within the ambit of the discipline of IR, and thereby encourage IR scholars to treat the late medieval age with the seriousness it deserves. It would also, however, allow us to continue to appreciate the very real differences between international orders in each of the ages mentioned above. Finally, decisively breaking with the myth of 1648—ending once and for all the "tyranny" of this particular "construct"— would bring IR scholarship into closer alignment with the historiography of medieval political thought and development, opening up the possibility for more fertile cross-fertilization between these bodies of scholarship.[4] All these, I believe, would be salutary developments within the discipline(s).

## THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE

This study also tells us something about what IR scholars typically refer to as the "triumph of the sovereign state." By my count, there are seven basic approaches to the emergence of the modern sovereign state: a "bellocentric" approach that emphasizes "the impact of changing forms of warfare";[5] a "Neo-Evolutionary" approach that emphasizes the impact of exogenous factors—in this case, the expansion of trade—on generating variations in the institutions of rule, and the processes of systemic selection to determine which of these institutional variations will prosper and which will be selected out;[6] a variety of Marxist accounts that focus on the role of social property relations and the dynamics of class conflict on patterns of rule and political organization;[7] a "post-structural" approach that emphasizes the role of shifts in the "territorial imaginary" in making the modern state conceivable and enabling it to prevail over its imperial and ecclesiastical competitors;[8] a "medium theory" approach that highlights the role played by the emergence of print media in the transition to the modern world order;[9] a "relational-institutionalist" that emphasizes the corrosive impact

of the Protestant Reformations on the social networks underpinning the late medieval/early modern "composite state" on processes of modern state formation;[10] and a "constructivist" account that centers "on changing norms, ideas, identities and discourses."[11] These accounts—which rely on both exogenous and endogenous causes to explain the transition to the modern international system—provide a rich and multifaceted picture of the process of early modern state formation. This study, however, brings into focus another important factor contributing to the rise of what we have agreed to mischaracterize as the "sovereign state" (actually the triumph of the kingdom) in the early modern era: the emergence of the constitutive ideal of the "corporate-sovereign state" that came to dominate the political imaginary of Latin Christendom by the thirteenth century. Somewhat more specifically, it suggests that the kingdom triumphed in the sixteenth century for the simple reason that the constitutive discourse of the corporate-sovereign state that emerged in the thirteenth century privileged this variant over all others, ultimately enabling those enacting the script of the kingdom to displace or subordinate those enacting rival scripts of statehood. I argued above that as the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state crystallized in the thirteenth century it gave rise to several variants or sub-types: the commune, the league and the kingdom. I also argued that, as this novel constitutive script was enacted against the backdrop of the disorder of the high medieval era, it inevitably gave rise to numerous conflicts over such quintessentially political issues as authority, jurisdiction, sovereignty and territory. Significantly, these conflicts were not among equals: within the social imaginary of the political elites of Latin Christendom, the kingdom occupied a distinctive position as the most natural and most legitimate form of political unit—one with superior jurisdictional claims to the towns, duchies, counties and lordships within its borders. In essence, the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state distinguished the kingdom from other lordships and principalities and vested it with a legitimate claim to jurisdiction over all other temporal powers within the imagined "historical" boundaries of the kingdom. As Watts puts it, this ideal represented the king as "the sole source of legitimate secular authority" within the territorial limits of his kingdom. It also rendered "actions against the king . . . qualitatively different from the mere betrayal of a lord; they were crimes against the whole people and the majestas, or public power, by which it was justly ruled."[12] As a result, when these various state-building projects collided, the kingdom nearly always had a substantial normative advantage over its competitors: whether in the context of legal proceedings, diplomacy, mediation or war, the claims of the kingdom were almost invariably considered to be more legitimate than those of lesser powers.

To be sure, this advantage did not always translate into immediate political success; the material ability to enforce or defend jurisdictional claims also mattered greatly, as did the ability to mobilize economic and martial resources in pursuit of these claims. And even when kingdoms did manage

to bring other states into their constitutional folds, they often did so (initially at least) on the basis of political bargains that reserved to the subordinate state substantial "liberties" and rights to self-government. Even so, reviewing the history of the "making of polities" between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the genotypically superior kingdom was "destined" to triumph sooner or later over its competitors. The framing of the ideal of the kingdom as superior to its competitors invested the efforts of those states to assert jurisdiction and sovereignty with a degree of legitimacy that made them difficult—and ultimately impossible—to resist. Over time, this study suggests, it was the non-linear working out of the constitutive ideal of the corporate-sovereign state that resulted in the triumph of the so-called sovereign state and the birth of its associated international system or society in the seventeenth century.

## THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
## BEYOND THE LATE MEDIEVAL CASE

What does this study of late medieval war suggests about *the study of international relations beyond the late medieval case*? Echoing Fernand Braudel, my answer to this question is that "politics and institutions can themselves contribute to the understanding of politics and institutions."[13] While politics and political dynamics are never wholly independent of other structures and processes, neither are they simply expressions of them. As argued above, most of the wars of the late medieval era were the result of the governing powers of that era enacting incompatible or contradictory scripts of sovereign, territorial statehood. Simply put, as they enacted this script, and created the technologies-of-rule needed to give it effect, they not only collided with one another, but provoked anxiety and insecurity in surrounding powers as well. It was this dynamic, inflected and mitigated by the prevailing Hobbesian-Lockean culture of anarchy, that gave rise to the violent political conflicts of the era. This is not, of course, to argue that economic considerations were absent in the late medieval case. War required resources and warring states not surprisingly sought to maximize their access to sources of wealth. But, as the scholarly consensus on perhaps the most important war of the era—the Hundred Years War—clearly conveys, the "pursuit of wealth" was not the *primum movens* behind this conflict. Nor was it the first mover in late medieval international relations more broadly. Rather, the causes and conditions-of-possibility for the wars of this era were primarily political in nature.

One of the implications of this study for the field of IR, then, is that international politics can be studied as a *political* phenomenon. Invoking the principle of Ockham's Razor, I would argue that there is simply no need to look for "deeper" socio-economic structures and causes to make sense of either late medieval or, by extension, late modern international

relations: political causes (colliding state-building projects) have political effects (public war). In turn, this ontological "primacy of the political" has implications for how we theorize international relations more broadly. Specifically, it strongly suggests that constructivism (with its focus on the role of political norms on political structures and practices) is better suited to explaining international politics than either structural realism (which is unconcerned with the character of units—i.e. political institutions) or historical materialism (which is either unconcerned with politics or treats it as an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic structures and dynamics). Again, this is not to suggest that socio-economic factors are absent or wholly unimportant—that would be going too far. Rather, it is to argue that politics have primacy—that is, that geopolitical system can be adequately theorized in terms of the structuring and regulative effects of political forces. While other factors may usefully round out an account of geopolitical systems, they are not—strictly speaking—necessary to such an account.

Having made this argument for the "primacy of the political," I want to cut against the grain of it a bit to point out another rather obvious finding of this study: that "religion," too, is an irreducible motive force in international relations. The Church during this era was not motivated primarily by power-political considerations or by the logic of social property relations; rather, it was motivated by a particular set of religious self-representations and an entailed set of core values and interests. While other motives intersected with and inflected these core values and interests, they were decidedly secondary in nature. The principal condition-of-possibility for the religious wars of late-medieval Latin Christendom was the religious identity-interest complex of a religious institution and the structural antagonisms this complex generated with other actors within and beyond the Latin Christian world order. Similarly, while kings, princes and lords may to some degree have had more mundane interests related to the pursuit of wealth, their primary motives in "taking the cross" were religious in nature. The "language" of religion—in the sense intended by Quentin Skinner when he coined the phrase "the language of *politics*"—used to explain and justify crusading on the part of temporal actors was neither a smokescreen for "deeper" motives (political or socio-economic) nor some sort of false consciousness.[14] Instead, it was both a Skinnerian "discourse of legitimacy" that constrained actors and a Wendtian core identity that motivated them.

This has implications for the field of IR. I am not the first scholar, of course, to call for religion to be brought into the study of International Relations.[15] As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd and others have commented, the field of IR has too long operated on the basis of some very modern (and largely unexamined) secular assumptions—assumptions that have largely blinded us to the role of religious belief and identity in global political life. Nevertheless, I do want to add to this rising chorus my own particular plea that the field pay more attention to the way in which religious belief and identity constitute actors on the international relations stage. My analysis

of the crusades demonstrates how a distinctively religious "identity-interest complex" made possible the religious wars of the late medieval era. This is a very specific historical case, to be sure, and I have endeavored to present it as such. But there is no reason to suppose that the argument that religious identities (along with all of their entailments) cannot and do not motivate individual and collective actors on the international stage just as powerfully today as they did a millennium ago. Indeed, as the works of scholars such as Olivier Roy and David Cook convincingly demonstrate, historical and contemporary Islamist political violence—to take one particularly salient example—is both made possible and motivated by a particular religious identity and its associated political project.[16] Like the crusades, this violence cannot be convincingly explained by recourse to the "hidden logic" of the mode of production, the transhistorical logic of self-help under anarchy, or "second image" dynamics that explain violence in terms of the war-prone pathologies of certain actors on the international stage. The crusades were not the product of feudal social property relations, power-political calculations or the inherent bellicosity of Latin Christians; and contemporary global *jihad* is, likewise, not the product of economic underdevelopment in the Islamic world, "Islamophobia" and anti-Muslim sentiment in the West or the inherent bellicosity of Islam or Muslims. In both of these cases, the wellspring of religious war is twofold: first, a religious identity-interest complex that constructs the Self as being a divinely inspired instrument of "reform" and "justice" and the Other as being in some way inherently antagonistic to this "sacred" project; and, second, a cultural discourse that constructs religious war as a legitimate institution and the religious warrior as a legitimate actor (at least in the eyes of some significant portion of the relevant population). There are differences, of course, and I wouldn't want to press the parallels too far. But the basic point is that in both cases, the language of religion was not a *smokescreen* for real (socio-economic) motives; it was a *window* on the real (religious) ones. The bad news is that we IR scholars still haven't seriously embraced religious identities as causal variables, especially when it comes to explaining organized violence; the good news is that, as constructivist IR scholars already have tools to tackle issues related to the identity-interest nexus, the barriers to "bringing religion in to international relations" are relatively low.

## THE HISTORICITY OF WAR

As I mentioned briefly in the Preface, the roots of this study can ultimately be traced back to the debates over the "transformation of war" thesis that had erupted in both academic and policy circles in the late 1990s and early 2000s. My original goal was to contribute to these debates by developing a comparative analysis of the "historical structure of war" in the medieval, modern and emerging postmodern eras. While this project has evolved in

ways that have taken it very far from that original goal, it nevertheless seems somehow fitting to conclude this study with a brief reflection on what the case of late medieval war might tell us about contemporary transformations (or non-transformations) in the deep character of organized political violence. In the remainder of the book, then, I first map the contours of the still-ongoing debate about what Martin van Creveld famously called the "transformation of war." I then suggest some of the ways in which this study confirms the core claim of the "New Wars" advocates (that the deep character of war is subject to change over time and that we therefore need to historicize it). I conclude by sounding a cautionary note, however, highlighting the potential pitfalls associated with making claims to epochal change in the absence of an adequate historical or temporal vantage point.

What, then, is the nature of the debate that originally motivated this study and to which it now returns? Simply put, it is a debate over whether and in what ways war has been transformed over the past half-century.[17] On the one hand, over the last decade-and-a-half or so an argument has been developed that we are in the midst of an epochal transition from what might generically be thought of as the "Old Wars" characteristic of the high modern era to what are variously described as "wars of the third kind" (Holsti); "New Wars" (Kaldor; Duffield); "globalizing" and "globalization-induced" wars (Bauman); "degenerate war" and "risk transfer war" (Shaw); "post-national" war (Beck); the "liberal way of war" (Dillon and Reid); and "war in the age of risk" (Coker).[18] While adherents to this view differ significantly in terms of their respective analytical assumptions, theoretical concerns and policy prescriptions, they share at least one common—indeed, defining—element: a belief that we are currently in the midst of an epochal "transformation of war" involving changes in the causes, correlates and socio-political character violent political conflict. They are also similar in that they tend to attribute this transformation in the character of war to "globalization" and/or a variety of related epochal shifts in global social, cultural, political and economic relations.

On the other hand, there are those who are deeply skeptical of the New Wars thesis. These critics have subjected claims of epochal transformation in organized political violence to a range of cross-disciplinary conceptual and empirical challenges that have called into question many of its key findings.[19] To begin with, the critics argue, New Wars are not all that *new*. As Newman succinctly puts it, "all of the factors that characterize the new wars have been present, to varying degrees, throughout the last 100 years. The actors, objectives, spatial context, human impact, political economy, and social structure of conflict have not changed to the extent argued in the new wars literature."[20] All that is really new, Newman argues, is the novel intellectual framework that has brought these types of conflict into sharp relief. Secondly, critics of the New Wars thesis convincingly point out that contemporary conflicts cannot easily be lumped into a single category. So-called New Wars vary enormously in

terms of actors, motive forces and other key factors. Placing them under a single rubric suggests, therefore, a degree of homogeneity that is neither empirically justified nor conceptually defensible.[21] Third, the critics argue that Old Wars remain more prevalent than New Wars. As Chojnacki has demonstrated empirically, while New Wars "have clearly gained in importance over the past two decades, they have not become the dominant form of violence."[22] Finally, critics such as Hirst argue that, as the fundamental *premise* of the New Wars literature (that world order is being transformed through globalization) is invalid, so too is its core *finding* (that both the state as a war-making unit and the forms of war associated with the state are passing from the historical scene).[23]

Responding to these critiques, defenders of the New Wars thesis offer a number of counter-arguments. First, as Malešević argues, empirical challenges are not in themselves sufficient to falsify the New Wars paradigm.[24] As Kuhn argued many years ago, paradigms are conceptual worldviews that are usually quite capable of accommodating empirical "anomalies" (i.e. findings that do not fit the expectations of the paradigm). Such anomalies create a crisis for the paradigm only if they persist over time and if they ultimately simply cannot be explained away. It is premature to claim that the empirical challenges have yet generated such a crisis in the New Wars paradigm. Second, defenders of the New Wars thesis argue that, while the conceptual criticisms offered by the skeptics are more telling, they do not really challenge the core conceptual insights of the New Wars paradigm. While it is true that the "first-generation" of New Wars scholarship was conceptually imprecise and methodologically underdeveloped, the most fundamental insight of the paradigm—that history is punctuated with episodes of epochal transformation in the socio-political character of war and that we are living through one such episode—has gained widespread acceptance among both scholars and practitioners.[25] Finally, as Chojnacki argues convincingly, a careful reading of the now-extensive empirical evidence suggests that "critics . . . should not prematurely dismiss the obvious qualitative and quantitative changes in war."[26]

Bearing all this in mind, what if anything can this study contribute to the still-unresolved debate over the New Wars thesis? First, I would suggest, it demonstrates that the history of violent political conflict is indeed punctuated by periodic *caesura* or ruptures, moments when novel forms of organized violence—"New Wars"—take shape. In the medieval case it is clear that, from the beginning of the twelfth century on, what I have called "public war" and "religious war" decisively displaced "proprietorial war" as the dominant form of violent political conflict in Latin Christendom. With the benefit of hindsight, we now see these wars for what they were—the "New Wars" of the late medieval era. Against claims or assumptions that the very idea of New Wars is implausible, the late medieval case provides powerful support for the argument that deep changes in world order lead to profound transformations in the correlates, character and causes of war.

Second, this study provides a framework for more rigorously and systematically theorizing these epochal transformations of war. In the late

medieval case, we have seen how changes in the political architecture of organized violence, the structural antagonisms that derive from this architecture, and the cultural institutions that permit war to be used to resolve certain of these antagonisms while prohibiting it with respect to others gave rise to a historically specific constellation of violent political conflicts. In principle, there would seem to be little reason to suppose that this framework could not be used to effect in connection with contemporary claims regarding the transformation of war. To be sure, this would require painstaking work: charting the political architecture, structural antagonisms and cultural institutions of war in both the high modern and (contemporary) late modern eras is likely to prove no easy task. But, while this study cannot provide a direct answer to the question of whether the contemporary New Wars literature depicts a concrete historical phenomenon or whether it is merely a cultural artifact of a peculiar moment in post-Cold War history (it is after all about *medieval* war), it can provide a means to answer it.

Third, though, this study also suggests the need for caution when assessing whether we are currently in the midst of such an epochal shift. When looking back at the late medieval case, we have the benefit of seven centuries or so of historical distance, providing a perspective that allows us to see relatively clearly what war was like on either side of the twelfth century "Great Divide," and to trace connections between this transformation in violent conflict to broader and deeper changes in the character of world order. To be sure, this historical distance poses its own rather obvious set of historiographical challenges. But the very fact that we can place this transformation within a *longue durée* historical context allows us to speak with some confidence about the advent of New Wars in the later medieval era. Fast forward to today and it becomes much more difficult to speak definitively about either world order transformation or changes in the historical structure of war—or even, as we have seen, about the crystallization of new configurations of organic wars. Lacking any meaningful historical distance at all (if we *are* witnessing an epochal transformation of war then we are certainly doing so from deep within that transformation), it is difficult to determine whether the New Wars of the 1990s were mere historical ephemera or something much more structural in nature. Indeed, as Justin Rosenberg has argued in a related context, it is entirely possible that the New Wars literature is nothing more than a peculiar (and dated) intellectual artifact of the 1990s—one that, as he puts it in connection with "globalization," *reflects* the broader intellectual trends characteristic of that decade, rather than *explaining* the experience of those years.[27] While not a particularly welcome conclusion, this study suggests that a definitive judgement regarding the New Wars thesis is effectively impossible today. A corollary of this conclusion is that such a judgement may become possible in the future, but only when future historians and historically minded political scientists are able to look back on the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries from an appropriate historical distance.

# Appendix
## The Crusades, 1095–1500

### THE CRUSADES TO THE HOLY LAND

As Riley-Smith has argued, following the "birth" of the crusading movement and the First Crusade (described in the preceding chapter), the history of the crusades to the Holy Land can be organized into several discrete phases. The first of these, *c*. 1102–87, he describes as that of "crusading in adolescence."[1] During this phase, the Church and crusader principalities were forced decisively onto the defensive by an increasingly unified Islamic polity committed to the reconquest of Jerusalem and the extirpation of the Christian presence in Syria and Palestine. The success of the First Crusade, it will be recalled, was largely a function of disunity and internecine conflict in the Islamic world. This was also true of the period in which the Crusader States were established—disunity among the contiguous Muslim polities (Rum, Aleppo and Mosul, Damascus, Egypt, Seijar, Hama, Homs) meant that the Christian princes could play them off against one another to great strategic effect. Almost immediately after the loss of Jerusalem, however, Muslim opposition began to coalesce: Egyptian forces, for example, attempted to retake Jerusalem as early as 1099, as did those of the sultanate of Iraq beginning in 1110.[2] Ominously from the Church's perspective, an increasingly unified Muslim state centered on Mosul and Aleppo began to coalesce in the 1120s. When a new governor, 'Imad as-Din Zengi, was appointed in 1128, he led this newly unified emirate on a series of campaigns intended to further extend what had become his personal domain at the expense of both his Christian and Muslim neighbours. When in 1144 the count of Edessa entered into a defensive alliance with one of Zengi's Muslim adversaries, Zengi sensed an opportunity and attacked the county. Edessa, the capital of the first crusader principality and a cornerstone of the strategic defenses of Jerusalem, fell to Zengi's forces on Christmas 1144.

Almost as soon as they had taken Jerusalem in 1099, the crusader leadership realized that if the Holy Land were to be made secure it would be necessary to create a kind of defensive buffer around Jerusalem. In addition to an "inner ring" formed by the principalities founded during the First Crusade, this would also require an "outer ring" comprising the key strategic towns of Ascalon, Aleppo, Damascus and the Mediterranean ports, all of which could provide staging areas for any future Muslim counter-offensive

against the Kingdom of Jerusalem. With the fall of Edessa, this strategy was seriously compromised. On 1 December 1145 Pope Eugenius III reacted to this unwelcome development by issuing a general letter entitled *Quantum praedecessores*, which called for a second crusade to fight in defense of the Holy Land. Following a poor initial response, the encyclical was reissued on 1 March 1146 and Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux was charged with preaching the crusade in France and Germany. *Quantum praedecessores* was augmented by a second encyclical issued in October of that year—*Divini dispensatione*—addressed specifically to the Italian clergy. In addition to calling on the armed laity to take the cross and come to the aid of their besieged brethren in Outremer, both of these letters offered those who did so remission of sins, protection of property and other privileges. The former also outlines the motives behind this call to crusade: on the one hand, the need to right the injustices perpetrated by the Muslims (the unlawful seizure of one of the oldest of all Christian cities; the spoliation of the local Church and its relics; and the murder of the local archbishop and his clergy); and, on the other, the need to deal with the threat to the Church and all Christendom posed by the loss of the city. The latter extended the crusade to Iberia and the Baltic frontier, in effect authorizing a three-front campaign to defend and expand Latin Christendom.[3]

The response to the call was an extraordinary mobilization of the armed laity of the Latin world. In 1147, two massive armies—one under the leadership of King Louis VII of France; the other under Conrad III of Germany—embarked in quick succession on the overland route through Byzantine Greece and Anatolia to Syria. Despite the tremendous enthusiasm generated by the venture, however, the sad reality (from the Church's perspective) was that these crusader armies were simply not up to the task of taking on the Muslims threatening *Outremer*. Against the backdrop of political maneuvering amongst the French, German and Byzantine leaders, the Seljuk Turks inflicted crushing defeats on Conrad's army at Dorylaeum and Louis' army at Laodicea, both in Asia Minor. Despite the clear danger posed by the unification of Egypt and Syria under Saladin in 1174, the resulting demoralization and disillusionment mooted the possibility of a major crusade to the East for the better part of a generation.[4]

The second phase in the history of the crusades to the Holy Land, that of their "coming of age," began with the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187 and ended with its restoration to Latin Christendom in 1229.[5] Above all else, this phase was characterized by a profound change in geopolitical purpose: during this period, the crusades were no longer prosecuted in *defense* of Jerusalem, but for its *recovery*. After the failure of the Second Crusade, the *jihad* against the Christian principalities provided both a common goal and a unifying religious focal point for the Muslim polities in the region. Building on this, Zengi's son and successor, Nur al-Din, first created a unified Syrian emirate and then entered into an alliance with Egypt for the purpose of putting pressure on the Christians. On his death, the vizier

of Egypt, Saladin, invaded Syria, creating for the first time a truly unified Muslim polity surrounding *Outremer*. Once he had consolidated his hold over this "empire," Saladin resumed the *jihad* against the crusader principalities. After a somewhat checkerd period marked by a few notable victories and several serious defeats, and at a point when "the Christians were exceptionally weak and divided," Saladin's army attacked Tiberias.[6] When the Christian army marched to relieve the besieged citadel, Saladin caught them in a highly unfavorable position and inflicted a devastating defeat upon them at the Battle of Hattin. The majority of the massive Christian host was killed or captured, including the King of Jerusalem, the Master of the Temple and many other important leaders. The True Cross, recovered during the First Crusade and typically carried into battle by the King of Jerusalem, was captured and paraded upside down through the streets of Damascus by the victorious Muslims. With the principalities denuded of their best fighting men, Jerusalem fell to Saladin's forces on 2 October 1187. By the time Saladin was finished his campaign, *Outremer* had been reduced to little more than the coastal enclaves of Tripoli, Antioch and Tyre.

On 29 October 1187 Pope Gregory VIII responded to these catastrophic developments by issuing an encyclical—*Audita tremendi*—that called upon the princes, nobles and knights of Latin Christendom to launch an expedition to liberate Jerusalem once again from the Muslims.[7] The encyclical began by characterizing the disastrous fall of Jerusalem as punishment for the collective sinfulness of all Christendom; the city had been lost, so the pope argued, because of the sins of Christians everywhere. This being the case, the encyclical continued, the redemption and liberation of the holy sites necessarily required penitential sacrifice by Christians everywhere.[8] In effect, the pope called on Latin Christendom to redeem itself through acts of contrition, piety and purification, including participation in an expedition to liberate Jerusalem. In practical terms, the encyclical also sought to facilitate such an expedition by imposing a seven-year truce throughout Latin Christendom and by mobilizing the princes and nobles of the *respublica Christiana* by offering them the now-usual indulgences, privileges and protections in exchange for their penitent participation in an armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem.[9]

The response to Gregory's call was "the largest military enterprise in the middle ages."[10] Richard I (Lionheart) of England, Phillip II (Augustus) of France and Frederick I (Barbarossa) of the Holy Roman Empire all led vast armies to the Holy Land. Once again, however, the campaign was to prove ill-fated. Frederick drowned en route, leaving only a rump force under the command of Duke Leopold IV of Austria to press on to Palestine. Divisions among the three temporal crusade leaders subsequently led to the departure of Leopold and Phillip from the Holy Land in 1191. This left only Richard to continue the campaign, which he did ably and with some notable military successes against Saladin. When he began his campaign, the Latin kingdom comprised little more than a handful of coastal cities

and a few isolated inland fortresses; when he was finished, it consisted of the whole coast from Tyre to Jaffa. However, while Richard had effectively reversed most of Saladin's gains since the Battle of Hattin, he was able neither to break the sultan's army nor force him to abandon Jerusalem. The best he could manage was a negotiated settlement that guaranteed unarmed Christian pilgrims access to the holy sites, but that left the Holy City in Muslim hands. Having achieved this—and created the geopolitical conditions necessary for the Kingdom of Jerusalem to survive for another century—Richard quit the Holy Land for good in 1192.

While Richard's campaign against Saladin was in some ways remarkably successful, from the Church's perspective it manifestly failed to achieve the goals articulated in *Audita tremendi*. To be certain, the crusader principalities had been restored and their strategic position greatly enhanced. But, as Madden puts it, "the purpose of these states was the protection of the holy sites; they were not an end in themselves." To the papacy and many of Latin Christendom's temporal leaders, Richard's inability to liberate Jerusalem from Saladin's grip was a crushing setback—one that needed to be reversed at the earliest possible opportunity. The failure to realize this crucial objective thus set the stage for three more major crusades, all intended to restore the holy sites to Latin Christendom. In 1198, Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) issued the encyclical *Post miserable*, launching the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204). The avowed objective of this campaign was "the liberation of Jerusalem by an attack on Egypt."[11] It was, however, soon diverted into an attack on the Byzantine capital, largely as a result of the strategic calculation that "a Constantinople in reliable western hands might be deemed as much of an asset for the liberation of Jerusalem as the conquest of Alexandria."[12] While it succeeded in establishing the Latin Kingdom of Constantinople, this crusade too manifestly failed to realize its declared goal of liberating Jerusalem. The Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), also launched by Innocent, was similarly intended to harness the "full economic, military and spiritual might" of Latin Christendom to the task of liberating Jerusalem, this time under even tighter Church leadership. The proximate objective of the crusade was again Egypt—the Nile port of Damietta was to be captured and used as a base for an attack on Cairo which was in turn to be used as a base for the liberation of Jerusalem. Following extensive preparations, Damietta was attacked and captured in 1219. In August 1221, however, the crusader army found itself surrounded by Muslim forces near El Mansura and was forced to withdraw from Egypt. For all its efforts, this crusade achieved little more than an eight-year truce and a (never fulfilled) promise that the relic of the True Cross—lost to Christendom at the Battle of Hattin—would be returned. The Sixth Crusade (1228–1229) was to prove considerably more successful, though more due to skilful diplomacy than martial prowess.[13] Under pressure first from Pope Honorius III and later from Gregory IX, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Jerusalem, Frederick II, finally embarked on his long-promised crusade in 1228. He launched

his expedition, however, without papal approval because, having failed for so long to fulfill his crusader vow, he was under sanction of excommunication. While his status as an excommunicate caused him considerable political difficulty—he was not afforded crusader protections and privileges; he was opposed by the military orders—Frederick was nevertheless able to force the sultan of Egypt, al-Kamil, to the bargaining table. Against the backdrop of al-Kamil's efforts to consolidate control over his own newly acquired Syrian territories, Frederick was then able to pressure him into signing a treaty that effectively surrendered Jerusalem to the Christians. While the treaty itself no longer survives, its terms were widely reported in contemporary accounts. On the one hand, in return for a much-needed ten-year truce, al-Kamil agreed that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would extend from Beirut to Jaffa and would include Bethlehem, Nazareth, Belfort and Montfort and the city of Jerusalem (which would be demilitarized). On the other, Frederick agreed that the Muslim inhabitants would retain control over their holy sites (the Dome of the Rock and the Temple of Solomon), remain in possession of their property and administer their own system of justice. He also agreed that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would stay neutral in any future conflict between the sultanate and the Christian principalities of Tripoli and Antioch. While condemned by many at the time for the "humiliating" nature of its outcome, in geopolitical terms the crusade was clearly a success: the city of Jerusalem was restored to Latin Christendom and the Kingdom of Jerusalem rebuilt as its defensive glacis.

The third phase of crusading in the Holy Land—that of its "maturity"—began with the expiration of Frederick's truce in 1239 and ended with the fall of the last remnant of *Outremer*, the city of Acre, in 1291.[14] Its opening act involved the occupation of the defenseless city of Jerusalem by the forces of the Muslim emir of Kerak in 1239. Against the backdrop of internecine conflict in the Muslim world, over the next two years minor crusader armies were able to play Muslim factions of against each other, thereby securing the return of the city of Jerusalem and greatly extending the frontiers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. But the regional balance of forces soon shifted again and the Muslims retook the defenseless city in 1244, subsequently massacring its Christian inhabitants and torching the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. This set the stage for the final three acts of this phase of the crusades to the East. The Seventh Crusade (1248–54), led by King Louis IX of France, was a direct response to the loss of the Holy City. Louis led a massive army to Egypt, occupying Damietta almost without resistance and then advancing on Cairo. Stiffening Muslim resistance and an outbreak of dysentery within the crusader army, however, turned the tide and Louis was forced to withdraw toward his operational base at Damietta. Additional Muslim successes soon rendered the crusader army's position untenable and Louis' first bid to liberate Jerusalem ended with him surrendering to the sultan of Egypt on 6 April 1250. The Eighth Crusade (1270) was King Louis' second attempt to liberate the holy sites. This time

he adopted a three-step strategy: first, attack Tunis; second, advance along the north African coast and take Egypt; and, third, liberate Jerusalem. At first, the expedition went well: Carthage fell to Louis in July 1270 and a Sicilian fleet led by Charles of Anjou was nearing the port with reinforcements that would allow the king to exploit this initial victory. On 25 August, however, Louis died of dysentery; the crusade was abandoned shortly thereafter. Finally, in the immediate aftermath of the failed Eighth Crusade, Prince Edward of England led an expedition to the Holy Land to help defend Tripoli and the rump Kingdom of Jerusalem. This was the Ninth Crusade (1271–2), conventionally considered to be the last major crusade to the Holy Land. It ended when a treaty was signed between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Upon the death of his father, King Henry III, Edward returned home to assume the English throne.

As this necessarily schematic sketch clearly indicates, the crusades to the Holy Land were a powerful expression of the historical structure of war of later medieval Latin Christendom: they reflected the distinctive war-making capacity of the Church (the crusader army and the military religious orders); they expressed the socially constructed interests of the reform papacy (the liberation and defense of Jerusalem); and they were made possible by the institution of the crusade (constituting the Church as a legitimate war-making unit and the "crusader" as a recognizable form of actor with a defined portfolio of religious interests). Of course, crusading was not the only form of war conducted by Christian powers in the Holy Land. The dynamics of public war were clearly at work throughout the two-centuries long Latin political presence in Syria and Palestine. Nevertheless, any serious account of medieval geopolitics must recognize and take into account the distinctiveness of these ecclesiastical wars. While often intertwined with other forms of violent conflict, the crusades were not reducible to them; nor were they motivated by the same underlying constellation of war-making units, structural antagonisms and institutions that gave rise to these other forms of war. Rather, they were a distinctive form of organized violence—one that would quickly find expression in other parts of Latin Christendom.

## THE IBERIAN CRUSADES

The pre-history of the Iberian Crusades can be traced to the disintegration of Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba in 1031 and the subsequent emergence of a constellation of weak successor kingdoms—Badajoz, Seville, Grenada, Málaga, Toledo, Valencia, Denia, the Balearic Islands, Zaragosa and Lérida—known as *taifas*. Locked in intense internecine competition, these emirates soon began to seek the "protection" of the militarily stronger Christian kingdoms of León, Castille, Navarre, Aragón and Catalonia. In turn, these Christian kingdoms began to vie with one another for the tributary payments (*parias*) paid by the *taifas* for protection. In this complex

regional system, the geopolitical fault-lines were not always drawn along religious or civilizational lines: as O'Callaghan puts it, "Just as Muslim kings concluded that it was prudent to become vassals of their Christian neighbors, paying tribute and joining in attacks on their fellow Muslims, so too, when it suited their purpose, Christian princes did not hesitate to make alliances with Muslims."[15] Nor were they stable: alliances and tributary arrangements changed as perceptions of advantage or insecurity shifted.[16] And while territorial expansion at the expense of the *taifas* was certainly part of the dynamic of this system (witness Fernando I's conquest of the town of Coimbra from the *taifa* of Badajoz in 1064), it was not its *defining* characteristic. Rather, the dominant logic of Iberian geopolitics during this period was maneuvering for advantage among the *taifa* statelets coupled with competition over the *parias* (which had both proprietorial and state-building dimensions) among the now-dominant Christian principalities.[17]

It was against this backdrop that in 1063 Pope Alexander II encouraged Christian knights from within and beyond Iberia to wage war on the *taifas*. Reflecting his worldview as one of the early reform popes, Alexander was greatly concerned by the general military threat posed to Christendom by Islam. Indeed, in common with Gregory VII and Urban II, Alexander "considered the military threat posed to Christianity by Islam, and its eschatological context, at least as much in terms of the struggle in Iberia as in that of wars occurring in the Middle East."[18] Sensing an opportunity to liberate at least some of the once-Christian lands of the peninsula from Muslim rule, Alexander responded to an appeal for assistance from the Christian king of Aragón by issuing a bull—*Clero Vultutnensi*—that offered relief from penance and remission of sin to any and all Christian warriors participating in his planned expedition against the *taifa* of Zaragosa.[19] In response, a large number of knights from Burgundy, Normandy, Aquitaine, Italy and all over Christian Iberia journeyed to Aragón to take part in the campaign. The fort at Barbastro—a strategically important site about sixty miles north of the town of Zaragosa—was subsequently taken this army and held until recaptured by Muslim forces in late 1065.

Following several lesser actions in which Pope Gregory VII may have offered similar religious inducements to fight,[20] in 1089 another major proto-crusade was launched by Pope Urban II. The geopolitical context within which this campaign was undertaken was quite different from that prevailing in the 1060s. In 1085, King Alfonso VI of Castile captured Toledo, convincing the emirs of the *taifa* statelets that they faced an increasingly lethal threat to their existence. They subsequently appealed to the Almoravids—a puritanical Sunni sect that had recently subjugated Morocco—to help them resist the Christian campaign of reconquest. Responding to this appeal, but also acting on their belief that the *taifas* were decadent and in need of their particular brand of religious reinvigoration, the Almoravids crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and entered Iberia in force. In 1087, they routed King Alfonso's army at the battle of Sagrajas near Badajoz, thereby stemming

the Christian advance, ending the *parias* system and so simultaneously dealing a severe geopolitical and economic blow to the Christian principalities. Over the next two decades or so, the Almoravids then proceeded to incorporate the remaining *taifas* into their empire. These developments gravely concerned Church officials, who saw in them not only a reversal of the reconquest, but a growing threat to Christian Spain, southern France and, ultimately, all of Christendom.[21] In a bid to "create a wall and bastion against the Saracens,"[22] the pope offered remission of sins to those Catalan nobles who undertook to liberate and restore a number of important metropolitan sites under Muslim control (Braga, Mérida, Seville and Tarragona). While not yielding immediate successes, the call nevertheless resulted in the mobilization of considerable number of knights committed to the goal of liberating Tarragona. In some ways anticipating the future evolution of the Military Orders (Templars, Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights, etc.), it even led to the creation of novel form of "military confraternity"—comprising knights living communally in frontier fortresses—dedicated to liberating and restoring the See in return for the remission of their sins.[23]

These early campaigns, clear expressions of the historical structure of medieval war as it had begun to crystallize in the eleventh century, are significant for two reasons. First, they contributed to the evolution of the crusade proper as a defining element of the geopolitical system of medieval Latin Christendom. During these campaigns, many of the elements that were later to coalesce into the institution of the crusade were first developed: the use of papal bulls to mobilize the armed laity, the remission of sins in return for service, the invocation of the Peace of God in order to secure the internal tranquility necessary for campaigning against the Muslims,[24] and the translocal nature of the forces responding to the call all anticipated the character of crusading proper. While there is no denying that some of the institution's defining elements—such as the vow and the sense of pilgrimage—were not present in these pre-1095 campaigns, there is also no denying that these experiments laid the institutional groundwork for the First Crusade to the Holy Land. Second, these campaigns initiated a process of transformation that radically altered the overall character of the *Reconquista*. Space limitations preclude a detailed account of this broader process. Suffice it to say, however, that whereas prior to the 1060s the reconquest was driven by the intertwined logics of lordly political accumulation and princely state-building, after the Barbastro campaign it was increasingly driven by the logic of religious defense and expansion (*defensio* and *dilatio*) as well. To be sure, the more mundane dynamics of the *Reconquista* never disappeared: it was always in some substantial measure about the configuration, wealth and power of the peninsula's Christian kingdoms and lesser principalities. After 1063, however, a significant new religious dimension was introduced that profoundly transformed the causes, character and correlates of war in the region. If not completely reconfiguring the *Reconquista* into a sort of perpetual crusade—as O'Callaghan seems

to argue—this development clearly reshaped the basic patterns of violent political conflict in the peninsula for centuries to come.

The next phase of Iberian crusading—running from 1095–1123—was a period of *bricolage* and experimentation during which the constitutive ideal of the crusade—forged decisively during the successful expedition to Jerusalem in 1099—was purposefully introduced to Iberia. As with the experiments before 1095, the impulse to introduce crusading proper to the peninsula was provided primarily by developments in the Islamic world—specifically, by the continuing successes of the Almoravids in both weakening the Christian kingdoms and consolidating their own. By 1110, this process was completed with the incorporation of the last remaining *taifa*—Zaragosa—into their empire. With internal consolidation complete, the Almoravids were free to intensify their pressure on the Christian kingdoms of Léon-Castile and Aragón, prompting the rulers of these kingdoms in turn to appeal to the papacy for assistance.

The reform popes of the period—Urban II, Paschal II, Gelasius II, Calixtus II—viewing the threat in Iberia in its broader eschatological context, responded to this appeal by mobilizing the only military instrument then available to them: the crusader army. Drawing on the constitutive ideal of the successful 1095 expedition to Jerusalem, the papacy almost immediately began to introduce the formal apparatus of crusading—bull, preaching, vow, indulgence, privilege, signing with the cross—to the Iberian region in order to mobilize the martial resources of Christendom against the Almoravids. This resulted in two crusades between 1113–8. The first of these, authorized by Pope Paschal in 1113, was a joint Pisan-French-Catalan expedition to liberate Christian captives being held in the Balearic Islands;[25] the second, proclaimed in 1118 and led by King Alfonso I of Aragón-Navarre, was a campaign to capture Zaragosa.[26] While there is some debate as to whether they were full-fledged crusades or merely a type of Iberian proto-crusade,[27] these two campaigns clearly reflected the Church's newfound desire not merely to sanctify and encourage the *Reconquista*, but to use its recently acquired and distinctive war-making capacity to advance its own socially constructed interests in the region.

The final stage, from 1123 onwards, was that of *Iberian crusading in maturity*. As argued above, crusading in Iberia prior to 1123 involved either innovations that anticipated the First Crusade of 1095 or, after 1099, piecemeal applications of crusading practices that had crystallized as a result of that campaign. In 1123, however, the First Lateran Council decisively ruled that the Iberian Crusades were of a piece with those to the Holy Land.[28] From this point on, the crusades in Iberia were seen as part of a wider conflict against Islam—usually as a kind of "second front," though sometimes as an alternate route to the East—and steps were often taken to coordinate (or at least "de-conflict") crusades in the two theaters. As importantly, with the full application of the increasingly well-defined crusade institution in Iberia, crusader armies could be more

readily mobilized by the Church to advance its interests in the peninsula. Taking advantage of this new capacity, the papacy authorized a number of Iberian campaigns—one conducted by Alfonso VII of Castile against Almería on the southern coast of Granada 1147,[29] another, conducted by a joint Catalan-Genoese force, against Tortosa at the mouth of the Ebro in 1148—in support of the Second Crusade (1145–9).[30] Popes Eugenius III and Anastasius IV also authorized a crusade by Count Ramon Berenguer IV to consolidate control of the Ebro valley between 1152 and 1154, and one by King Alfonso VII to capture Andújar in 1155. [31]

From the mid-1100s onward, however, the Church was increasingly concerned with the threat to Christendom posed by the Almohads, a fundamentalist Islamic sect originating in Morocco that had begun displacing the Almoravids as rulers of Muslim Iberia. Against the backdrop of continuing rivalry among the Christian principalities, for several decades this new empire reversed the geopolitical dynamic in the peninsula, winning several important battles, and retaking territory that had been lost in the later years of the Almoravid regime. In 1172, the Almohads seized the last Almoravid emirate in Iberia. The period of Almohad expansion was not to last for long, however. Faced with the grave threat to Christian Iberia posed by the resurgent Muslim forces, the Christian princes (with papal encouragement) began to employ a number of religious military orders as a bulwark against further Almohad advances. As Houlsey observes, this phenomenon had both a local and translocal dimension.[32] On the one hand, each of the Christian kingdoms (except Navarre) created its own order. These included the larger and more long-lived orders such as Alcántara, Calatrava and Santiago, as well as more ephemeral ones such as Le Merced, Monte Gaudio, San Jorge de Alfama and Trujillo. On the other hand, the Templars and the Hospitallers, both iconic translocal orders, had a significant presence in the peninsula, especially in Aragón and Catalonia.[33] Taken together, these orders provided a permanent defensive carapace along the frontier—a carapace that contributed substantially to the frustration of the Almohad advance in the latter part of the twelfth century.

Not content with merely stabilizing the frontier in Iberia, during this period successive popes offered remission of sins and other spiritual inducements to those fighting to drive the Muslims out of Iberia. In 1175, Pope Alexander III used the promise of the same indulgence given to crusaders to the Holy Land to encourage Christian rulers of Léon, Castile and Aragón to go on the offensive against the Almohads. In an effort to prevent any large-scale departure of penitential warriors from Spain to the Holy Land following the proclamation of the Third Crusade (to liberate Jerusalem, which had fallen in 1187), Pope Clement III extended the scope of that crusade to include Iberia. In response, Alfonso VIII went on the offensive south of the Guadiana River and, more importantly, non-Iberian crusaders on their way to the Holy Land engaged in a joint venture with Sancho I of Portugal to capture the town of Silves (the Crusade of Silves, 1189). Also encouraged by

the extension of the crusade bull to Iberia, Alfonso VIII embarked upon the ill-fated Crusade of Alarcos (1193). Against the backdrop of successful and crucial papal efforts to end the internecine struggles among the peninsula's Christian princes, the Crusade of Las Navas de Tolosa was launched in 1212. Culminating in a decisive Christian victory, the campaign effectively broke the back of the Almohad empire and constituted a tipping point of sorts in the long conflict in Iberia. The preceding century or so had been one of geopolitical stalemate, with the frontier whipsawing back and forth according to the always-shifting balance of forces between the Muslim and Christian powers. After Las Navas, however, the Almohads never again managed to recover their footing, and their empire entered into a period of terminal decline. Four decades (and several crusades) later, *al-Andalus* had been all but extinguished and almost all of Iberia had been permanently reincorporated into the Latin Christian world order.

Perhaps not surprisingly, over the course of several centuries the Iberian Crusades developed their own distinctive character: "pilgrimage" was far less important than in the crusades to the Holy Land; they were closely controlled by Iberian monarchies (especially Léon-Castile); they were more successful than those in the East (especially after the Battle of Las Navas in 1212); they were more reliant on both regional and transregional military orders; and the Iberian "Crusader States"—unlike those in the Holy Land—developed strong fiscal and administrative bases from which to launch both "public wars" and "religious wars."[34] But they were nevertheless also clear expressions of a historical structure of war that transcended the Iberian sub-system: they reflected the distinctive war-making capacity of the Church (the crusader army and the military religious orders); they expressed the socially constructed interests of the reform papacy (the restoration of once-Christian lands in Spain to the Latin Christian fold); and they were made possible by the institution of the crusade (constituting the Church as a legitimate war-making unit and the "crusader" as a recognizable form of agent with a defined portfolio of religious interests). Of course, this does not explain the totality of the historical process known as the *Reconquista*. It does, however, highlight the distinctively ecclesiastical or religious dimension of the process—a dimension that was organic to the historical structure of war in later medieval Latin Christendom.

## THE NORTHERN CRUSADES

As Peter Lock has characterized them, the Northern Crusades were conducted in five partly overlapping phases: the Wendish Crusades (1147–85), the Livonian and Estonian Crusades (1198–1290), the Prussian Crusades (1230–83), the Lithuanian Crusades (1280–1435) and the Novgorod Crusades (1243–fifteenth century).[35] While authorized by, and fought on behalf of, the Church, these wars were prosecuted by Danish, Saxon and

Swedish princes as well as by military orders such as the Sword Brothers and the Teutonic Knights. They were fought primarily against a range of pagan adversaries—Wends, Livonians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Suomi and Prussians—although some were also waged against Russian Christian schismatics (i.e. adherents to the Greek Orthodox rite). By the early sixteenth century, these ecclesiastical wars—always only one element of broader process of the expansion of medieval Europe—had contributed significantly to extension of the northeastern frontier of Latin Christendom and the transformation of the Baltic from a pagan *mare incognita* into a Latin Christian lake.

The pre-history of the Northern Crusades can be traced to the so-called Magdeburg Charter of 1107/8—a document that explicitly called for an expedition to be undertaken against the Baltic pagans. Although there are a number of debates about the provenance and purpose of this document,[36] it is important for the purposes of this study in that it constitutes the earliest known text in which the crusading idea is grafted on to pre-existing ideas about the dangers and opportunities confronting the Church on the northeastern frontier of Latin Christendom—i.e. the earliest translation of the idea of the crusade to the Baltic region. Several themes running through the document are particularly significant. To begin with, it depicts the pagan Slavs in terms redolent of depictions of Muslims in accounts of the First Crusade—i.e. as "oppressors" guilty of committing grievous "injuries" against the Church and its members. Second, it portrays the pagan lands as "our Jerusalem," a land of milk and honey lost to the heathen because of sinfulness of the Christians in the region. Third, it calls on the "soldiers of Christ" to liberate this Jerusalem, implying that doing so will create conditions favorable not only for settlement but for evangelization as well.[37] While the charter's call to arms came to nothing at the time, it expressed ideas that were circulating widely among the clerics in the region and that over time would come to exercise an increasingly powerful grip on the collective imagination of the highest levels of ecclesiastical leadership.

The formal introduction of the crusade to northern Europe can be attributed to Pope Eugenius III's 1147 encyclical *Divini dispensatione*, which extended the scope of the Second Crusade to include not just the Holy Land, but Iberia and the Wendish (West Slavic) lands adjoining Saxony as well. The explicit objectives of the expedition were to subject the pagans to the Christian faith—a goal that came close to contradicting canon law prohibiting forced conversions. Reflecting many of the themes of the Magdeburg Charter, however, senior Church officials—including, significantly, Pope Eugenius and Bernard of Clairvaux, the chief ideologist of the Second Crusade—almost certainly regarded this expedition as a just war fought primarily to defend Christian missionaries and converts from harassment at the hands of the pagan Wends and to create a political context conducive to the peaceful expansion of Christendom through missionary work. As Hans-Deitrich Kahl has argued, these core eschatological

motives were also at least inflected by a powerful belief that the second coming of Christ was imminent (with all that this implied for the prospect of mass conversion).[38] Proceeding hand-in-hand with territorial expansion on the part of the Saxons, the region had seen extensive missionary activity in the preceding decades. Not surprisingly, the Wends had resisted both of these activities, on the one hand mounting military campaigns against the Saxons, on the other destroying missions, martyring missionaries and menacing local converts into apostasy. When the crusade encyclical *Quantum praedecessores* was proclaimed following the fall of Edessa in 1144, the state of affairs on the Wendish frontier was such that the Saxon nobility responded only half-heartedly to the Church's call, asking instead to be allowed to campaign against the pagan Wends with whom they were already embroiled in conflict. This was supported by local clergy, who argued that Christian converts—and thus the future of evangelization in the region—could only be made secure if the Wends were brought under Christian rule. Given the centrality of evangelization to the core ontological narrative of the Church—as well, perhaps, as the general enthusiasm generated by the proclamation of the Second Crusade—Eugenius not surprisingly responded positively to this request. He subsequently appointed Bishop Anselm of Havelburg as papal legate, authorized an expedition to subject the Wends to Saxon lordship (thereby creating the conditions within which the permanent evangelization of their territory could take place), and promised those crusading in the North the same indulgence (and many of the same privileges) as had been granted by Urban II to those fighting in the First Crusade.

Responding to the papal proclamation, in 1147 a crusader army comprising Saxon, Polish and Danish contingents invaded the Wendish lands. While this army enjoyed some successes on the battlefield, however, it ultimately failed to achieve its primary goal: the destruction of paganism in the Wends' territories and their decisive incorporation into Latin Christendom. As Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt has shown, this prompted the Church to reconsider the whole enterprise of crusading in the Baltic.[39] For several decades after 1147, the papacy demonstrated a considerable lack of enthusiasm for any further crusading in the North and neither local ecclesiastical nor lay authorities petitioned for one. Wars continued to be fought in the region in the aftermath of the Wendish crusade, of course, but "they were fought without benefit of papal authorization, or any of the apparatus of the crusade; there was no vow, no *ad hoc* legatine commission, no special preaching or promises of crusade privileges."[40] Indeed, it was not until 1171 that Pope Alexander III (1159–81) issued a new crusading bull for the region (*Non parum animus noster*), and even then he recast these expeditions as "penitential wars"—similar to crusades to the Holy Land, but offering fewer spiritual rewards, privileges and protections and enjoying a somewhat lower status.[41] The wars against the Wends continued, however, led by men such as Duke Henry the Lion of

Saxony (1142–95) and King Valdemar the Great of Denmark (1157–82). As Christiansen puts it, these campaigns were "wars carried on successfully in the shadow of the unsuccessful 1147 crusade."[42] After decades of brutal conflict, by 1185 the Wends had been effectively pacified, their pagan regime destroyed, and political and ecclesiastical structures more conducive to Christianization erected in their place.

When Alexander issued his bull of 1171 he not only reintroduced the institution of the crusade—or at least a diluted version of it in the form of "penitential war"—to Northern Christendom; in a marked departure from past practice,[43] he also outlined a papal vision for the evangelization of the entire East Baltic region. This vision had two key elements. First, it entailed a commitment to the armed defense of the Christian Church and its missions in the region. Alexander had received troubling reports that the mission in Estonia was subject to repeated pagan attacks—attacks that he viewed as both unjust (contrary to the *ius gentium*) and a serious threat to the Church's core mission of evangelization. Accordingly, he authorized the use of armed force in the defense of the Estonian mission and granted limited indulgences to those fighting in this just cause.[44] Second, Alexander envisioned a significant expansion of the northern frontiers of Latin Christendom to include, at a minimum, Estonia and Livonia. This latter part of the vision, Alexander argued, was to be accomplished through peaceful missionary work if at all possible, but through the use of armed force if necessary. By combining the goals of both *defensio* and *dilatio*, Alexander's 1171 bull established the basic approach to crusading in the North: in Erdmann's terms, "indirect missionary war." In the future, peaceful missions would be established in pagan territory; when these incurred local hostility, they and their activities would be defended by penitential warriors; and finally, when circumstances seemed propitious, the pagan "problem" in that particular region would be resolved by forcibly incorporating the catchment area of the endangered mission into Latin Christendom through crusade.

The mission of Bishop Meinhard to the pagan Livonians powerfully illustrates this expansionary dynamic. With the support of both the Archbishop of the missionary see of Hamburg-Bremen and the papacy, Meinhard established a mission in the Dvina River basin around 1180. Sensing an opportunity for large-scale conversion, Meinhard offered the Livonians a bargain: in return for their agreement to undergo baptism he would build two fortifications on islands in the Dvina River (Üxküll and Holm) to protect them from their enemies among the other pagan peoples of the region. According to the chronicler Henry of Livonia, the Livonians freely accepted this offer.[45] When they realized that all those who converted were also going to be held financially responsible for the upkeep of these fortifications, however, the Livonians balked: few among them actually accepted baptism or placed themselves under the authority of the bishop. Viewed from Meinhard's perspective, this constituted a grave breach of

the Livonians' promise to convert. It also presented him with a serious problem. Not only was he not attracting many converts, but those few Livonians whom he did baptize (the only people Meinhard actually had any authority over) simply did not constitute a tax-base capable of supporting the mission's castles and their garrisons. Meinhard realized that if he could not maintain these forces he would not be able to provide the protection he had promised, fatally undermining his entire strategy for evangelizing the region. The Bishop's problem was compounded by the fact that the relatively high taxes he was forced to levy on his small flock of converts actually provided a strong financial incentive to apostasy—he was losing souls faster than he was gaining them. Meinhard's solution: expand the tax-base by compelling the Livonian people to keep what he believed to be their promise to convert.[46] When persuasion and threats failed to compel the Livonians to come in, the bishop appealed to Rome for the military forces needed to implement this strategy.

Gravely concerned by the Livonians' apostasy and their collective failure to honor the terms of their agreement with Meinhard, in 1195 Pope Celestine III responded positively to the Bishop's appeal, granting limited remission of sins to those agreeing to take the cross to fight in Livonia. An expedition was subsequently launched under the leadership of the Duke of Sweden, but failed to achieve much before the Duke returned home with the majority of the crusader army. Following Meinhard's death in 1196, his successor—the Cistercian Bishop Berthold—led another expedition against the Livonians, explicitly justifying the campaign in terms of restoring the apostates to the faith.[47] When Berthold was killed in 1198, Pope Innocent III authorized yet another Livonian crusade, this one led by the newly elected Bishop Albert of Buxhövden. This and subsequent crusades—all explicitly justified in terms of defending the Church from pagan harassment, restoring apostates to the faith and/or creating conditions propitious for evangelization—were far more successful, ultimately resulting in the destruction of the Livonians' war-making capacity and with it their ability to resist incorporation into Latin Christendom. By the time of Albert's death in 1229, Livonia been made an imperial fief and most Livonians had been converted to Latin Christianity.[48]

Thus ended the early phase of Northern crusading. The crusades that took place during the subsequent high phase—specifically, the Prussian Crusades (1230–83), the Lithuanian Crusades (1280–1435) and the Novgorod Crusades (1243–sixteenth century)—all shared the same basic structural character as the indirect missionary wars against the Livonians, but were differentiated from them in significant ways. First, from the earliest decades of the thirteenth century on, the Baltic wars were distinguished from earlier expeditions by their elevation from "penitential wars" to full-blown "crusades." As Fonnesberg-Schmidt has convincingly demonstrated, crusading in the Baltic prior to 1230 involved piecemeal applications of crusading ideas and practices developed primarily in the context of the

Church's crusade experience in the Holy Land. As a result, it acquired the character of what she calls "penitential war"—a form of ecclesiastical war conferring fewer spiritual rewards and less prestige than the crusades to the East. Under Pope Honorius III (1216–27), however, papal policy changed in this respect: largely due to growing papal involvement in the missionary project, during his pontificate the ecclesiastical wars in the Baltic region were decisively elevated to full crusade status with all the same indulgences, privileges and protections as those to the Holy Land. Prior to the pontificate of Innocent III (Honorius' predecessor), missions had effectively fallen within the purview of the frontier bishops, kings and princes. During the pontificates of Innocent and Honorius, however, the papacy arrogated to itself greater responsibility for initiating and directing large-scale missions among both heretics and pagans—largely as a result of the post-Gregorian papacy's socially constructed identity and its entailed core interest in active preaching and evangelization (i.e. living the "apostolic life").[49] Not surprisingly, as the missions became an increasingly important papal priority so too did their defense against those social forces that would violently oppose their evangelizing work.

In practical terms, this had the effect of creating two new models for Baltic crusading. During the early phase, expeditions were initiated by local bishops or princes who sought and received papal authorization, but essentially retained control over planning, preaching, financing and other practical matters. As Fonnesberg-Schmidt demonstrates, while this pattern continued throughout the later Middle Ages, it was supplemented from the early thirteenth century onward by two new forms of crusade. The first of these involved a partnership between the Dominicans and the Teutonic Order in which the former preached and recruited for the crusade and the latter financed and conducted it. The Teutonic Order had been introduced to the region in the 1220s and had subsequently secured from Pope Innocent IV the right to launch expeditions and issue indulgences to those fighting in its ranks without additional papal authorization.[50] In effect, this created a permanent crusade under the leadership of the knights who proceeded to conquer Prussia and Lithuania and establish the Order State of the Teutonic Knights. The second new model involved a more active leadership role for the papal curia. In this type, the initiative for the crusade came from the pope, while its preaching and direction was made the responsibility of a papal legate. The crusade in Livonia proclaimed by Pope Gregory in his 1236 encyclical *Ne Terra Vastae* is a prime example of this sort of expedition. In both cases, the rationale remained the defense of the missions and their newly converted flocks; the "liberation" of Christians from pagan oppression and pagans from ignorance; and the vindication of injuries done to Christ and His Church.[51] From the early thirteenth century onward, however, the way in which the Church mobilized its martial resources became more differentiated.

It used to be believed that the Northern Crusades were simply an unremarkable element of the broader historical process of conquest and

colonization that has come to be known as the *Ostseidlung.* On this view, the ecclesiastical wars in the Baltic region were little more than a series of essentially mundane campaigns to acquire fish, fur and land—campaigns cloaked in a thin religious veil to be sure, but ultimately reducible to the all-too-worldly pursuit of wealth and power. As Housley points out, however, recent research has begun to move in a somewhat different direction. Rather than focusing narrowly on the socio-political determinants of these crusades, researchers have now begun to explore more fully the *religious* causes and character of these wars.[52] The emerging consensus seems to be that the causes and character of the crusades around the Baltic were informed by the convergence of socio-political and socio-religious factors. On the one hand, there is little doubt that many Christian marcher lords were powerfully motivated to wage war on their pagan neighbors for reasons that had little to do with religion—specifically, the desire to acquire productive land and peasants through a process of violent political accumulation. Similarly, there can be little doubt that the dynamics of state-building were also at play in many of these expeditions. On the other, it is increasingly clear that the key Church officials behind the Northern Crusades were motivated primarily by religious concerns and interests, including most importantly the perceived need to create a political context conducive to the peaceful expansion of Christendom through missionary work. It is also clear that many Christian warriors were motivated to wage war not on the basis of worldly concerns, but as a result of their deeply held religious convictions.

## CRUSADES AGAINST CHRISTIANS

Thus far, we have looked at three expressions of religious war along Latin Christendom's long frontier with the non-Christian world: the crusades to the Holy Land, those in Iberia and those taking place along the Baltic coastline. The final expression or form of religious war, however, was not directed outward against Muslims or pagans, but inward against Christians within Catholic Christendom.

The most notable example of an ecclesiastical war waged against a heretical social movement was that waged against the Cathars or Albigensians in the Languedoc region in what is now southwestern France.[53] The Cathars were a dualist or Manichean sect which rejected almost every element of Latin dogma, liturgical practice and ecclesiastical structure.[54] By the early thirteenth century, the movement had taken hold in areas such as the Rhineland and northern Italy, but was especially pervasive in the Languedoc where it had found favor not only amongst peasants and burghers, but amongst a number of the region's more influential nobles as well. The reasons for its popularity in this region are complex, but a crucially important factor was the lack of effective political authority in

the region. For centuries, the Church had relied on the secular authorities to create the political context within which the Church could carry out its core mission. This included suppressing unorthodox religious movements when they posed a threat to this mission. For most of the preceding 900 years, this had not been a particularly pressing problem as most such movements had comprised little more than individual preachers and a handful of followers. In Languedoc, however, Catharism was an increasingly pervasive and institutionalized mass movement—one that threatened to displace catholicism throughout the region and so inflict grievous injury on both the Church and the *respublica Christiana*. It was also viewed as an expression of the kind of collective sinfulness that had contributed to the disasters in the Holy Land in 1187—that is, as a manifestation of the spiritual disorder plaguing Christendom that God had punished by laying low the crusader principalities. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the Church turned to the temporal authorities—including both Count Raymond VI of Toulouse, the nominal prince of the region, and King Philip of France—to suppress this movement. It was only when it found these powers unable or unwilling to deal with the Cathar threat that it sought alternative remedies.

Catharism had been an issue in the region at least since 1178 when Count Raymond V appealed to the temporal and spiritual authorities for assistance in dealing with the emerging heresy in his domain. The initial response, a Cistercian preaching mission to the region, failed to stem the rising Cathar tide, as did a subsequent military expedition against Roger Trencavel II, who was believed to be abetting the heretics. When Innocent III became pope in 1198, he was determined to enforce orthodoxy in the region. Reflecting his own identity as a reform pope, he began his campaign by sending preachers to the region and by taking steps to reform the local Church. When these efforts again failed to yield the hoped-for results, however, Innocent came to the conclusion that he had no option but to suppress Catharism by force. In 1204 he called on Philip of France to come to the aid the Church, promising indulgences to all of the king's subjects who did their duty to suppress heretical movements. At first, Philip declined to provide the requested aid, largely because he was concerned that King John of England would exploit the opportunity and attempt to recover territories recently lost to France. Innocent repeated his appeal for aid in 1205 and 1207, sweetening the offer by promising all who took the cross the privileges and protections typically associated with a crusade (although none had yet been proclaimed). Philip, however, again declined to act. Frustrated by the failure of the temporal powers to discharge what he perceived to be their duty to aid the Church, Innocent eventually came round to the view that he would have to mobilize his own war-making capabilities to deal with the Cathars. He was able to do nothing militarily, however, until one of his legates, Peter of Castelnau, was murdered in 1208 after excommunicating Raymond VI for failing to take steps to suppress the heresy. Upon hearing of Peter's death (which he suspected was at Raymond's hand), Innocent

seized the opportunity to mobilize the armed laity of Latin Christendom against the Cathars and those, like Raymond, whom he believed abetted them, by proclaiming a crusade. The response to the call among the nobles of France was "enthusiastic, even fervent" and a large crusader army was quickly dispatched to attack the lands of Raymond Roger Trencavel, Viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne, a suspected Cathar sympathizer.[55] Thus began a brutal two-decades long war in the region—a war that ultimately destroyed the power of the temporal lords who had protected the heretics, leaving the newly created Inquisition a free hand to extinguish Catharism as a threat to Latin Christendom once and for all.

# Notes

## NOTES TO THE PREFACE

1. Andrew Latham, "Warfare Transformed: Perspectives on the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2002, vol. 8, no. 2, 231–66.
2. The term is Sverre Bagge's. See Bagge, "Medieval and Renaissance Historiography: Break or Continuity?" *European Legacy* vol. 3, no. 2, 1998, 1337.
3. Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History" *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 3, 493–505; Ian S. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias," *The American Political Science Review*, 1996, vol. 90, no. 3, 605–618.
4. Or, to use E.P. Thompson's felicitous phrase, to rescue the late medieval international order "from the enormous condescension of posterity." See E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Vintage, 1966, 12.
5. Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science," 606.
6. Ibid., 616.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Broadly speaking, the term "geopolitics" – and its near-synonyms "geopolitical relations" and "geopolitical order" – can be said to have two meanings. In the narrower sense, the term refers to a well-established historical tradition of strategic thought that emphasizes the spatial and geographic elements of statecraft. In a broader sense, however, "geopolitics" has come to refer more generically to all competitive/conflictual relations between units-of-rule.  See Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, New York: Verso, 2004, 12; and Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 288.
2. John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis," *World Politics*, 1983, vol. 35, no. 2, 261–85.
3. Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization*, 1992, vol. 46, no. 2, 427–466.
4. Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 3, 493–505.

5. Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, no. 4, 591–622.

6. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*.

7. Tal Dingott Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The Crusades as *Realpolitik* vs *Socialpolitik*," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2005, vol. 49, no. 4, 715–37.

8. Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

9. Among historians of political thought, see Brian Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150–1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Joseph P. Canning, "Law, Sovereignty and Corporation Theory, 1300–1450," in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 454–76; Kenneth Pennington, *The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; and Janet Coleman, *Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. Among historians of medieval politics see Susan Reynolds, "There Were States in Medieval Europe: A Response to Rees Davies," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 2003, vol. 16, no. 4; Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe* (trans. Juliet Vale), Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Thomas N. Bisson, *The Crises of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship and the Origins of European Government*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009; and Albert Rigaudière, "The Theory and Practice of Government in Western Europe in the Fourteenth Century," in Michael Jones (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. VI, c. 1300–1415*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 17–41.

10. Joseph Canning, "Introduction: Politics, Institutions and Ideas," in *CHMPT*, 350.

11. War is the crystallization or condensation of geopolitics in the broader sense articulated above. Put slightly differently, it is the moment of "realization" when the key features and dynamics of a geopolitical system are thrown into starkest relief. Accordingly, I treat war as a window on the broader geopolitical system within which it is embedded.

12. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 86.

13. I will say more on the topic below, but for now I will define "identity-interest complex" as a configuration of self-representations *and* the interests that are entailed in or derived from these identities. In a sense, it is a shorthand for the constructivist insight that "identities are the basis of interests." See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

14. As Wendt puts it, "first-order theorizing is domain-specific. It involves choosing a social system . . . identifying the relevant actors and how they are structured, and developing propositions about what is going on." See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 6.

## NOTES TO  CHAPTER 2

1. Christian Reus-Smit, *Moral Theory of the State*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; Justin Rosenberg, *Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London: Verso, 1994; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

2. Andrew Latham, "Warfare Transformed: Perspectives on the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2002, vol. 8, no. 2, 231–266.

3. Excellent examples of this type of scholarship include Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, (trans. Michael Jones), New York: Blackwell, 1984; John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999; Maurice Keen, *Medieval Warfare: A History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; and Brian Todd Carey, Joshua B. Allfree and John Cairns, *Warfare in the Medieval World*, Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword, 2006.

4. For an excellent discussion of "proprietorial war" during the high Middle Ages see France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades.*

5. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 280, 283.

6. While this region was internally diverse, as early as the eleventh century these differentiating commonalities were already sufficiently well-pronounced that terms such as "the Latin people," the "Latin world" and "Latin Christendom" were being used as terms of self-description by members of the aristocratic elite of what we would now call Western and Central Europe. See Christopher Tyerman, "Expansion and the Crusades," in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English (eds.), *Companion to the Medieval World*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009, 455–8; Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350*, London; Penguin Press, 1993, 19; John France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000–1714*, New York: Routledge, 2005, 3.

7. France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom*, 3.

8. Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization*, 1992, vol. 46, no. 2, 463.

9. Ibid., 463, emphasis added.

10. Ibid., 438.

11. Ibid., 443.

12. Ibid., 438.

13. Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 3, 493–505; Benno Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 52, no. 2, 324–58; Tal Dingott Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The Crusades as *Realpolitik* vs *Socialpolitik*," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2005, vol. 49, no. 4, 715–37. See also Markus Fischer, "On Context, Facts, and Norms: Response to Hall and Kratochwil," *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 3, 493–500.

14. Hall and Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales."

15. Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, 3.

16. Hall and Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales"; Fischer, "Feudal Europe 800–1300"; Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; and Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages." Hall does address the crusades, but only the First Crusade launched by Pope Urban II in 1095 and then only briefly and incidentally as a catalytic moment in the evolution of the institution of Christian chivalry. See Rodney Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, no. 4, 605–609.

17. Elements of this argument appeared in Teschke, "Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages."

18. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 7.

19. Ibid., 8.

20. Ibid., 59.
21. Ibid., 67–9.
22. Ibid., 103. The others included the Truce of God, the Peace of God, the doctrine of the Three Orders and even the institution of chivalry. In this respect, there are notable similarities to Hall's argument regarding the etiology of the crusades. Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," 603–9. Recent scholarship suggests that these movements were something quite different: attempts to establish peace on the "home front" as a necessary pre-condition for crusading. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 3rd edition, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 36.
23. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 9.
24. The other three were the Spanish *Reconquista*, the German *Ostseidlung*, and the various Norman conquests. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 97–107.
25. Ibid., 98.
26. For a fuller critique see Andrew Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2011, vol. 55, no. 1, 223–43.
27. Jean Flori, "De la paix de Dieu á la croisade? Un réexamen," *Crusades*, 2003, vol. 2, 1–23; Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 27–9.
28. Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 79–108.
29. Hall and Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales." See also Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," 606–7; and Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c. 1071–1291*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 24–7.
30. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 90; see also Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades*, London: Routledge, 2006, 301.
31. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism," in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 131–49.
32. Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 31–62.
33. Benno Teschke, "Marxism," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, 163–187.
34. Teschke, *Myth of 1648* , 77.
35. See, for example, Raymond Boudon, "Beyond Rational Choice Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2003, no. 29, 1–21.
36. Vivien Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008, no. 11, 317–9.
37. France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, 1–15; Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 7.
38. Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War." See also Tal Dingott Alkopher, "The Role of Rights in the Social Construction of Wars: From the Crusades to Humanitarian Interventions," *Millennium*, 2007, vol. 36, no. 1, 1–27.
39. Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War," 721.
40. Alphonse Dupront, *Le Myth de croisade*, Paris: Gallimard, 1997; Jean Flori, *La guerre sainte: La formation de l'idée de croisade dans l'Occident Chrétien*, Paris: Aubier, 2001; Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254*, Boston: Brill, 2007; Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*; Norman Housley, *Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008; Thomas F. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*; and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.

41. Paul Alphandéry, *La Chrétienté et L'Idée de Croisade*, Paris: A Michel, 1954–9; Étienne Delaruelle, "Essai Sur la Formation de l'Idée de Croisade," *Bulletin de la Litérature Ecclésiastique*, 1955, no. 55, 50–63.

42. Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War," 725–6.

43. Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War," 715.

44. Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales," 493–505; Ian S. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias," *The American Political Science Review*, 1996, vol. 90, no. 3, 605–18; Andreas Osiander, *Before the State: Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

45. Osiander, *Before the State*, 2.

46. Ibid.

47. Otto von Gierke, *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, vols. 1–4, Berlin, 1868–1913.

48. Georges de Lagarde, *La Naissance de l'espirit laïque au déclin du moyen âge*, 2nd ed., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942.

49. J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, revised edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. A more complete, if still partial, genealogy would also include various works by John Neville Figgis (1866–1919); Fritz Kern's *Law and the Constitution in the Middle Ages* (1919); F.J.C. Hearnshaw's two-volume edited collection entitled *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers*, London: G.G. Harrap & Company, Ltd., 1923; Meinecke's *The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History* (1924); G.C. Crump and E.F. Jacob's edited collection *The Legacy of the Middle Ages* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926; Heinrich Mitteis, *State in the Middle Ages: A Comparative Constitutional History of Feudal Europe*, Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1975 [1940].; Charles Howard McIllwain's *Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1940; Ewart Lewis' *Medieval Political Ideas*, New York: Knopf, 1954, Marcel David's *La souveraineté et les limites juridiques du pouvoir monarchique du IX<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris : Librairie Dalloz, 1954, F.A. Hinsley's *Sovereignty* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966; and Bernard Guenée, *L'Occident aux XIVe et XVe Siècles: les États*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971.

50. Cary Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought: Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009, xix.

51. Classic works in this vein include Georges Duby's *Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; Marc Bloch's *Feudal Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961; Otto Brunner, *Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, [1939] 1992; Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London: Verso, 1974; Fernand Braudel's *Civilization and Capitalism*, London: Verso, 1979; and Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements and the Civilizations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

52. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science."

53. Ibid., 605.

54. A notable exception to this is Hall and Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales," which explicitly refers to Lustick's concerns.

55. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science," 616.

56. Brian Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150–1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Francis Oakley, *Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights*, New York: Continuum, 2005; Kenneth Pennington, *The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*; and Janet Coleman, *A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000.

57. A fuller genealogy would include Walter Ullmann, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources Of Medieval Political Ideas*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975; Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963; Gaines Post, *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100–1322*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957; Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970; and Anthony Black, *Political Thought in Europe, 1250–1450*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

58. Regarding Bodin, see Pennington 1993, *The Prince and the Law,* 8.

59. As A. London Fell puts it, ". . . although there was a *medieval* sovereignty and a *medieval* state in practice as well as theory, they must not be too closely identified with their *modern* counterparts." See A. London Fell, *Medieval or Renaissance Origins? Historiographical Debates and Deconstructions*, New York: Praeger, 1991, 65.

60. Lustick, "History, Historiography and Political Science," 615.

61. In this, I am following the advice of Fell, *Medieval or Renaissance Origins*, 200.

62. Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 5. For a good summary of the declining authority of Ullmann's scholarship see ibid., 3–12.

63. Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 8–9.

64. Ibid., 4.

65. Cameron G. Thies, "A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives,* 2002, vol. 3, no. 4, 360. See also Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1931.

66. For example, Poggi takes the modern definition of "sovereignty" and projects it backwards into the pre-modern world where, of course, it cannot then be found. See Francesco Maiolo, *Medieval Sovereignty: Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus of Saxoferrato*, Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2007, 26.

67. Notable exceptions include Osiander, *Before the State*; and Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

68. Such denials take a variety of forms, ranging from Ruggie's statement to the effect that the term "feudal state" hardly makes any sense at all, to Phillips' entirely stateless portrayal of the late medieval era. There are, of course, exceptions to this: Hendrik Spruyt, recognizes the sovereign territorial kingdom that emerged out of the twelfth century commercial revolution; Teschke acknowledges the existence of a historically specific "feudal state"; and Fischer, not surprisingly, see states everywhere.

69. Paul W. Schroeder, "History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit," *International Security*, 1997, vol. 22, no. 1, 64–74.

70. Two sources are cited in this regard: John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis," *World Politics*, 1983, vol. 35, no. 2, 261–85; and Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 1, 139–74.

71. Ruggie provides two sources for the concept of heteronomy. The first is Friedrich Meinecke, who, as Ruggie readily concedes, never actually used the term in writing (it was attributed to him by his translator Douglas Scott). See Ruggie, "Territoriality," 150, fn 62. The second is the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Ibid., 151, fn. 63.

72. For an overview of this approach in the context of IR see Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; George Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations," *International Studies Review*, 2006, vol. 8, no. 3, 397–423; and Lawson, "Historical Sociology in International Relations: Open Society, Research Programme and Vocation," *International Politics*, 2007, vol. 44, no. 4, 343–68.

73. Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology," 415.

74. Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*, New York: Russell Sage, 1984, 61.

75. Colin Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War," *Parameters*, 2005, vol. 35, no. 1, 17.

76. Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 193.

77. Gat *A History of Military Thought*; Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War*, New York: Atlantic Books, 2007.

78. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 77.

79. It is perhaps worth noting that in drawing on Clausewitz I am not interested in recapturing his "initial intent"; rather, in the spirit of what Christopher Bassford has called the "inspirationist school," my approach is to adapt Clausewitzian insights and concepts to the study of late medieval war. See Bassford, "The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought," in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.), *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 75–76.

80. Fernand Braudel *On History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 28

81. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 155.

82. Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (trans. Richard Mayne), New York: Penguin Press, 1972, 34

83. Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*, 22.

84. This is derived from Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1981, vol. 10, no. 2, 126–55.

85. Following Hedley Bull I distinguish between "war in the material sense" and "war in the legal or normative sense." While I use the term "historical structure of war" to refer to war in the material sense, I share Bull's view that rules and norms (war in the normative or notional sense) are part of the material reality of war. Thus my insistence on including the "institution" of war in my framework. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 178–80.

86. This notion is broadly similar to both Reus-Smit's concept of "constitutional structure" and Philpott's concept of "constitution of international society." See Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and*

*Institutional Rationality in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; and Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

87. For a discussion, see Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 1–40.
88. Kenneth Waltz, "Political Structures" in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 81–7.
89. Regarding "heteronomy" see Ruggie, "Territoriality"; regarding "negarchy," see Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007; regarding "hegemony," see Adam Watson, "Systems of States," *Review of International Studies*, 1990, vol. 16, no. 2, 99–109.
90. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," 142, italics in the original.
91. Regarding homonomy, see Ruggie, "Territoriality," 151.
92. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 151–2.
93. Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert, "Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2010, vol. 16, no. 3, 315–37.
94. Buzan and Albert, "Differentiation," 318.
95. Ibid., 318.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 326.
98. Reus-Smit, *Moral Purpose of the State*, 13–5.
99. See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 268.
100. See Christopher Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

**NOTES TO CHAPTER 3**

1. John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis," *World Politics*, 1983, vol. 35, no. 2, 261–85; Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization*, 1993, vol. 47, no. 3, 493–505; Tal Dingott Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The Crusades as Realpolitik vs Socialpolitik," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2005, vol. 49, no. 4, 715–37; and Andrew Latham, "Theorizing the Crusades: Identity, Institutions and Religious War in Medieval Latin Christendom," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2011, vol. 55, no. 55, 223–43.
2. Andreas Osiander, *Before the State: Political Change in the West from the Greeks to the French Revolution*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
3. The term "great divide" is Sverre Bagge's. See Bagge, "Medieval and Renaissance Historiography: Break or Continuity?" *European Legacy 2*, 1998, vol. 3, no. 2, 1337.
4. The argument that the late Middle Ages have been orientalized and Othered is made in Constantin Fasolt, *The Limits of History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2004, 16–45 as cited in Cary J. Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought: Explorations Along the Medieval/Modern Divide from John of Salisbury to Hegel*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009, xix.
5. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 151.

6. Ibid., 150.
7. Ibid., 151.
8. Part of the problem in this connection has to do with a tendency in the literature to conflate what are two distinct epochs: the high and late Middle Ages.
9. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 150.
10. Ibid., 150, fn. 58. Emphasis added.
11. Even Ruggie resists these conclusions, arguing that the territorially fixed, defined and exclusive state did not emerge in the thirteenth century – largely because of wars, famines and plagues that "arrested" economic and political development in the fourteenth century. This characterization, however, while a staple of older historiographical accounts, no longer reflects the scholarly consensus regarding political development during this era. See John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. If we are talking about constitutive *norms*, as opposed to concrete institutions, it is also somewhat beside the point. The crux of my argument here as elsewhere is not that fully evolved sovereign states populated Latin Christendom from 1300 on, but (a) that the constitutive norm of the corporate-sovereign state did, and (b) that the enactment of this norm was the defining dynamic of late medieval political life. The fact that, in practice, the states of this era – especially at the beginning of this era – did not always conform to the ideal in no way disconfirms this claim.
12. Examples include Osiander, *Before the State*; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 77–80; Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
13. Susan Reynolds, "The Historiography of the Medieval State," in Michael Bentley (ed.), *Companion to Historiography*, London: Routledge, 1997, 119.
14. Reynolds, "Historiography," 118. She goes on to hold up Poggi as an example of this, quoting him as arguing that "although one often speaks of the 'modern state' … strictly speaking the adjective 'modern' is pleonastic." Ibid., fn. 5.
15. Susan Reynolds, "There Were States in Medieval Europe: A Response to Rees Davies," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 2003, vol. 16, no. 4, 551.
16. Reynolds, "Historiography," 118.
17. Ibid., 132.
18. See, for example, Joseph P. Canning, "Ideas of the State in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentators on the Roman Law," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* Fifth Series, 1983, no. 33, 1–27; Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300–1450*, New York: Routledge, 1996; Anthony Black, *Political Thought in Europe, 1250–1450*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Brian Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150–1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Kenneth Pennington, *The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe* (trans. Juliet Vale), Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; Susan Reynolds, "There Were States in Medieval Europe,"  550–5; Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*; Janet Coleman, *A History of Political Thought: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. Even Skinner and other members of the Cambridge School concede that almost all of the foundational elements of statehood emerged in the late medieval era – they merely insist that the *concept* of the state necessary to catalyze its decisive emergence did not crystallize until the early modern era. See Quentin Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1978. Finally, Rees Davies – author of another important critique of the medieval state argument – did not so much oppose the idea of the medieval state as the unreflexive and under-specified use of the term. See Rees Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?" *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 2003, vol. 16, no. 2,  280–300.

19. Within IR, the main proponents of this thesis are Ruggie, "Territoriality"; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Sovereignty as *Dominium*: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?" in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 21–42; Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, *Nations, Markets and War: Modern History and the American Civil War*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006; Kurt Burch, *"Property" and the Making of the International System*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998; and Ben Holland, "Sovereignty as *Dominium*? Reconstructing the Constructivist Roman Law Thesis," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2010, vol. 52, no. 2, 449–80.

20. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 157 as cited in Holland, "Sovereignty as *Dominium*?" 451.

21. Ibid., 452.

22. Ibid., 452.

23. Ruggie, "Territoriality"; Kratochwil, "Sovereignty as *Dominium*"; Burch, *"Property" and the Making of the International System*.

24. Justinian's code was rediscovered about 1070 as a result of studies undertaken in connection with the Gregorian Reforms. See David E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans "The Twelfth Century Renaissance," in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350–c. 1450*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 315–6; Janet Coleman, *A History of Political Thought*, 33–8; Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 33–4;

25. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 115.

26. Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 38.

27. This account of Roman property law is based on Janet Coleman, "Dominium in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Political Thought and its Seventeenth-Century Heirs: John of Paris and Locke," *Political Studies*, 1985, vol. 33, no. 1, 73–100.; Coleman, *A History of Political Thought*; and Diana Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*.

28. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 149–51.

29. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 19.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 161.

32. Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, no. 4, 566.

33. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1997, vol. 103, no. 1, 144–181.

34. A "castellan" was a castle-holder.

35. George Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 153.

36. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*: *Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, New York: Verso, 2004, 88–9; Duby, *The Three Orders*, 152–3.

37. Thomas N. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power Lordship and the Origins of European Government*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 3.

38. Regarding the impact of the Investiture controversy, see Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, no. 4, 591–622. Regarding those broader currents of political thought that fed into this process see Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 82–134; and Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 10.

39. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 5.

40. Black, *Political Thought*, 14; Sverre Bagge, *From Viking Stronghold to Christian Kingdom: State Formation in Norway, c. 900–1350*, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2010, 11–12. Building on the insights of Alexander Passerin D'Entrèves, Cary Nederman makes the point that "the concepts that are imbedded in history are not always perfectly or even adequately aligned with the language in which they are couched. Indeed, it may be the case that ideas outstrip the ability of thinkers to express them: language may occasionally 'lag behind' thought." See Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 59. Reynolds makes a similar argument in "There Were States in Medieval Europe," as does Jean Dunbabin in "Government," *CHMPT*, 477–519.

41. See also Reynolds, "There Were States in Medieval Europe"; and Davies, "The Medieval State: The Tyranny of a Concept?"

42. For a good introduction to the late medieval understanding of political community see Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 14–41.

43. See Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*.

44. For a discussion of Augustinian views of the state see Canning, *Political Thought in Europe*, 40–3.

45. John Finnis, *Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 114.

46. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 15.

47. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 43.

48. Anthony Black, "The Individual and Society," *CHMPT* 593.

49. Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 39.

50. Charles F. Briggs, *The Body Broken: Medieval Europe, 1300–1520*, London: Routledge, 2011, 39.

51. Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 39–40.

52. Briggs, *The Body Broken*, 37.

53. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 149–50

54. For Dante, the optimal scale was the universal Empire; for Giles of Rome, John of Paris and Nicolas Oresme it was the kingdom. See Dunbabin, "Government," 479–82.

55. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 109–110. See also Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 262–331; Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 50–64; and Watts, *Making of Polities*, 141–3.

56. Regarding peasant xenophobia see H.G. Keonigsberger and George L. Mosse, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, Longman: London, 1968, 213 as cited in Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 94, n. 118. The longer quotation is the language Hall uses to dismiss claims regarding national identity in the Middle Ages. Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. He goes on to make the claim that the issue of national or ethnic identities is settled in the literature. According to leading medievalists, however, it is in fact far from settled – many argue that politically non-trivial ethnic or regnal collective identities were an important facet of late medieval life. My reading of the various literatures suggests consciousness of regnal collective identities was relatively limited early in the era, but grew dramatically over the course of the late Middle Ages.

57. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 49.
58. Watts, *The Making of Polities*, 141. See also Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 50–65; and Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 109–10.
59. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 50.
60. Watts, *The Making of Polities*, 143.
61. Ibid., 142.
62. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 53.
63. Kenneth Pennington, "Law, Legislative Authority and Theories of Government," in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 443.
64. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 172.
65. For a discussion of corporation theory see Pennington, *CHMPT*, 444–9 and Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, 19–25.
66. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 172
67. Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, 19
68. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 172
69. Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, 25.
70. The verb "to govern" is from the Latin *gubernare* – to steer. Dunbabin, *CHMPT*, 483. See also Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 23.
71. Bisson, *The Crisis of the Twelfth Century*, 3; Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 62.
72. Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, 30.
73. Canning, *CHMPT*, 360–1. See, for example, John of Paris. According to Ruggie, the spatial demarcation of "public" and "private" is one of the distinguishing features of the modern system of territorial states. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 151.
74. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 186.
75. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 173.
76. Cary Nederman, "Conciliarism and Constitutionalism: Jean Gerson and Medieval Political Thought," *History of Political Thought*, 1990, vol. 17, no. 2, 193–5 as cited in Nederman, *Lineages of European Political Thought*, 38, n. 36.
77. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 25. For a fuller discussion of the terminology of the common good, see Kempshall, *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 10–14.
78. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 42.
79. Black, "Individual and Society," 596.
80. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 130.
81. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 10. Regarding the continuing influence of Augustine well into the fifteenth century see Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 39.
82. Fischer, *CHMPT*, 107. See also Kemphsall, *The Common Good*, 20.
83. Fischer, *CHMPT*, 107.
84. Ibid., 110.
85. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 129.
86. Ibid.,128.
87. Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 24; Black, *CHMPT*, 596.
88. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 42. For a detailed account of the points of agreement and disagreement among eight prominent late medieval political thinkers see Kempshall, *The Common Good*.
89. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 26.
90. Ibid., 27.
91. Ibid., 28.
92. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 129.

93. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 40.
94. See Kempshall, *The Common Good*, 340–4; and Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire*, 17–9.
95. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 41.
96. Kempshall, *Common Good*, 62.
97. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 41.
98. Ibid., 41.
99. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 35. As Justinian puts it in the *Digest* (1.1.10.1 Ulpianus 1 reg.), "the basic principles of [justice] are: to live honestly, not to harm other people, and to recognize the rights of others" (*Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum [ius]cuique tribuere*).
100. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 41.
101. Ibid., 41.
102. The term is from Richard W. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Late Middle Ages*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
103. Finnis, *Aquinas*, 284.
104. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 135
105. Kenneth Pennington, "Law, Legislative Authority and Theories of Government," in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 426.
106. Ibid., 427.
107. Ibid., 434–6.
108. Michael Wilks argues that the recovery of Aristotle and the reintroduction of Roman law gradually transformed the Augustinian idea of papal sovereignty into an ideal of temporal sovereignty. See Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty*. See also Gaines Post, "Review of Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*," *Speculum*, 1964, 366–8, vol. 39, no. 2.
109. Regarding the cross-fertilization of Roman and canon law concepts and doctrines see Tierney, *Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought*, 25.
110. Pennington, *CHMPT*, 432.
111. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 60–1. This theoretical transfer of sovereignty from the Roman people to the Roman emperor was labeled the *lex regia* (royal law). See Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 8–9
112. Pennington, *The Prince and the Law*, 32–3.
113. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 6.
114. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 6.
115. Pennington, *CHMPT*, 432–3.
116. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 124–5.
117. Ibid., 125.
118. Pennington, *CHMPT*, 468–9.
119. For a good overview of the idea of the state developed in Roman law see Brian Tierney, "Ideas of the State in Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentators on the Roman Law," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1983, Fifth Series, vol. 33, 1–27.
120. Pennington, *CHMPT*, 469–73. See also Canning *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 169–71.
121. Ibid., 125.
122. Canning, *CHMPT*, 465.
123. Ibid., 466.
124. Coleman, *A History of Political Thought*, 7.
125. Ibid., 43.
126. Janet Coleman, "*Dominium*," 82–3.

127. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, 58.
128. Janet Coleman, *CHMPT*, 607–11.
129. Regarding property see Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, 17–41.
130. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Sovereignty as *Dominium*," 41.
131. Burch,"*Property" and the Making of the International System*, 29.
132. Canning, "Ideas of the State," 21.
133. While the Church always lay at least partly outside regnal jurisdiction, the actually existing late medieval kingdom was characterized by the progressive subordination of ecclesiastical institutions and personnel and their incorporation within the state. See Watts, *Making of Polities*, 118–20 and Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 110–1.
134. Regarding *raison d'etat* see Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
135. For a discussion see Pennington, *CHMPT*; Canning, "Law, Sovereignty and Corporation Theory," *CHMPT*; Dunbabin, *CHMPT*; and Guenée, *States and Rulers*. Properly understood, these are Meinecke's "heteronomous shackles" – nothing more than a web of constraints on the exercise of the sovereign will of the crown. Meinecke actually put it thus, although the "State certainly existed in the Middle Ages … it did not rank supreme. The Law was set above it; it was a means for enforcing the law." See Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, 27.
136. As Reus-Smit puts it, "in modern international society, the principle of sovereign equality is an unquestioned given." Reus-Smit, *Moral Purpose of the State*, 102.
137. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 204.
138. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 78–9.
139. Ibid., 136.
140. Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities*, 256ff.
141. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 121.
142. For an overview of the growth of administration and government see Watts, *Making of Polities*, 238–44, 393–409; and Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 111–25.
143. Wim Blockmans and Peter Hoppenbrouwers, *Introduction to Medieval Europe, 300–1550*, London: Routledge, 2007, 311.
144. Quentin Skinner, "The State," in Terence Ball, J. Farr and R.L. Hanson (eds.), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 102 as cited in Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 186, n. 2.
145. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 75.
146. See Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers, *Introduction to Medieval Europe*, 309–11.
147. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 210.
148. Ibid., 78.
149. For a good overview with respect to England and France see Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, 32–77.
150. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 93.
151. Oresme, *De moneta*, as cited in Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, 106, n. 81.
152. Regarding the relationship between money and identity see Eric Helleiner, "One Money, One People? Political Identity and the Euro," TIPEC Working Paper 01/6, Trent, Ontario: Trent International Political Economy Centre, 2001. Available at http://www.trentu.ca/org/tipec/helleiner6.pdf. Accessed August 1, 2011.

153. Blockmans and Hoppenbrouwers, *Introduction to Medieval Europe*, 313–7. Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, 36–40.
154. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 75.
155. This was the doctrine of "necessity," an implicit element of the constitutive norm of the corporate-sovereign state. See Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, 36–8.
156. Regarding taxation see Watts, *Making of Polities*, 224–33; Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 96–107. Regarding the "fiscal revolution" see Richard Bonney, *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, esp. the introduction and chapters 1, 3, 5, and 7.
157. See Norman Housley, "European Warfare, *c.* 1200–1320," in Maurice Keen (ed.), *Medieval Warfare: A History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (trans. Michael Jones) Oxford: Blackwell, 1984, 65–165; J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages: From the Eighth Century to 1340* (trans. S. Willard and S.C.M. Southern), New York: North Holland Publishing Co., 1977.
158. Guenée, *States and Rulers*, 138.
159. Ibid., 138–9.
160. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 220.
161. Guenèe, *States and Rulers*, 139.
162. Clifford J. Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," *The Journal of Military History*, 1993, vol. 57, no. 2, 241–78.
163. Andrew Latham and Kabir Sethi, "The Transformation of War," in Craig A. Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 3rd edition, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. For an earlier version of this framework see Andrew Latham, "Warfare Transformed: Perspectives on the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2002, vol. 8, no. 2, 231–66
164. Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*: *Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 70–1. More generally, see James Muldoon, *Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800–1800*, New York: St. Martin's, 1999.
165. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, 71
166. Ibid., 71.
167. See Michael Prestwich (ed.), *Liberties and Identities in the Medieval British Isles*, Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2008. Regarding the Empire as a composite state or kingdom, see Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, 79–82.
168. For a contrary view, see Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, 88–96.
169. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 95.
170. Ibid., 97.
171. Ibid., 98.
172. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, 78.
173. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitor*: *An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 109–29.
174. While the Hansa began as a league of merchants, by 1300 it had become an alliance or network of towns. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 102.
175. Indeed, many composite kingdoms comprised territorially non-contiguous territories. England and Gascony, for example, could hardly be said to be contiguous.
176. Ruggie, "Territoriality," 142.
177. Ibid., 143.

178. Hall, 1999.
179. Although social critics like Dante continued to employ the idiom of universal Empire to critique papal and regnal misconduct, as a political project the restoration of the Empire was already anachronistic by the mid-thirteenth century.
180. Watts, *Making of States*, 72, 74; Reynolds, *Kingdoms*, 259; Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought*, 78.
181. Black, *Political Thought in Europe*, 109.
182. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 209.
183. Ibid., 264–86.
184. Watts, *Making of Polities*, 82.
185. Culminating in the famous Battle of the Golden Spurs, fought at Courtrai (Kortrijk), Flanders, in 1302.
186. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 208.
187. Ibid., 209.
188. Wim Blockmans, *A History of Power in Europe: Peoples, Markets, States*, Antwerp: Fonds Mercator Paribas, 1997, 668.
189. See Fredrick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 16–39.
190. Augustine, *City of God*, London: Penguin Books, 1984, 6.
191. Fischer, *CHMPT*, 107, emphasis added. See also Kemphsall, *The Common Good*, 20.
192. Fischer, *CHMPT*, 110.
193. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 258–91.
194. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, IIa IIae, qu. 42, art 1 as quoted in Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 280.
195. One might also look at the expression of these norms in Roman law. Given the extent to which these two bodies of law cross-fertilized one another, however, there is little to be gained by looking at both bodies. I have chosen to focus on canon law rather than Roman because it provides a better foundation for my discussion of the crusades in the next chapter. For an overview of Roman law in this connection see Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 40–54.
196. Alex J. Bellamy, *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006, 31.
197. Norman F. Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, New York: Harper-Perennial, 1994, 312.
198. Ibid., 313.
199. Bellamy, *Just War*, 33.
200. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 75.
201. Ibid., 71.
202. Ibid., 62.
203. Bellamy, *Just War*, 34.
204. Ibid.
205. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 84.
206. Bellamy, *Just War*, 35.
207. Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, 126.
208. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, 283.
209. "Configurative war" and "constitutive war" are terms first introduced by John Ruggie. See Ruggie, "Territoriality," 162–3.
210. R.R. Davies, *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles, 1093–1343*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
211. The Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 is perhaps the most clearly expressed statement of the Scottish cause. It is an appeal to the pope, asking him to recognize Scottish sovereignty and to anathematize the English for unjustly attacking the community of the realm.

212. Key sources regarding the Wars of Scottish Independence include G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965; and Michael Brown, *The Wars of Scotland, 1214–1371*, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2004.
213. Key works supporting this interpretation of the origins of the Hundred Years War include T.F. Tout, *France and England in the Middle Ages*, Manchester: University Press, 1922; Geoffrey Templeman, "Edward III and the Beginnings of the Hundred Years War," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 1952, 5th ser., ii; George P. Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985; Jean Le Patourel, "Origins of the Hundred Years War" in Kenneth Alan Fowler (ed.), The Hundred Years War, London: Macmillan, 1971, 28–50; and Malcolm Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades*, 3rd edition, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 1.
2. See Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, 144–66.
3. For a good overview see Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
4. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
5. Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, 217–20.
6. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
7. Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, New York: New Left Books, 1974, 136.
8. Ibid.
9. Norman F. Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, New York: Harper-Perennial, 1994, 79.
10. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 194.
11. Colin Morris, *Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 24–8.
12. David F. Noble, *A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of Western Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 112. For a brief overview see Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," *International Organization*, 1997, vol. 51, no. 4, 609–15; for a more detailed picture see Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, 11–134.
13. Herbert Workman, *The Evolution of the Monastic Ideal*, London: Epworth Press, 1927, 227 as quoted in Noble, *A World Without Women*, 111.
14. Noble, *A World Without Women,* 110.
15. Cantor refers to this as the "Gregorian World Revolution." For a fuller discussion see Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 243–76.
16. For a discussion of the papal monarchy see Morris, *Papal Monarchy* and Sylvia Schein *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274–1314*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
17. Pennington, in J.H. Burns (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 433.
18. Ibid., 437.

19. Ibid., 444.
20. Rooted in political Augustinianism, the Gelasian doctrine, the Doctrine of the Two Swords and the (forged, but influential) Donation of Constantine.
21. See Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*: *An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 42–8. Good overviews of the socio-political character of the Church during this era include Morris, *The Papal Monarchy*; Gerd Tellenbach, *The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, *The Pope's Body*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000; and Andreas Meyer, "Papal Monarchy," in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English (eds.), *Companion to the Medieval World*, Oxford: Blackwell 2009, 372–96.
22. John Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 51.
23. Ibid., 52.
24. P.N.R Zutshi, "The Avignon Papacy," in Michael Jones (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Volume VI c. 1300–1415*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 663–4.
25. Ibid., 665.
26. Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," 604–7; Tal Dingott Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The Crusades as Realpolitik vs Socialpolitik," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2005, vol. 49, no. 4, 725–6.
27. Alkopher, "The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War," 726.
28. Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
29. John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, 205; Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 34.
30. Authoritative studies of the military religious orders include Alan Forey, *The Military Orders From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992; Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ: Les Ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge*, Paris: Seuil, 2002; and Anthony Luttrell and Léon Pressouyre, *La commanderie: institution des ordres militaires dans l'occident medieval*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 2002.
31. Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, (trans. Michael Jones), Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1984, 75.
32. Ibid.
33. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 80.
34. Ibid., 79.
35. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 50–2.
36. Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 258.
37. Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977 [1935].
38. Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, 79–108. In this historical context, of course, ensuring "justice" had a very specific meaning: to right a past or present injury perpetrated against the *respublica Christiana*, "which could include any violation of righteousness, God's laws or Christian doctrine." Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 9.

39. Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," 610. At the end of the eleventh century, "the church supplied the German King with much of his revenue, and tenants of church lands furnished three quarters of his army." Robin W. Winks and Teofilo F. Ruiz, *Medieval Europe and the World: From Late Antiquity to Modernity, 400–1500,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 135.
40. Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, 113–7.
41. Ibid., 117.
42. Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, 339–40.
43. Closely related to this was a concern that non-Roman rite Christians in liberated lands (Mozarabs in Iberia and members of the Greek Orthodox Church in Sicily, to take but two examples) accept the authority, theology and liturgy of the Latin Church. See John France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000–1714,* New York: Routledge, 2005, 35–6.
44. The term "moral authority" is from Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource."
45. Where institutions are defined as "stable sets of norms, rules, and principles that serve two functions in shaping social relations: they constitute actors a knowledgeable social agents, and they regulate behavior." Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, 12. See also Charles A. Jones, "War in the Twenty-First Century: An Institution in Crisis," in Richard Little and John Williams (eds.), *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
46. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, 3.
47. Ibid., x.
48. One of the ways in which Christians of the era constructed their identity was to contrast the peaceful evangelization practices of Christianity with what they imagined were the forcible conversion practices of Islam. See John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, 261.
49. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, 10.
50. Ibid., 9–10. See also Jean Flori, *La guerre sainte: La formation de l'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien*, Paris: Aubier, 2001.
51. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, 10.
52. Ibid., xx.
53. Ibid., xxiii.
54. Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 123.
55. Ibid., 124.
56. Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," in Thomas F. Madden (ed.), *The Crusades: The Essential Readings*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002, 31–50; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*; Marcus Bull, "The Roots of Lay Enthusiasm for the First Crusade," in Madden, *The Crusades*, 172–93.
57. Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
58. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades*, 55–64.
59. See, for example, France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom*.
60. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 9.
61. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 56.
62. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 1–2.
63. A sentiment itself derived directly from the reformers' core commitment to righting the injustices plaguing Christendom and the Church. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 37.

64. Ibid., 31. See also Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 306–8.
65. France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom*, 23–63; Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 1–3; Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades*, London: Routledge, 2006, 298–300.
66. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 4–8.
67. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades*, 15.
68. Regarding "critical junctures" and "path dependent development" see Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1999, no. 2, 369–404; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002, 693–721.
69. Michel Villey, *La croisade: Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1942. The crusade was institutionalized at various sites, but the most concrete were canon law and theology. Regarding the former, see J.A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969 and Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*; regarding the latter, see Paul Alphandéry, *La Chrétienté et L'Idée de Croisade*, Paris: A. Michel, 1954–9.
70. Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," 31–50.
71. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 48–74, 99–143.
72. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, *1147–1254*. Boston: Brill, 2007, 4.
73. For a related argument see Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," 605–9.
74. Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 317–8; Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 75–98.
75. Given the focus of the existing constructivist literature on the crusades, the Appendix provides an account of these religious wars organized around the framework developed here.
76. Para-crusaders, or *milites ad terminum*, served for a fixed amount of time as an act of devotion. See Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 103.
77. Key contemporary secondary sources related to the Crusades to the Holy Land include Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*; Helen Nicholson, *The Crusades*, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004; Thomas F. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom*; Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*; Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
78. Christopher Tyerman, *God's War*, 660. The authoritative study of the Iberian Crusades in English is Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. See also Jean Flori, *La guerre saint*, 277–91. For a good overview of the evolution of the historiography of these crusades see Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 100–9.
79. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 21.
80. Tyerman, *God's War*, 655; Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 211.
81. See William Urban, *The Baltic Crusade*, 2nd edition, Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies Center, 1994; Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 2nd edition, London: Macmillan, 1997; Alan V. Murray (ed.), *Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier 1150–1500*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; Sven Ekdahl, "Crusades and Colonization in the Baltic," in Helen J. Nicholson (ed.), *Palgrave Advances in the Crusades*, Basingstoke, England:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; and Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades.*

82. See Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades* for a different historical schema.
83. Although scholars once overwhelmingly viewed this type of war as a distortion or perversion of the institution of the crusade, in recent years it has come to be seen instead as perfectly legitimate extension of that institution – little different, in fact, from its application in Iberia or the Baltic. See Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 115–21.
84. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 20.
85. Ibid., 22.
86. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 297–8.

**NOTES TO CHAPTER 5**

1. Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
2. Buzan and Little, 402.
3. This is an extension of a schema first introduced by Rodney Bruce Hall in his *National Collective Identity.*
4. In the same way that Elizabeth A.R. Brown's article "The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe" began to break down an ossified intellectual structure based on the myth of feudalism.
5. Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; and Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*, New York: Free Press, 2002.
6. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*: *An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
7. Justin Rosenberg, *Empire of Civil Society*: *A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London: Verso, 1994; Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*, New York: Verso, 2004.
8. Jeremy Larkins, *From Hierarchy to Anarchy: Territory and Politics Before Westphalia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
9. Ronald Diebert, *Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
10. Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
11. Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
12. John Watts, *The Making of Polities*: *Europe, 1300–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 77.
13. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II, vol. II* (trans. Siân Reynolds), New York: Harper & Row, 1973, as cited in Watts, *The Making of Polities, 39.*
14. See Quentin Skinner, "Surveying *The Foundations*: A retrospect and reassessment," in Annabel Brett and James Tully (eds.), *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 236–60. See also Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 11–70.

15. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*, 291. Nexon also lists Jonathan Fox and Schmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, New York: Palgrave, 2006; Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007; and Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

16. Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006; and David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

17. For an overview of this literature see Latham and Sethi, "The Transformation of War," in Craig Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 3rd edition, Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 2012, ch. 9.

18. Zygmunt Bauman, "Wars of the Globalisation Era," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2001, vol. 4, no., 1, 11–28; Ulrich Beck, "War is Peace: On Post-National War," *Security Dialogue*, 2005, vol. 36, no, 1, 5–26; Christopher Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, Cambridge: Polity, 2009; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*, New York: Routledge, 2009; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, London: Zed, 2001; Kal Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 2nd edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007; Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, Cambridge: Polity, 2004; and Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.

19. Mats Berdal, "How New are 'New Wars': Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil Wars, *Global Governance*, 2003, vol. 9, no. 4, 477–502; Sven Chojnacki, "Anything New or More of the Same? Wars and Military Interventions in the International System, 1946–2003," *Global Society*, 2006, vol. 20, no. 1, 25–46; Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001; Stathis Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? *World Politics*, 2001, vol. 54, no. 1, 99–118; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Siniša Malešević, "Sociology of New Wars?," *International Political Sociology*, 2008, no. 2, 97–112; Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed," *Security Dialogue*, 2004, vol. 35, no. 2, 173–89.

20. Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate," 179.

21. Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate."

22. Chojnacki, "Anything New or More of the Same," 25.

23. Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century*, 44–78.

24. Malešević, "Sociology of New Wars?"

25. Chojnacki, "Anything New or More of the Same?" 28.

26. Ibid.

27. Justin Rosenberg, "Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem," *International Politics*, 2005, vol. 42, no. 1, 4.

## NOTES TO THE APPENDIX

1. Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 2nd edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 112–36. For an alternative periodization see Helen Nicholson, *The Crusades*, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004, 1–20.

2. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 104.

3.  Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 124.
4.  More detailed summaries of the Second Crusade include Thomas F. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, 57–63; John France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000–1714*, New York: Routledge, 2005, 130–139; and Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 121–33.
5.  Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 137–82.
6.  Ibid., 107.
7.  More detailed summaries of the Third Crusade include Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, 65–98; and Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 137–45.
8.  Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 137.
9.  Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades*, London: Routledge, 2006, 152.
10. Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, 81.
11. Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 156.
12. Ibid., 158.
13. For summary accounts see Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 169–70 and Madden, *A Concise History of the Crusades*, 155–165.
14. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 183–214.
15. Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, 23.
16. France, *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom*, 29.
17. Christopher Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006, 658.
18. Norman Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006, 101.
19. While some, such as Riley-Smith, have questioned the claim that this was a *précroisade*, O'Callaghan makes a convincing case that it was. See O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 24–7.
20. Ibid., 27–9.
21. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 31.
22. Tyerman, *God's War*, 662.
23. Lawrence J. McCrank, *Medieval Frontier History in New Catalonia.* No. III, Aldershot: Variorum, 1996 as cited in O'Callghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 32.
24. Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 206, 307.
25. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 35–6.
26. Ibid., 36–8.
27. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 103.
28. Ibid., 102–3.
29. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 44–6.
30. Tyerman, *God's War*, 667.
31. This latter crusade was preceded by the promulgation of a Peace and Truce of God in order to ensure the internal tranquility necessary for a successful campaign against the Muslims. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 47.
32. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 105.
33. For a discussion of the military religious orders in Iberia, see O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*, 55–8 and Tyerman, *God's War*, 667–8.
34. Tyerman, *God's War*, 668; Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 105.
35. See Eric Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 2nd edition, London; Macmillan, 1997 for a different historical schema.

36. Giles Constable, *Crusaders and Crusading in the Twelfth Century*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008, 197–204.
37. For a translation of this Charter, see Ibid., 211–4.
38. Hans-Deitrich Kahl, "Crusade Eschatology as Seen by Saint Bernard in the Years 1146–1148," *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 35–48.Regarding the so-called Sybelline prophesies, see also Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades, 1147–1254*. Boston: Brill, 2007, 28.
39. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*.
40. Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 65.
41. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*.
42. Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades*, 65.
43. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*.
44. One year's remission of sin rather than the plenary indulgences granted by Eugenius in 1147 and typical of the crusades to the Holy Land. Probably in order to make crusades to the Holy Land more appealing, Alexander also offered none of the related privileges and protections. See Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 56–65.
45. William Urban, *The Baltic Crusade*, 2nd edition, Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies Center, 1994, 25–6.
46. Ibid., 27–8.
47. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 72.
48. Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 220.
49. See Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 183–6.
50. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 197–8.
51. Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades*, 193.
52. Housley, *Contesting the Crusades*, 115.
53. Other crusades against heretics include the so-called "Hussite Crusade," 1420–*c*. 1434 and the Waldensian crusade in the Dauphine, 1487–8. See, respectively, Lock, *Companion to the Crusades*, 201–2 and 204–5.
54. For an extended discussion of the nature of Catharism, see Malcom Barber, *The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages*, Harlow: Longman, 2000. For an alternative perspective, see Mark Gregory Pegg, *A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
55. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 167.

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